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screening function be discontinued. Amory did not act on the recommendation, and in July 1954 he named Roman V. Mrozinski as his representative to screen cables.

By January 1955 Mrozinski was convinced that the one-day-a-month screening of cables was serving no good purpose and that the DDI suspense procedure was not meeting the needs of the DDI. He discussed the matter with Butler, and then the two of them went to Amory to get the DDI's personal view on the problem. Amory pointed out that the suspense procedure was of little help to him; he was still attending DCI meetings at which was discussed cable information that had been made available to the DDP, the deputy DDP, and the DDP/COP but had not reached his, Amory's, desk because it had been delayed by the suspense procedure. He thought that the only solution was to provide the DDI himself with copies of all cables containing intelligence information immediately on receipt of the cables. He suggested that the suspense procedure might still be used for dissemination to DDI components -- primarily OCI -- and that the spot-check screening be continued. Butler agreed with

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Amory, but he pointed out that only the DCI had the authority to change the suspense procedure and that the initiative would have to come from Amory -- which it did; the procedure was soon altered, and the DDI was included in the initial distribution of cables that contained intelligence information.

The one-day-a-month DDI spot check continued, however, as did the application of the suspense system to DDI components. In February 1956 [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) replaced Mrozinski as the DDI spot-checker; in October 1957 [redacted] replaced [redacted] and in May 1958 [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) [redacted] replaced [redacted]. A year later, in May 1959, Amory decided that the spot check on the suspense items was no longer necessary. He so informed the DDP/COP; and on 14 May, Butler was informed that the spot-check screening was to be discontinued.

E. Vital Records and Emergency Planning

1. Vital Records

In July 1953 Reynolds arranged with [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) [redacted] chief of the Signal Center, for the Cable Secretariat vital records to be stored with those of the Signal Center at the Agency's emergency relocation site, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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In the event of an emergency that necessitated the evacuation of headquarters buildings, both the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat would relocate and resume their functions in the same building at the relocation site. At that time the only records considered vital in the processing of cables at the site were copies of the Secretariat's cable distribution guide and a set of standard operating procedures. On 3 July 1953 copies of these were deposited with the Signal Center for safekeeping. 82/

To provide break-out service for the DCI at the relocation site, however, it was necessary to find a way of duplicating the Secretariat's cryptonym and pseudonym card file, which by that time contained many thousands of identity cards. On 23 October 1953, Reynolds discussed this problem with [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) deputy chief of RID. [redacted] said that furnishing the Secretariat with duplicate cards was out of the question; it was all that his staff could do to keep the file updated with additions and deletions. He also said that the only practical way of duplicating the file was to microfilm it, as was done every three or four months for RID's file, and he offered

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to have his camera man film the Secretariat file. Reynolds accepted the offer, and the file was filmed during November. Five 100-foot reels were required, and these were deposited with the Signal Center on 3 December 1953, 83/ completing the vital records needed by the Secretariat for emergency processing of cables at the relocation site.

2. Emergency Planning

On 22 October 1953 Reynolds represented the Cable Secretary at a conference between Office of Communications and General Services representatives that was called for the purpose of establishing requirements for supplies and equipment in the event that it became necessary to evacuate headquarters and resume activities at the relocation site. For the purpose of a joint emergency plan it was agreed that Secretariat personnel would integrate their actions according to an existing Signal Center plan. Under this plan the Cable Secretary, Butler, and Deputy Cable Secretary, Greer, and the Executive Officer, Reynolds, would rely on the Chief of the Signal Center, [] to alert them to the existence of an emergency. Butler and Greer would move immediately to the relocation site when [] sounded the alert; [] was

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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designated group leader for the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat. Designated assistant group leader under [] Reynolds would alert certain personnel, (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) direct the securing of the Cable Secretariat work area, and collect all cables and file copies of cables processed the previous day and place the material in canvas pouches. After these tasks had been done, the designated "emergency force" would move to the site, carrying the pouches. All transportation to the site was to be by privately owned vehicles.

Reynolds and William B. Flickinger, Deputy Chief of the Signal Center, were assigned the task of drafting an ADCO memorandum to the commanding officer of the site, outlining the joint requirements of the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat for expendable and non-expendable supplies. McClelland, the ADCO, signed this memorandum on 20 November 1953 and forwarded it through General Services to [] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) commanding officer of the relocation site. The memorandum contained a requirement for a microfilm reader for the Secretariat's exclusive use in breaking out identities for the DCI. 84/

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F. Other Activities and Events

On 18 August 1953 Butler left Washington on military orders to attend the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During his absence Greer was designated Acting Cable Secretary. Butler was away for almost four months; he returned to Washington on 23 December 1953 and was then on leave until 4 January 1954.

In July 1952, when the chief of the Far East Division had released Greer for assignment as Deputy Cable Secretary, it had been with the understanding that the detail would be for one year, after which Greer would return to FE. As of mid-October 1953, Greer had been on loan to the Cable Secretariat for 15 months, and FE wanted him to return for an operational assignment. With Butler away it was not feasible for Greer to leave the Secretariat immediately, but in November he did begin to divide his working day between FE and the Secretariat. He spent the morning hours in the Secretariat drafting [redacted] version of Headquarters [redacted] "Basic (b)(3) NatSecAct Covert Cable Procedures," which he wanted to complete before returning to FE. In the afternoons he

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read files and reports in preparation for his new assignment. Greer completed the drafting of the (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] regulation in late December, and on 22 January 1954 he officially returned to FE Division. On 31 January 1954 Reynolds succeeded Greer as Deputy Cable Secretary, and on the same date [redacted] moved into the Executive Officer position.

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IV. The Cable Reduction Program

A. Studies, Proposals, and Experiments

1. The Inspector General Study

As noted earlier, although the DCI's notice requesting a 25-percent reduction in cable traffic was issued in April 1953, by the end of the year no real progress had been made. The Inspector General (IG), Lyman Kirkpatrick, described the situation succinctly in February 1954:

Since the promulgation of the DCI's Notice in April re cable traffic, there has been little substantive accomplishment in reducing cable traffic per se, nor has there been any discernable pattern amongst the relationships, either increase or decrease, of number of cables, total group-count of cables and number of dispatches. During the period concerned, the only discernable factor is that there appears to be a minor lessening of total volume of the three elements concerned, i.e., cables, group-counts and dispatches continue to fluctuate with no relationship. 85/

Earlier in 1954 Kirkpatrick had appointed a committee to study the problem and to come up with a staff study that would recommend solutions; the committee was composed of senior officers of the IG Staff, the

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DDA, the DDP, the Office of Communications (OC), and the Cable Secretariat. 86/ On 8 February Kirkpatrick called a meeting of the committee; the draft of the staff study was presented and discussed. 87/ Butler, the Secretariat representative at the meeting, said that he concurred generally with the findings and recommendations of the study but had some reservations. These he made specific in an 11 February memorandum to the IG. 88/ He said that he did not believe that further notice on the reduction of cables should be issued over the DCI's signature; rather, he suggested, "we implement specific plans by which we can comply with his 17 April 1953 directive. If all possible means result in failure, then it may be necessary to issue some new directive in the name of the Director."*

Apparently Kirkpatrick was convinced that to get the job done the authority of the Director was needed -- even though that authority had already been exercised; and on 19 February he sent to the Director

* Butler, a career military officer, was reluctant to violate a time-honored military command principle: a commanding officer does not repeat a written order; it is the responsibility of his staff to see that the order is carried out.

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the completed staff study under a memorandum that stated:

Inasmuch as the major volume of cable traffic emanates from the DD/P organization, it is planned, subject to your approval of this staff study, to furnish DD/P with various amounts of material gathered in the course of compiling these recommendations, such material perhaps being of additional value to him in trying to accomplish the desired reduction. 89/

No doubt this paragraph in the IG's cover memorandum was intended to make it clear to the Director that the DDP had been the major culprit in the failure to reduce cable traffic. The same point was made indirectly in the section of the staff study itself that established the facts bearing on the problem:

The reduction of cable traffic volume must be attacked on a three-fold basis: (a) the elimination of non-essential cable traffic and using the dispatch medium therefore; (b) practicing the greatest economy of words for those messages deemed essential for cable communications; (c) elimination to the greatest degree possible of "book" and "multiple addressee" cables, principally of the "info" variety.

The IG's staff study also informed the DCI that two additional studies of the problem were in progress -- one by OC designed to produce statistics on the originators of cable traffic, and one by the Management Improvement Staff (MIS) designed to evaluate the

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feasibility of using "pouchgrams" instead of cables.

The IG's study recommended that certain responsibilities be assigned to the DDP, the DDA, the AD/CO, and the Cable Secretariat and specified those responsibilities. The final recommendation was:

That within ninety days of the approval of this study that if there is not accomplished a sizeable reduction of cable traffic, that the DCI instruct the Cable Secretary to establish maximum quotas on a word-count basis for the various units of organization which will represent the required 25% reduction in traffic below the level of April 1953. The establishment of such maximum quotas will not preclude the right to exceed any given quota based on demonstrated operational necessity. [*]

The DCI approved the IG staff study recommendations on 1 March 1954, and the components charged with specific responsibilities began to go through the process of meeting them -- some assiduously and some *pro forma* -- with, as is noted later, dubious results.**

2. The Management Improvement Staff Study

Meanwhile, the MIS study of a possible pouchgram procedure referred to in the IG study was in

* This badly over-stated threat was never carried out, of course; the last sentence effectively pulled any teeth that the threat was intended to have.

** See below, p. 90.

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progress, and on 18 March 1954 it was officially presented to the Cable Secretariat. 90/

The study contained 11 closely packed pages of facts, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations; there were 22 attachments containing statistical data -- including that developed by the OC study mentioned in the IG's study, charts, diagrams, and dispatch forms used by other Government departments and agencies. In substance the study recommended that pouchgram procedures should be used only if all other efforts to reduce cable traffic failed. Butler discussed the study with Hulick, EO/DDP, and they agreed that they didn't like the negative approach of the MIS recommendation and that the pouchgram procedure should be given a trial run with two or three principle^{a/} overseas stations. The pouchgram they had in mind was "a form of communication written on a cable form, using cable language, coordinated, released, and distributed as a cable, but sent to the field by pouch." 91/ Butler designed a procedure for pouchgram processing, which Hulick and McClelland, the AD/CO, approved; and Hulick recommended that the stations be used in (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
the test run. After considerable discussion among

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the elements concerned, primarily the Secretariat and the DDP area divisions, the plan was completed; it was approved by McClelland on 31 August 1954. 92/

3. The DDP Study -- the "Fast Pouch"

In the meantime the DDP had developed a refinement on the pouchgram procedure. On 13 August 1954 the DCI, in a meeting with his deputies, again expressed his concern about the volume of cable traffic, requested remedial action, and approved the

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

for improved courier service to the major Agency stations in Western Europe. 93/

On 24 August the DDP sent to the DCI a staff-study memorandum that incorporated the Butler-Hulick plan and recommended:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. That the Chief, Registry be authorized to

will provide the Agency with Daily except Sunday and Monday pouches between Headquarters and

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

with next day delivery for a trial period of six months at a cost not to exceed \$1,938 per week based on CIA proportionate use of this service.

2. That the Chief of Registry, Cable Secretary and the Assistant Director of Communications arrange for the necessary implementing action in Headquarters and the field.

The DDP memorandum -- signed by Helms, the DDP/ COPS, for the DDP -- was concurred in by the DDA, White;

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the ADCO, McClelland; the Cable Secretary, Butler; and the DDCI, Cabell.

Before signing his approval, the DCI, Dulles, made an addition to the second recommendation: "and report to the DCI at the end of the six months' trial whether this system should be continued." Dulles approved the recommendations on 11 October 1954. 94/

Between that time and the end of January 1955

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
[redacted]
were worked out in detail, and personnel both at headquarters and the three overseas stations were thoroughly indoctrinated. The first westward fast-pouch courier flight was on 11 February 1955; the first eastward flight was on 15 February. 95/

From the beginning of the experiment the Cable Secretary furnished Hulick with a pouchgram weekly count, and the chief of RID furnished him with the weight of each pouch to and from the three overseas stations. On the basis of these data Hulick informed the area divisions and the three senior representatives overseas of their week-to-week performance in terms of percentages of routine cables diverted to pouch and the average pouch weights for the courier flights.

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At the end of the first two weeks of the experiment, Hulick advised the stations by pouchgram that "Results Fast Pouch Service to date disappointing in that we are not approaching maximum use this facility by diverting routine precedence cable traffic to Fast Pouch," and he asked all releasing officers to make a greater effort to increase diversion. 96/

On 1 April 1955 an additional courier flight each way was added, providing six trips each week instead of five, but by the end of the tenth week of the experiment the results were still disappointing.

After the twelfth week Helms sent to the chiefs of the area divisions and the senior representatives involved in the trial run a memorandum summarizing the results of the test up to that time and asked each of them for his views on whether or not the experiment should be continued. 97/

The responses were uniformly in favor of continuation, but some of them pointed out that there were problems -- for example, the distance of the

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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By the end of May there had been little improvement, but both the DDP and the Cable Secretary were optimistic about the future. Wisner, the DDP, sent to the Director a memorandum that said, in effect, that all concerned in the pouchgram project agreed that the experiment had proved to be successful and recommended that it be continued. 98/ Apparently the Director had been watching the weekly records maintained by Hulick, and he took no action on Wisner's recommendation. He had made a decision, however, and on 26 July, 24 weeks after the trial run had been started, cables went to [] and [] announcing discontinuance of the fast pouch service, effective 30 July. 99/

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On the following day, 27 July, discontinuance of the fast pouch service was announced by a Clandestine Services Notice, 100/ which reminded releasing officials that they should still use dispatches in preference to cables and deferred cables in preference to those of higher precedence.

The discontinuance of the fast pouch service appeared to be fully justified. Despite the great

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efforts of the DDP, the DDS,* and the Cable Secretariat, the volume of cable traffic had continued to rise. By July 1955, a year after the fast pouch service had been proposed and six months after it had been put into effect, cable volume had reached 16,000 a month -- a 25 percent increase over the July 1954 volume.** The fast pouch service was an experiment that failed, but the effort to reduce cable volume continued.

B. Pouching Cables to Information Addressees***

1. The Pouch Procedure (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

About five months before the Fast Pouch experiment had actually started, another cable-reduction

* The Deputy Director for Administration (DDA), had been re-designated the Deputy Director for Support (DDS) on 3 February 1955.

** The monthly cable volume continued to rise thereafter. For March 1956 it was 18,100; for March 1957 it was 18,300; and for March 1958 it was 19,100.

*** The undocumented statements in this section are based on the Cable Secretariat's monthly reports covering the period.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

device, the [] Pouch procedure, was initiated.

The IG's study of February 1954 had emphasized the need for eliminating to the greatest degree possible book and multiple addressee cables, particularly

"INFO" addressees. In his 11 February 1954 memorandum to the IG, Butler identified "INFO" addressees

as constituting about 40 percent of the total cable volume handled by the Signal Center, citing [] the chief of the Center, as the source of this estimate. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Butler said that [] "Basic Cable Policy," then in the process of formal coordination, contained a provision for pouching copies of cables to "INFO" addressees and that this category of cables offered the greatest potential for achieving a major reduction in cable volume. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The procedure for pouching copies of cables for information addressees was simple, and for cable originators it posed no burden other than that of making a decision that one or more of the information addressees of his cable should receive copies by pouch channels. Once he had made this decision, all labor involved in the preparation of the sterilized copies, the delivery of them to RI, the pouching

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to the field, and delivery to the addressee would be done for him by the Secretariat, RI, and the signal centers overseas. By this procedure multiple addressee cables would be prepared in the usual form, except for showing as additional information specifically which addressees would be furnished sterilized copies of the cable by pouch -- for example, [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

For each station indicated as a pouch addressee the Cable Secretariat would furnish to the Dispatch and Pouch Section of RI two copies of the cable, properly sterilized for pouching. This procedure was established to be effective 1 September 1954 by Clandestine Services Notice No. [redacted] and [redacted] Notice No. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] dated 12 August 1954, was to become effective on the same day. The notices established the indicator [redacted] to identify envelopes containing cables to information addressees; this was intended to facilitate the handling of the material in regular dispatch channels and to signify that upon receipt at its destination the envelope was to be delivered to the signal center for normal cable accounting and numbering and then was to be (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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delivered to the addressees.

This procedure provided originators with a relatively easy means of diverting a major portion of cable volume to pouch channels -- if they could make the decision to use it. For example, a 200-word multiple addressee cable to an action addressee and to three information addressees -- counted as four cables in the Signal Center -- generated 800 groups of cryptographic transmission. Simply by specifying VIA POUCH for information addressees, the originator could reduce Signal Center transmission by 600 words, 75 percent of the total. With the Secretariat furnishing RI with the sterilized copies for delivery to the addressee, it is hard to understand why the procedure never proved to be effective in reducing cable volume. During the first five months that the procedure was in effect -- from September 1954 through January 1955 -- the Cable Secretariat processed 60,500 cables, of which less than 150 were diverted to pouch by the procedure. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Revision of the Procedure

After the activation of the Fast Pouch procedure in March 1955, no one bothered to count the small number of cables diverted to pouch channels through

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use of the [] procedure. Meanwhile, cable (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
volume continued to rise for six consecutive months.
From 15,000 in March it had reached an all-time high
of 17,800 in August 1955; this was an increase of
63 percent, or 6,900 cables more than in August 1954.
The Cable Secretariat's monthly cable count was
derived from the simple method of recording the
number of DIR numbers and IN numbers used during
the month. Each number used was counted as one
cable regardless of the number of addressees; but
each addressee was counted as a transmission in the
Signal Center, and true cable volume was two or three
times the figures recorded in the Secretariat.

During the two weeks immediately following the
discontinuance of the Fast Pouch service, a count of
cables diverted to the [] pouch showed that (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
of 8,000 cables processed during those two weeks there
were but six cables pouched from headquarters and
three received by pouch from the field. Using the
[] procedure for lateral exchange, however, the (b)(1)
field had done considerably better; that count was (b)(3) NatSecAct
46 pouched cables for a total of 12,500 words. Butler
gave these figures to Hulick and recommended that the
[] procedure be discontinued. On 25 August 1955

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct~~SECRET~~

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Hulick sent Butler's figures to McClelland with a recommendation that existing procedures be revised to "permit the continuance of [] for lateral exchanges in the field and that it be discontinued for traffic to and from Headquarters." (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On 21 October 1955 McClelland concurred in this recommendation, and the revision of the procedure was accomplished by rescinding CSN [] outright and by modifying FN [] with notification to the field that the procedure would thereafter apply only when (b)(3) NatSecAct the information addressee was another field station, and that when DIR was an information addressee the cable would be sent to headquarters by electrical means.

3. The Education of Cable Writers

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

When McClelland approved the rescission of the [] procedure for headquarters, he said he believed that the procedure was workable but "the lack of continued re-education of cable writers had resulted in its gradual disuse to the point where it was no longer practical to continue it." 101/ His comment was brought to the attention of the Director of Training, Matthew Baird, and in the spring of 1956

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a course called "Cable Writing" was initiated as a joint venture of the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, and the DDP -- Dr. Hugh Cunningham, then chief of SE Division, was the DDP representative.

The Deputy Directors saw to it that everyone concerned with cables enrolled in the course. Classes were large; there were more than a hundred people in each running of the course. [] chief of the (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Signal Center, and members of his watch officer staff opened the course with a number of illustrations of how plain text was converted letter-by-letter into a cipher text, and examples were given showing how careless wording and the use of unauthorized abbreviations and contractions added unnecessary words to the cables. The course closed with Cunningham giving a discourse on the principles of clear and concise writing.

Assuming that the cable writing course would accomplish its purpose, Hulick, the EO/DDP, proposed in May 1956 that the [] procedure be reestablished for headquarters use. 102/ Butler agreed to try it (b)(1). again for three months, and the procedure was (b)(3) NatSecAct

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reinstated on 1 June 1956. 103/ The three-month test ran from 6 June through 4 September, and it proved conclusively that, despite the reeducation of the cable writers, the [] procedure was still an ineffective means of reducing cable traffic. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

During the test about 2 percent of 14,200 outgoing cables were diverted to pouch. Butler observed that, with few exceptions, 95 percent of the diverted cables were less than 60 words in length and that the savings to the Signal Center were very small in terms of group count. He told Hulick that he was content to let the procedure continue, as it was reducing at least that much of the Signal Center's encode-decode workload.* 104/

4. The Second Management Staff Study

The cable writing course provided by the Office of Training (OTR) with the support of the Signal Center

* The [] procedure continued, with little change in volume diverted, until 17 April 1970, when it was again rescinded for headquarters use for much the same reasons as before. At that time field stations were diverting a substantial volume of Intelligence Information cables -- average length about 500 to 600 words -- laterally to information addressees by the [] procedure. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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continued for the next few years, and OTR augmented the course by including cable writing instruction in other courses -- the Operations Support Course, the Operations Course, and the Operations Familiarization Course. In spite of this effort, however, in March 1958 new all-time highs were reached in both cable count (19,100 cables) and group count (about 7,500,000 words), and the Management Staff was again directed to study and find solutions to "Excessive-Unwarranted Cable Traffic." 105/

This Management Staff study was even more comprehensive than the one made on the pouchgram procedure in 1954. 106/ It contained more than 50 pages of facts, discussion, charts and graphs, and a single recommendation:

that there be established on the T/O of the Executive Officer[*] of the DCI, and physically located in the Office of the Cable Secretariat, a position to be known as the Cable Control Officer. This position should be established for a six-month trial period and it will be the duty of the individual assigned to:

* On 1 July 1957, Earman, the DCI's Executive Assistant, was redesignated the DCI's Executive Officer, with responsibility for coordination of the staff actions in CIA.

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(1) Examine daily, on a post-mortem basis, incoming and outgoing cables disseminated by the Cable Secretariat to determine the nature, extent, and frequency of infractions of existing cable regulations.

(2) Prepare more precise regulations regarding the use and preparation of cables where present regulations fail to provide clear, understandable prohibitions to the originating offices.

(3) Record and report to the Deputy Directors concerned all instances in which there are clear-cut violations of regulations covering the use and preparation of cables.

(4) Advise the Office of Training of those areas wherein it appears most profit could occur from training emphasis.

(5) Keep informed as to the trends in cable traffic through close liaison with the Signal Center, Office of Communications, and the Cable Secretariat in order to assist in the imposition of temporary restrictions wherever necessary.

Provision was made that the individual selected should be fully cleared and should be acceptable to the DDP, the DDS, and the DDI. The study was addressed to the DCI through the DDS and was sent forward to the DDS on 16 October 1958. The DDS indicated his concurrence in the recommendation on 22 November 1958 and nominated

-- by that time transferred from his position as chief of the Signal Center to the job of deputy chief of the Americas Division of OC -- for the position of cable control officer.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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Cabell also concurred and recommended that

be appointed. 107/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

In Butler's final discussion with members of the Management Staff before they issued the study, it was understood that they intended to suggest that he, Butler, wear the additional hat of cable control officer. He had made it clear that because the duties of the position duplicated so many of his own as Cable Secretary, he was doubtful that establishing another title or position was the best approach to the problem. He was certain that if the position were established, the DDP would consider that in order to be effective the person in the job would have to be an operations officer in the DDP chain of command. Butler told Earman that in spite of these misgivings he would go along with the proposal provided that the person was not located in his office and did not look to him for a major portion of his support. 108/

Kirkpatrick, the IG, commented on the study to the effect that it was doubtful that the establishment of the position of cable control officer would achieve a substantial reduction in cable traffic. He also

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said that without grave reservations he could not support the philosophy expressed in the study that "discipline, to be respected and most effective, should come from outside the organization being disciplined." He believed that the Deputy Directors had the authority to exercise what discipline was necessary and certainly were capable of doing so. The need was not for more policing but for a greater concentration on the elimination of unnecessary reporting by cable and in further improvement in pouch service. 109/

Amory, the DDI, saw no objection to establishing the new position on a temporary basis provided that it was clearly understood that the officer would have authority to act only in an advisory capacity after the actual release of cable traffic and would have no command or review authority before the release of cable traffic. 110/

Bissell,* the DDP, stated that

it seems to me that we do not need more regulations, nor more enforcers of regulations.

* Frank Wisner, the DDP, was succeeded by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., on 1 January 1959.

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I agree with Hugh Cunningham's opinion that the basic reason for excessive cable traffic is a lack of real interest in the subject all along the line.

He then quoted from Cunningham's note to him:

Anyone appointed to this job would have to be so senior and so experienced that he would surely be needed more elsewhere. He would have to swing a great deal of weight on strictly operational questions to be effective -- e.g. in attacking abuses of PP Staff's long guidance cables as too many addressees, he would have to know which stations are likely to use the guidance, and which customarily ignore it, and why.

To keep up a correspondence with the field on this subject (where the abuses are greatest) would require not one man but a staff, probably steadily increasing in accordance with Parkinson's Law. Even ignoring the field, this proposal means too much paper work -- a report on every infraction (and presumably a rebuttal and a counter-rebuttal, and meetings, etc.), a monthly report to the DCI (would he read it?, more reports to Deputies, Staff, and Division Chiefs, etc.)

Bissell said that he did not mean to recommend that we do nothing and that he understood that finding acceptable substitutes for cables was progressing on two fronts, teletape and better handling of regular dispatches, and he thought that priority attention should be given in that field. 111/ Apparently the DCI agreed with Kirkpatrick, Bissell, and others, for he did not approve the recommendation to establish the position of cable control officer. 112/

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C. Cable Regulations and Handbooks

In February 1954 the formal coordination of Greer's proposed [] "Basic Covert Cable Pro- (b)(3) NatSecAct cedures" -- he had finished it in September 1953 -- was returned to the Cable Secretariat for negotiation of the qualified concurrences of six offices, each of which wanted some major or minor change in the text. Because of the pressure on the Secretariat to produce a "how-to-do-it" handbook,* and because so much of the proposed regulation was handbook material, the Cable Secretary decided that the document should be separated into two publications -- a regulation containing only material that was regulatory in its scope, and a cable handbook containing all of the essential procedural material in Greer's draft.

Reynolds took on this task, working on the changes proposed by the six offices and on the division of material. The reorganization was completed in March; and after informal coordination with the offices concerned, the revised draft of the regulation was returned to the Regulations Control Staff for formal coordination.

* See above, pp. 48-49.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

In the revision of [] the subject was changed to "Basic Cable Policy," and the text was reduced to a half dozen pages of policy statements, largely those established in [] of (b)(3) NatSecAct October 1952. The revision was approved by White, the DDS, on 12 June and published on 25 June 1954. 113/

The proposed handbook was an unusual document.

[] chief of the Regulations Control (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Staff, agreed -- albeit reluctantly -- to permit the Cable Handbook, [] to be printed in color, (b)(3) NatSecAct an exception to the standard black-and-white printing of regulatory publications. Near the end of September the handbook, which was dated 25 June 1954, was distributed to offices throughout the Agency. It had a bright red, white, and blue cover, it was bound in spiral plastic, and certain pages contained graphic illustrations, made by the visual aids staff of the Office of Logistics, in three colors to emphasize the importance of the text.*

* See Figure 5, p. 106. Also see [] for a copy of the handbook.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~Figure 5


Excerpt from [REDACTED]

COMMUNICATIONS
25 June 1954

SECTION I

CABLE WRITING TECHNIQUES

1. Cultivating Techniques. - The ability to write a good cable, one which is clear, concise and accurate is not an inherent ability-- rather it is an ability cultivated through adherence to sound practices and through close attention to detail. In most instances, preparation of a cable in draft form and careful editing of the draft are essential if the cable is to be both clear and concise.



2. Cables vs Pouch. - When it has been determined that some form of communication must be sent to the field, the writer should consider whether a cable is the best form of communication to be used. He should consider whether the matter might not be handled satisfactorily by pouch,

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In October 1958 a revised edition of the cable handbook was published. The section on the Cable Secretariat had been expanded to include detailed descriptions of the processing of DDI suspense items. This was essentially the same procedure described in

TO DD/I, dated 2 July 1954, in which the suspense time allowed for area divisions to dispose of suspense cables had been reduced from six to three hours. In the 1958 edition the suspense time had again been reduced -- from three to two hours. Increased pressure to meet the two-hour limit was put upon area divisions by the following instructions for the Cable Secretary's disposal of DDI suspense items: (b)(3) NatSecAct

(1) File, on advice from the Deputy Director (Plans) (or his designee) that the cable *cannot* be released to DD/I.

(2) By direction of the Deputy Director (Plans) (or his designee), release to DD/I the cable as received or modified, as appropriate, to remove sensitive operational data and source.

(3) Failing receipt of advice or direction (as set forth in either subparagraphs (1) or (2) immediately above), release the cable or the modified version thereof, as appropriate, to DD/I upon expiration of the two-hour suspense.

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The Cable Secretary was never forced to exercise this new authority. To insure that the deadlines were met, Butler instructed his cable duty officers to monitor the times closely and to inform Hulick, the DDP Executive Officer, fifteen minutes before the expiration of suspense time. This procedure worked out very well; within a very few minutes after making such calls the items were promptly cleared for release, modification, or denial by the reports officer concerned, who either telephoned or came in person to the Cable Secretariat.

On 14 January 1956 the DCI had issued a memorandum for the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS on "Organization of the Clandestine Services," which rescinded Smith's 15 July 1952 memorandum on the same subject. In the January 1956 memorandum the DCI reaffirmed that "The Deputy Director (Plans) is the Director's Deputy and channel for the direction and control of CIA clandestine activities." It also reaffirmed the provision that "Release by, or with the authority of, DCI, DD/P, or the appropriate Chief of the Clandestine Services operating division is required for all outgoing overseas cables and dispatches."

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Exceptions to this requirement were cables bearing "Special Indicators," and these were to be issued solely by the DDP -- in appropriate situations at the request of other Deputy Directors -- in order to control the distribution and reduce the coordination of sensitive and specialized material. Such indicators would clearly designate the office or offices to which such material would be distributed and limited, including the Clandestine Services area division having responsibility for the station concerned. 114/

The 1958 edition of the cable handbook contained a listing of the "Special Indicators," which had been issued in February 1956 by the DDP to the DDI and the DDS and to their subordinate offices. These special indicators permitted certain exceptions to normal releasing channels at headquarters and indicated origination and release by other than a DDP component.* Use of the special indicators by field installations

* The conditions under which Agency components use special indicators have never been changed, but a number of additional offices have been assigned such indicators as they were established in the organization of the Agency -- for example, the DDR (later DDS&T) and its component offices. 115/

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did not imply release by other than the chief of station or base. The special indicators also served to reduce coordination on sensitive and special cables at the originating installations and assisted in the control of dissemination, at both the originating and addressee stations. 116/

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V. Development of the Teletype
Dissemination System

A. Cable Secretariat Support

1. Preliminary Dissemination

One of the major tasks of the Cable Secretariat was the processing of Preliminary Disseminations (PD's), a product of the reports officers in the DDP area divisions. The primary responsibility of these officers was the preparation of CIA Information Reports (IR's) for formal dissemination to the intelligence community. For the most part, the IR's were based on incoming cables, and after they were prepared by the reports officers, they were sent to the Reports Control Section of the FI Staff, which validated and logged them and then sent them on to the Printing Services Division (PSD) of the Office of Logistics (OL) for reproduction and delivery by courier mail to the members of the community -- a process that took at least three days and sometimes as many as six.

This time lapse between receipt of the cable and dissemination of the information contained in the cable

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was acceptable for routine information, but there was some information that required immediate dissemination. That was the function of the PD's.

The area division reports officers prepared PD's on a special form and sent them to the Secretariat, where they were processed as outgoing cables and passed on to the signal center for transmission to State, Army, Navy, Air, NSA, JCS, and SECDEF, and to OCI.

The Secretariat's processing of PD's was much more complicated than the standard processing of outgoing cables. After the Signal Center's transmission of the PD's, the original copy was returned to the Secretariat for retyping and distribution within the Agency. This involved the reproduction of copies, the assignment of distribution symbols for DDP components, the return to the originator for sterilization, and thereafter the reproduction and dissemination of the sterilized copies for non-DDP units.

In the summer of 1954 the Secretariat was processing an average of 300 PD's a month, and in September the Cable Secretary, Butler, decided to launch his

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own cable reduction program by simplifying the handling of PD's. He induced the FI Requirements Staff to change the one-ply PD form to a multiple-copy form similar to the Secretariat's outgoing cable form. This provided a Ditto master, which eliminated the retyping and proofing in the Secretariat, provided a transmission copy for the Signal Center, and made possible the Secretariat's distribution concurrently with Signal Center transmission. In October 1954, area division reports officers began preparing PD's on the standard outgoing cable forms -- it would take some time for the new PD forms to be printed, and the Secretariat was able to furnish Agency components with finished copies within an hour or so of the time of filing for transmission.

The speed-up in the processing of PD's soon led to an agreement that the Signal Center would transmit only PRIORITY PD's, and ROUTINE PD's would be processed for courier delivery -- an arrangement that reduced the Signal Center's workload by about 100,000 groups of electrical transmissions per month. 117/*

* The undocumented statements in this section are based on Cable Secretariat Monthly Reports covering this period.

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During October 1954 a total of 306 PD's were processed, and 275 of these were diverted to courier delivery. The volume of PD's continued to rise thereafter, and by June 1955 it reached more than 400 a month and a year later more than 500 a month. It was in June 1956 that there came a major change in the system of disseminating PD's to the intelligence community.

2. Teletype Dissemination

On 4 June 1956 the Preliminary Dissemination category of information reports was abolished and replaced by the Teletype Dissemination (TD). 118/ The members of the intelligence community were so informed in a classified telegram initiated by FI/RQM/RC:

TO : STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, SECDEF,
NSA, AEC, FBI

FROM : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OUT 52506 1340Z 4 JUNE 56 ROUTINE

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY THE PRELIMINARY DISSEMINATION (PD) TYPE OF CIA INFORMATION REPORT IS DISCONTINUED.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The job of the reproduction and distribution of a "sufficient number of copies to satisfy needs formerly met by the followup" fell to the Secretariat. Deliveries were made to the Departments of State and Defense by Secretariat couriers, and the Office of Central Reference was provided with enough copies of the TD's to complete the distribution, including that to US Government agencies that were recipients of CIA information reports on certain subjects but were not normally addressees -- for example, Treasury, Agriculture, and Immigration. The Secretariat soon found that the hectograph equipment used to reproduce copies of TD's was not capable of turning out enough clear copies to meet the need, so offset printing equipment was procured. The TD and cable forms were revised and printed on offset masters, and by the end of 1956 the offset system was firmly established.

In the meantime, however, the volume of TD's had risen to the point where the Secretariat had to have help. The volume in June 1956, when the TD replaced the PD, was 575; by October it had increased to more than 900 -- that was the time of the Hungarian and Mid-East crises. Early in November Butler asked Hulick,

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the EO/DDP, for more manpower 120/; Hulick recognized Butler's problem, set the administrative machinery in motion, and almost immediately the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS each assigned a man to TDY with the Cable Secretariat. The men were sorely needed, for during November the Cable Secretariat reproduced and disseminated [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] By the end of the first week in December the introduction of the offset printing system and the easing of the Hungarian and Mid-East crises reduced the workload somewhat, and the DDP and DDI men were released to their offices; the DDS man liked the work and was transferred to an available slot in the Cable Secretariat T/O.

A significant factor in the development of the Secretariat's capability to handle the TD reproduction and dissemination was the adoption of three employee suggestions. All three of the suggestions had been submitted during the period from March through

* See above, p. 34-39.

** See above, p. 64-70.

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August 1955, but the process of evaluating them for granting incentive awards took some time; and they were not worked into the Secretariat system until after June 1956 when the TD's replaced the PD's.

During the 1956 October-to-December crisis period, however, they were in effect, and in April 1957 an evaluation group composed of Butler; [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct chief of RQM/RC; and [redacted] chief of the (b)(6) Records Management Staff, summarized the tangible benefits of adoption of the suggestions:

Since adopting the new "TD" (Teletype Dissemination) System stimulated by these three employee suggestions, the reporting workload has been cut almost in half. (Tab G). A considerably curtailed teletype transmission, supplemented or supplanted by a single, more extensive (dittoed originally, now multilithed) hard copy dissemination by Cable Secretariat, now suffices to get this "Hot" information reported to the policy making and all other working levels of the intelligence community in a timely manner. Unnecessary and duplicate handling, readings, extractions, filings and references are eliminated. Backlogs of routine CS reports have been reduced and better quality finished intelligence reports are now being written with corresponding improvements in customer services. Reports Officers now have more time to devote to such essentials and sometimes previously neglected Intelligence Officer functions as: developing requirements, directing field collection efforts, and providing guidance to field personnel in producing more pertinent, accurate and complete reports.

Incentive awards totaling \$8,500 were granted to

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the four people who made the three suggestions -- two people submitted one of them jointly. The DCI presented the awards checks to [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

B. Improving the System

1. Expanding the Courier Service

Although the diversion of the dissemination of routine TD's from electrical transmission to courier delivery achieved a major reduction in the workload of the Signal Center, priority TD's still had to be teletyped to the members of the intelligence community. There were four courier deliveries to State and the Pentagon each day, but priority TD's required faster service. As the total volume of TD's increased steadily, so did the Signal Center's workload; and on 4 June 1958, two years after the initiation of the TD system, the courier deliveries were increased to nine each day -- one each hour beginning at 0800. 121/ This made it possible to divert the day-time priority TD's to the courier system and thus relieve the Signal Center of all TD transmissions during the day.

In July 1958 the Iraq and Lebanon crises, coming almost simultaneously, generated a sharp rise in both

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cable and TD traffic; and to relieve the Signal Center of the burden of night transmission of TD's, the courier service was expanded to provide night delivery on an every-two-hour schedule. Thereafter only the most urgent TD's were transmitted -- and there were very few of them. The result was that in July 1958, 91.5 percent of a total of [] TD's were delivered by courier; in August it was 98 percent of [] and in October it reached 99.07 percent of [] (b)(3) NatSecAct

In terms of workload savings to the Signal Center, the June 1956 diversion of routine TD's to courier delivery saved the Center about 16 hours a day of cryptographic transmission 122/; the expansion of the courier service in June and July 1958 reduced the Center's group count from [] words to [] (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Standardizing Distribution

From the beginning of the TD system, distribution was a joint responsibility of the OCR* Documents Division (OCR/DD) and the Cable Secretariat. The Secretariat furnished OCR/DD with 25 sterilized copies

* On 12 August 1955 the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) was re-designated the Office of Central Reference (OCR). 123/

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of each TD, and OCR/DD distributed them among the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), the Office of National Estimates (ONE), the Contacts Division and the Soviet Materials Staff of the Office of Operations (OO/C and OO/SOVMAT), the Office of Training (OTR), the US Information Agency (USIA), and other CIA and non-CIA addressees indicated by the originator of each TD. The Secretariat distributed TD's within the Agency to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDI, the DDI Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the DDP, and the . staffs and divisions within the DDP complex; it also distributed to State, Defense,* and NSA.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

On 18 August 1958 [redacted] chief of OCR/DD, sent to the Cable Secretary a memorandum in which he recommended that the Secretariat take over OCR/DD's TD distribution function. He pointed out that the OCR/DD distribution was routine, governed by a standing list of addressees and other addressees listed by the originator of each TD. To save time and duplication of effort, he said, "it is requested

* Actually, distribution was made only to Army Staff Communications, which reproduced the TD's and sent copies to ACSI, Navy, Air, the JCS, and SECDEF.

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that your office accomplish the standard distribution and distribution to the addressees indicated at the bottom of each report which is presently done by this Division." 124/ On 19 August Frank Reynolds, Butler's deputy, sent [] memorandum along to

[] chief of FI/RQM, with the notation that the Secretariat would be happy to go along with the request if [] approved and would authorize certain procedural changes in the preparation of TD's. 125/ The changes would require reports officers to indicate on the transmittal page of the TD form a standard DDP dissemination and on the TD itself the pre-determined non-DDP distribution. These changes would eliminate a large part of the Secretariat's processing chores.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

About two months later -- on 20 October -- [] responded with a memorandum in which he said that he "fully agreed with the delegation of certain OCR responsibilities for distribution of TD reports to the Cable Secretary" as proposed by [] 126/ To the memorandum he attached a copy of FI/RQM/RC Memorandum No. 555, addressed to Area Division Chief Reports Officers and authorizing the changes

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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suggested by the Secretariat. The effective date was to be 21 October 1958. On 21 October Butler informed [] that the Secretariat would assume responsibility for the total distribution of TD's. 127/ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

By December 1958 the Secretariat had proved that it could handle the job. In a 15 December memorandum to Earman, the EO/DCI, the chief of FI/RQM, [] commended the Cable Secretary and his staff for their successful efforts in speeding the delivery of CS information reports to the intelligence community. [] said that since 21 October the Secretariat had relieved OCR of almost all responsibility for the distribution of [] reports and at the same time had cut the processing time in half. The memorandum went on to say: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct

This example is, however, only one in a long series in which Cable Secretariat personnel have contributed very materially to the improvement of the Washington distribution system. We are constantly impressed by their dedication to duty and the imagination and initiative they have applied to problems which very directly affect the usefulness of CS intelligence information. 128/

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~~SECRET~~VI. Management Staff Studies, 1955 - 1958A. Table of Organization, May 1955

The steady increase in cable traffic throughout the 1955-1958 period, the introduction of the Fast Pouch procedure in February 1955, the growth of the Preliminary Dissemination problem in 1955 and early 1956, and the establishment of the Teletype Dissemination system in June 1956 were bound to have a major impact on the Secretariat's manpower resources and to raise questions about the efficiency of the Secretariat's operations. The result was that five Management Staff studies of Secretariat activities were done during the period from May 1955 through February 1958.*

The first study during the period was conducted in April and May 1955 in response to the Cable Secretary's 9 March request for an increase in his T/O. 129/

* The March 1958 study of "Excessive, Unwarranted Cable Traffic," discussed in some detail earlier, was not primarily a study of Cable Secretariat activities. See p. 98, ff.

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Butler asked for GS-09 cable analyst (b)(3) CIAAct supervisors, GS-05 clerk typist supervisors, GS-04 clerk typists, and one GS-04 courier. To support his request, Butler cited a ten-percent increase in cable volume, the heavy workload involved in sterilizing cables for the fast-pouch trial run, and the growth in the volume of PD's. His request stated that

A sincere and conscientious effort has been made to cover the positions involved by diverting personnel from other activities. It has been determined that such diversion is no longer feasible. 130/

The Management Staff study was completed late in April 1955, and on 12 May Butler was informed that the chief of the staff, John O'Gara, had approved the T/O increase and had forwarded his recommendation through concurrence channels to the DDS, White. 131/ After concurrence by Earman, the EO/DCI, the Budget Division, and the Director of Personnel, White gave his approval on 23 May. 132/

Because of the complications of the three-shift, seven-day work week of the Secretariat, the Management Staff examiners had taken a close look at absenteeism and unnecessary routines that might develop from

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improper distribution and work flow. They found that absenteeism was not excessive and that there were no questionable routines; among the conclusions of the study was the statement that

. . . discussion with the Cable Secretary gave every indication of prudent administration and an intelligent appreciation of recognized management practices acquired through past experience. 133/

The increase of [] positions gave the Secretariat a T/O of [] positions; but in August 1955, before the new positions were filled, an Agency-wide limit on personnel ceilings reduced the T/O to [] positions. 134/ (b)(3) CIAAct

B. Proposed Merger with the Signal Center, October 1955

In September 1955 the DDS requested the chief of the Management Staff to make a study of the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center to determine the feasibility of merging them. Butler was sent a copy of the DDS memorandum requesting the study, and he immediately informed O'Gara that he would cooperate fully. Along with his offer of cooperation, however, went Butler's statement of his personal views on the proposed merger.

He believed that the Secretariat was properly placed organizationally and that to merge its

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administrative functions with "the very important -- but totally unrelated -- technical function of the Signal Center . . . would be a step backward." He said that transfer of the Secretariat out of the Office of the Director would deny the Director and his Deputies the clear-cut and direct command channels that existed. In conclusion he said:

I believe that the office of the Cable Secretariat must remain a part of the Director's Office. It could not, in my opinion, function as efficiently as a part of any office other than that of the Director. 135/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[] of the Management Staff did the feasibility study on the proposed merger, and near the end of October he told Butler that he hoped to finish by 7 November. Butler heard no more from

[] thereafter, but on 16 November Howard J. Osborn of the IG Staff visited Butler in connection with an IG study of the Office of Communications. They discussed Secretariat-Signal Center relationships and functions, and Butler told Osborn about his many discussions with [] -- including the last one in which the 7 November completion date had been established.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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~~SECRET~~(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Butler heard no more from [] and heard nothing more about the Management Staff study. On 11 January 1956, however, Osborn's IG study of Communications was issued, 136/ and Butler learned that the IG study had included consideration of the Management Staff study and contained a statement to the effect that although the results of the Management Staff study had not been approved, it was understood that there would be a Management Staff recommendation that the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center be merged. The IG report went on to say that such a merger would be organizationally logical but it should be implemented in slow stages -- to permit the "already overloaded Signal Center Staff" to adjust to the consolidation. The IG study then recommended that

The DCI approve the consolidation of the Signal Center and the Agency Cable Secretariat/Message Center but that such consolidation, if approved by the DCI, be implemented gradually in such a manner that it will not impose an undue burden on the Chief and the Deputy Chief, Signal Center.

On 17 February 1956 the Director of Communications, McClelland, indicated his non-concurrence in the IG recommendation: "Do not concur at this time. The OC views have been passed to the Chief Management Staff

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in connection with the study made by his office." 137/

The D/OC's non-concurrence effectively killed the merger proposal, and the Cable Secretariat continued as a component of the Office of the Director.*

C. The Second Table of Organization Study, April 1957

Although [] positions had been added to the T/O (b)(3) CIAAct of the Cable Secretariat in August 1955, manpower continued to be a pressing problem; and in November 1956 the DDS requested a second Management Staff study of the personnel requirements of the Secretariat. The study actually did not begin until 22 April 1957. O'Gara, chief of the Management Staff, then assigned [] to the job. [] finished the (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) fact-finding phase in May, but it was not until 12 August that the study in final form was submitted to Earman, the EO/DCI. 139/

The study made three recommendations; the Management Staff believed that if these recommendations were approved and implemented, man-hour productivity could be increased and there would be no need for

* On 1 February 1972, however, the Cable Secretariat was transferred from the Office of the Director to the Office of Communications. 138/

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increasing the T/O of the Secretariat. Butler and his staff considered the recommendations and decided that although none of them seemed likely to provide a significant increase in productivity, collectively they might diminish some of the manpower problems; so these recommendations were adopted:

- (1) Convert the two rotating shifts, the Day Shift and the Evening Shift, to straight shifts.
- (2) Establish a procedure for the periodic submission of individual production reports.
- (3) Meet increased work demands of a temporary nature, resulting from periods of international unrest, by activating "Situation Emergency."

The "Situation Emergency" plan was spelled out in the report. Generally it provided for the shifting of Secretariat personnel from routine jobs to activities affected by the emergency, the temporary use of cleared new employees from the Interim Assignment Section of O/Pers, the TDY assignment of people from other Agency components, and a sort of do-it-yourself system in cable distribution to the DDP components. In addition to the three recommendations, the Management Staff report contained a number of suggestions about minor changes in reporting and administrative procedures, most of which the Secretariat accepted.

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D. The Scheduled Overtime Study, July 1957

When the report of the second Management Staff study of the Secretariat's T/O was submitted on 12 August, the covering memorandum, signed by O'Gara, stated that

During the course of the study, it was observed that the Cable Secretariat staffs its week-end shifts on an overtime basis. In order to determine whether this method of staffing represents the most efficient utilization of personnel and an economical expenditure of funds, the Cable Secretary in the interest of good management, has invited the Management Staff to review with him the problem of staffing over week-ends. This problem will be subject of a separate study. 140/

The "separate study" was actually begun before the other study was submitted. In July 1957 [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[redacted] returned to the Secretariat to try to determine the answer to the question "Does the Cable Secretariat policy of scheduling overtime represent the most economical approach to meeting its present week-end staffing requirements?" The search for the answer was based on one assumption: "The elimination of scheduled overtime must result in a monetary savings" -- an assumption that appeared to be the answer to the question.

One must wonder whether or not O'Gara was technically correct when he said that the Cable

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Secretary had "invited" the Management Staff to make a study of the overtime problem. Butler had been struggling with the same question since he became Cable Secretary in 1952, and he had concluded that the answer to the question was "yes" and that the assumption was false. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Several times over the years between 1952 and 1957 Butler and his staff had studied the alternative to scheduled overtime -- the establishment of a staggered work-week, which would require the addition of a fourth shift to be manned by eight or ten additional employees. The mathematics of the studies always led to the same conclusion: the cost of the overtime was much less than the cost of the fourth platoon. The word "overtime," however, was a bad one in the Agency's management lexicon, so Butler did not object to the Management Staff having a try at the problem.

If he had -- and if his objection had been supported in high places -- he might have saved the Management Staff a lot of time and manpower. The study went on and was completed and submitted to the EO/DCI on 23 October 1957. 141/

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It was a very thorough study; the mathematical analysis was impeccable, and it inexorably led to the conclusion that the cost of the scheduled overtime was \$8,099.85 less than the cost of any alternative device. The single recommendation in the report of the study was that the Cable Secretariat continue the use of scheduled overtime. On 26 October Earman, the EO/DCI, approved the recommendation. 142/

E. Cable Secretariat-Signal Center Operations,
February 1958

Although the proposal to combine the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center had been laid to rest in October 1955,* apparently the DDS was not fully convinced that managerial effectiveness was best served by having two components in different directorates doing the same kind of work -- handling cable traffic.

In October 1957 he requested the Management Staff to examine Cable Secretariat and Signal Center operations and come up with the answer to a complex question:

Can any combination of functions, tasks, procedures or activities bring about a saving in

* See above, p. 128.

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manpower, and are certain refinements now carried on for the Office of the Director necessary? 143/

O'Gara assigned the study to [] a (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

senior examiner on his staff. During the latter part of October and all of November [] virtually lived in the Secretariat and the Signal Center and observed and recorded the details of all of the procedures in both units. Then he devised a series of step-by-step flow charts covering the procedures, carefully coordinating everything with the chiefs and deputy chiefs of both components. He completed his report in January 1958, and on 7 February O'Gara submitted the report to White, the DDS, who approved it on 11 February.

The report described the investigative methods used, included the series of flow charts illustrating processing activities, and reached five specific conclusions -- all of which led to two recommendations:

- a. That the distribution of functions and activities of the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat remain as they are.
- b. That the question concerning procedural duplication between these components and the question concerning unnecessary refinements in Cable Secretariat service to the DCI be dismissed as being more seeming than real.

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~~SECRET~~F. Conclusions

Perhaps it should be noted at this point that of the five Management Staff studies of Cable Secretariat operations during the 1955-1958 period only one was positively productive -- the first one, which recommended a [] increase in the Secretariat's T/O. (b)(3) CIAAct

The October 1955 study of the feasibility of combining the Secretariat and the Signal Center came up with definitely negative recommendations, as did the July 1957 study of overtime practices and the February 1958 study of possible duplication in Cable Secretariat and Signal Center procedures. The April 1957 study of the Secretariat's manpower problem, although it recommended some minor administrative changes, produced nothing of real value.

One must conclude that Butler had studied his own problems thoroughly and had put his own house in order. There was ample justification for the O'Gara comment in his 12 August 1957 memorandum to Earman:

We are pleased to report that in the conduct of this study, the Executive Assistant [] (b)(3) CIAAct
[] observed many management practices (b)(6)
which were evidences of efficient and progressive executive performance on the part of the Cable Secretary.

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~~SECRET~~VII. New Technology in Cable Processing, 1957 - 1960A. Early Developments

Needless to say, both the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center were constantly aware of the possibilities of applying technological advances to all phases of cable processing. As noted earlier, for example, with the sophistication of the teletype capability, the Signal Center had converted the Preliminary Dissemination system to Teletype Dissemination; and with the development of new applications of the basic offset printing process, the Secretariat had adopted offset for the reproduction of copies of incoming cables. During the 1957-1960 period this adaption of technological developments to cable processing became one of the major concerns of all Agency components involved in communications.

Some of the early adaptations of technology tended to create as well as solve problems. For example, in 1956 and 1957 the Signal Center converted the high-volume overseas signal centers from manual cipher to machine cipher, a change that greatly increased the

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transmission capability of the system. The effect on the Cable Secretariat, however, was quite different. Under the manual system the Signal Center had provided the Secretariat with offset multilith masters for incoming cables, and the Secretariat simply used the masters to reproduce distribution copies; under the machine cipher system the Secretariat got raw teletype copies of the machine-deciphered cables, and these had to be edited and retyped on offset masters before distribution copies could be prepared -- a considerable addition to the Secretariat's workload.

While the Secretariat was still developing ways to absorb this additional burden, the DDP records integration system was undergoing technological changes; and in the fall of 1957 Walter Jessel, the assistant Executive Officer of the DDP, asked the Secretariat to provide DDP cable originators and action units with a special records integration (RI) copy of each cable -- both outgoing and incoming -- in addition to the standard distribution. This the Secretariat did. The RI copies made a significant improvement in the indexing of cables, but it also put another burden on the Secretariat.

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Not only did some of the applications of technology -- like the Signal Center's machine cipher system and RI's indexing system -- create peripheral problems, but also some of the attempts to apply technology were fruitless. As early as October 1954 Frank Reynolds, then the deputy Cable Secretary, had suggested that the Secretariat's typing, proofreading, and duplication chores might be drastically reduced by the adoption of flexowriters. In January 1955 the Office of Communications rejected the proposal as being impractical. Reynolds did not give up the idea, however, and in September 1955 he visited the cable processing center at the Department of State and learned that the use of flexowriters was -- contrary to OC's judgment -- quite practical. State had developed a method whereby reproducible masters could be derived semi-automatically through the use of teletype tapes and Friden flexowriters. This had required some changes in cable format -- changes related to the transmission of digits and unusual words -- but it had worked.

Reynolds discussed the new technique with Butler, and Butler agreed that it was worth a try.

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On 23 September 1955 Butler proposed to the Director of Communications that he reconsider Reynolds' October 1954 suggestion and give the flexowriter system a trial run -- adding that if the trial was successful the Secretariat's typing staff could be reduced by one-half to two-thirds, which would mean a saving of as much as \$50,000 a year. 144/ On 4 October McClelland replied that he was agreeable to "modifying current message preparation procedures on a trial basis," 145/ and he directed his staff to make the necessary changes for a one-week test with the [] station. He (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct stipulated that at the conclusion of the test an evaluation would be made from a communications standpoint to determine whether or not the adoption of the procedure would result in a net saving to the Agency.

The test was conducted during the week of 14 November 1955. The Secretariat had borrowed two flexowriters for the occasion; the machines were not expressly designed to use teletype tape, but they served the purpose. The Signal Center furnished the Secretariat with [] tapes of cables from [] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct during the week, [] of them were processed through the flexowriter, and the average time required for the preparation of masters was reduced from 12 minutes

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per cable to 6 minutes, a clear indication that the test had been successful -- as far as the Secretariat was concerned.

As far as the Signal Center was concerned, however, the trial run was a near disaster. [] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[] transmissions were routed through the Army's radio-teletype network, and they reached the Signal Center in badly garbled condition; the Signal Center staff did its best to unscramble the garbles -- a time-consuming task -- but even then only [] of the (b)(3) NatSecAct
[] tapes could be processed through the flexowriters in the Secretariat. On balance, the test run was a failure; it proved that the teletype tape-flexowriter could be effective only with accurate, ungarbled transmission of cipher text from the field to headquarters. The project was abandoned.

A year later, in November 1956, a second flexowriter experiment was launched -- this one in a sort of reverse direction. Reynolds and Jessel, both advocates of the use of the flexowriter, proposed that Priority TD's and dispatches be originated on the flexowriter. The theory was that the clear-text tape generated could be used by both the Signal

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Center and RI. The proposal was accepted on a trial basis, but the Signal Center soon found that the tapes generated varied in format and were not accurate enough to meet the Center's rigid standards; that project, too, was abandoned.

B. The Experiment

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Although the two flexowriter experiments had proved to be failures, Walter Jessel was still convinced that the machine could be useful in improving the Agency's communications system. In February 1959 he completed a paper, "Proposal for the Rapid Transmittal of Information Reports and Customer Reactions," and circulated copies among the Agency offices concerned with communications. The paper came to the attention of the DCI, who decided that it warranted serious consideration and assigned the job to a planning group that had been appointed late in 1958.

The group, given the somewhat grandiose official title of "The Agency Planning Group for Mechanically Integrated Reporting and Communications System," was composed of 22 men. James Reber of the DDP was chairman; there were four other DDP members, including Jessel; Butler and Reynolds represented the Secretariat;

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and there were four DDI members, ten members from DDS components, and one representative from what was then the office of the Deputy Director for Coordination. 146/

The group met on 19 February 1959 to discuss the Jessel paper. What Jessel proposed was, in brief, the establishment of a pilot model for a new field reporting system in which information reports would be originated in TD format using a flexowriter; the by-product tape would then be mechanically encrypted and pouched to headquarters, where it would be mechanically decrypted and turned over to the Cable Secretariat for processing on a flexowriter that was a twin to the one used in the field to originate the (b)(1) report. Jessel proposed that the [] station be (b)(3) NatSecAct used for the pilot project and that the experiment get under way as soon as possible -- he said that he was prepared to go to [] immediately to set (b)(1) the procedure so that the test could be in progress (b)(3) NatSecAct while the planning group was considering the other aspects of his proposal. The other aspects were those concerned with the various uses that headquarters components could make of the decrypted flexowriter tape after it arrived in the Secretariat.

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The planning group discussed the proposal at great length, each member raising questions about the impact of the system on his own particular component. At the end of the discussion it was agreed that the [] pilot project be initiated as Jessel had (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct proposed, and Reber instructed the group's secretary, [] of the Office of the DDS, to draft a (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) memorandum recommending to the Deputy Directors that the pilot project be approved. 147/ The Deputy Directors approved the recommendation, Jessel went to [] and the [] project began on 25 March (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 1959. 148/

During the first six weeks of the trial run, only about 40 reports were transmitted from [] by t (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [] system, all of them dispatches. The Secretariat processed these on a borrowed flexowriter, and the system worked. Jessel's original proposal provided for the Secretariat to process the tapes until the system became fully operational, after which the processing would be handled either by RID or the DDP operating divisions. By the end of June a total of [] had been sent from [] The (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct average transmission time, from typing [] to the automatic retyping in the Secretariat, was 4.9 days;

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and the total time elapse between origination in Munich and receipt at the desk of the DDI analyst was 7.2 days -- a vast improvement over the 54 days formerly required by the traditional pouch and manual reproduction and dissemination procedures.*

In July the chairman of the planning group, Reber, sent to the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS a memorandum advising them that the preliminary trial run had shown that

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

It is clear from the results of the [] test the [] system is feasible. From a technical point of view, the system works well and can be made to work even better. The results we hoped for can be attained or clearly could be attained. 149/

Reber said that the planning group recommended that the [] test link be continued and that additional

links be established at []

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The Deputy Directors promptly approved the recommen-

dation, 150/ and the expansion of the [] system

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

went forward. The Cable Secretariat continued to

process the tapes until February 1960, and then the

* The 54-day figure was given in Jessel's February 1959 [] proposal.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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responsibility was transferred to EE, WE, and FE divisions of the DDP. Since that time the system has continued as the major means of transmitting dispatch material.

C. Automated Cryptographic Transmission

Meanwhile, Reber's planning group had been working on another phase of technological development in communications. As noted earlier, an attempt to adapt the flexowriter technique to the reproduction and dissemination of mechanically decrypted cables had been a failure because of imperfections in the electrical transmission of mechanically encrypted cables. In December 1958 McClelland and his staff submitted to the newly formed planning group a comprehensive description of the Agency's communications system, including recommendations for improvement. 151/

The major recommendation was for a program that would completely automate the cryptographic process. The program called for improved circuits and new equipment that would permit transmission of encoded cables at the rate of 100 words a minute, automatic decrypting without garbles, and production of a

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clear-text teletype tape that would serve as a master for reproduction of distribution copies. Such a system would relieve the Signal Center of the garble problem and the Secretariat of the reproduction problem.

The planning group recommended approval of the proposal, the DCI approved, the equipment was procured, and the program began to develop. The first new circuits to use the new equipment operated at only 60 words a minute -- neither the foreign telephone company relays nor the M-19 teletypes then in use could cope with the 100-word speed. By the end of 1960, however, the newer high-speed M-28 teletypes had been installed and the foreign relay capability had been improved; the system was operating at the 100-word-per-minute rate; 152/ and the cable processing in both the Signal Center and the Secretariat had been vastly simplified.

D. Improvement of TD Processing

In January 1958 the Cable Secretary had introduced a refinement in TD processing that later dovetailed neatly with the fully automated transmission of encrypted cables. Butler's new procedure was

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relatively simple. By making some changes in the format of cables at the point of origin, the Cable Secretariat could provide the action unit with a teletype master in TD form, the area division reports officers could simply add the TDCS numbers and the distribution information and return the master to the Secretariat, and the Secretariat could then use the master for the reproduction and dissemination of TD's. This procedure would virtually eliminate the typing of TD's by reports officers and would simplify TD dissemination. 153/

Butler's proposal was approved, and on 10 March 1959 Helms, the DDP/COP, sent instructions to the field by book dispatch. 154/ The new system began early in April, and by the end of the month Helms sent another book dispatch to the field:

The new system for preparing and handling intelligence reports can already be set down as a definite success in most areas, even though the system is only a few weeks old. Cabled reports are, more and more, being disseminated exactly as you have written them. 155/

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VIII. Changes in Procedures and Organization,
1959 - 1965

A. The Intelligence Watch*

In February 1959 the Chief of the DDP Foreign Intelligence (FI) Staff proposed to the DDP/COP that a team of intelligence watch officers be organized to provide immediate processing and dissemination of the most urgent intelligence information cables -- at first during non-duty hours only and possibly, after a trial run, on a round-the-clock schedule. The purpose of the group would not be to duplicate the function of the regular cable duty officers but rather to provide the DDP area divisions and staffs with instant information.

The group would be composed of a chief, an administrative assistant, and six watch officers. It would be called the Intelligence Watch Officer Group (IWOG - later shortened to IW), and it would

* The development of the Intelligence Watch is discussed in detail in *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring, 1970, p. 37, "Rapid Transit in Clandestine Intelligence." Much of the information in this section is based on that article.

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handle cables bearing IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY precedences and, when time permitted, selected ROUTINE cables. It would be a component of the FI Staff, but it would serve the entire DDP. Physically it was to be located as close as possible to the Cable Secretariat.

The DDP approved the proposal, and by mid-1959 Kenneth Greer had been appointed chief of the group. Greer, who had served as deputy Cable Secretary from August 1952 to January 1954, had just returned from an assignment overseas at an FE Division post. Greer, his group, and the function of the group were welcomed by the Cable Secretariat, and after some complicated space manipulation on the top floor of Wing Two of L Building, space was arranged for them adjacent to, and with immediate access to, the Secretariat quarters.

All of this took time, of course, and it was not until midnight on 5 February 1960 that the IW actually began operations. The procedure was the immediate release of intelligence information cables to the action unit and the simultaneous release of TD's to information addressees. From the outset, the IW used the device -- suggested by Butler -- of

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eliminating the distribution to information recipients of cables that had been released as TD's. This practice avoided duplicate receipt of cable information by many recipients, and it also relieved the Cable Secretariat of a part of its responsibility for TD handling. The IW used new transmittal forms that notified TD recipients that there would be no additional cable distribution to them and notified action units if TD's were being suspended pending release by the action unit. The entire IW operation worked smoothly and integrated perfectly with Cable Secretariat procedures.

During March 1960, the IW processed intelligence information cables during non-duty hours, and of them were released as (b)(3) NatSecAct TD's. By May the IW non-duty hour operation had demonstrated that IW-released TD's could be processed for intelligence community distribution more rapidly than those referred to the operating divisions for release approval, and the IW function was extended to a 24-hour schedule.

In effect, the IW operation not only provided the DDP components with instant information --

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the original purpose -- but also it achieved a major improvement in the processing of TD's for distribution both inside the Agency and to the non-Agency members of the community. By the end of 1960, TD's* were being disseminated to the community within a few hours after receipt at headquarters. During the first half of 1960 the average TD dissemination was about [] a month; during the second half the (b)(3) NatSecAct average was about [] a month. It should be noted that the IW operation was not solely responsible for the breakthrough in TD handling; field reports had improved in format, transmission and Signal Center processing had reached greater speed and accuracy, and the Secretariat had developed more rapid reproduction and distribution techniques. In any event, by the end of 1960 the TD system was in excellent working order.

B. TD Dissemination to the White House

In late April 1961, acting on instructions from

* In November 1959 the TD had been officially re-titled "Information Report" and thereafter bore that label when disseminated. Within the Agency, however, the TD name continued in use for some time.

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Helms, who was chief of DDP operations, Lloyd George (chief of FI) and [] (chief of FI/RQM) met at the White House with Robert Komer of McGeorge Bundy's office. It seemed that Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, wanted to be provided with the more important Clandestine Services information reports. Komer made it clear to George and [] that Bundy didn't want all CS reports, just the more significant ones. In reporting the Komer discussion to Helms on 27 April, George said that it had been determined that only certain categories of reports would be sent to Bundy's office:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

A copy of whatever dissemination Gordon Butler of the Cable Secretariat provides to the DCI with an indication to the DCI that this particular report has gone to Bundy.

A copy of the CSDBs [the disseminations by letter] that go to any member of the USIB by name.

The more significant disseminations made up from pouched reports which, if sent to Bundy's office, would also go to the Director's office.
156/

George concluded his report to Helms with the remark that because Butler had mentioned the new procedure to Earman,

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Jack wanted me to equip you with this information so that you could mention it to the Director on Friday morning at the Staff Meeting, because Jack's notes show, he says, that the Director, after due consideration and discussion, had said send them "all" [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

On 28 April the chief of FI/RQM Reports Control sent to the DDP chief reports officers a memorandum informing them that dissemination to Bundy's office would not affect the reporting channel from OCI to Brigadier General Clifton in the White House, that they would recognize the Bundy disseminations by the symbol EXO/BUNDY, and that cable duty officers would be responsible for the actual dissemination. 157/ With the procedures established and the affected people informed, dissemination to Bundy began on Monday, 1 May 1961.

At that time and for about six months thereafter the TD's were delivered only during daytime on-duty hours. In October Butler was informed by FI/RQM that a Mr. Debrevoise in Bundy's office had requested that deliveries be made on a round-the-clock, seven-day-a-week schedule. The day-time deliveries were to continue to be made to Bundy's Executive Office Building office, and after 1730 deliveries were to go to the Situation Room at the White House. 158/ Round-the-clock service began on 30 October 1961.

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~~SECRET~~C. Cable Processing

The two flexowriter experiments described earlier had failed largely because of technical imperfections in the transmission systems then in use. By the spring of 1960 the installation of new circuits and the complete automation of the ciphering system had corrected the imperfections, and most cables from the field were being received in a format that could go directly into the Secretariat's reproduction and distribution system. There was no longer a barrier to the use of the flexowriter for the automatic typing of masters of incoming cables. By this time, however, there had been new developments in the technology of copying, and the flexowriter was no longer the answer to the Secretariat's problem.

In early 1960 the Haloid Xerox Office Copier, Model 914, came on the market. 159/ In November 1959 the machine had been demonstrated at a business show in Washington; and Butler, Reynolds, and Cascio had examined it and had decided that it was a piece of equipment that offered a breakthrough in cable processing. The Xerox copier not only produced copies automatically at a rate of six a minute but it also

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could make offset masters from a paper original -- masters that could be used in satellite reproduction and distribution centers, such as those in OCI and OCR, and were good for clear production of as many as 500 copies.

As soon as the Xerox 914 was available for rental, Butler requested [] chief of the Printing Services Division (PSD) of OL, to arrange for a 914 to be placed in the Secretariat.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[] did this -- on a free-trial basis -- and the Xerox machine was installed in the Secretariat in March 1960. It was an instant success.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

A rental contract was arranged, and by the end of July more than 50,000 masters and copies had been made on the 914. [] then arranged for the rental of a second machine to give the Secretariat a back-up capability that insured continuation of processing in the event of breakdown and during periods of preventive maintenance. The rental cost of the first machine had been absorbed by PSD, but on 1 July 1960 the Secretariat assumed the rental cost of the 914, in accordance with an earlier agreement between Butler and [] and for the second machine, which

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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was delivered and installed in October.

The master-making capability of the Xerox 914 eliminated one of the most time-consuming chores in the Cable Secretariat -- the typing, proofing, and retyping of incoming cables. The process with the 914 was simple and fast. The teletype copy from the Signal Center was placed on a photo-trimmer, and the teletype heading -- of concern only to the Signal Center -- was cut off. Then the confirmation at the end of the page or the end of the cable was removed. The cable itself was then pasted on a cable form, using a continuation-page form if the cable ran more than one page, and the copy was then ready for the 914. The time required for the procedure was between 15 and 45 seconds, depending on the length of the cable.

From the original copy the 914 produced masters at the rate of five a minute, about 12 seconds for each. The old method had required about 12 minutes for the preparation of the copy for a master and about six minutes for the reproduction of each master. The 914 process was from five to six times as fast as the old method.

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The Xerox 914 could not, of course, absorb all of the typing and reproduction chores of the Secretariat. In January 1961 Butler made a study of cable processing in the Secretariat. The study showed that 16 percent of incoming cables were received in the manual system in the Signal Center and had to be processed manually in the Secretariat; 5.5 percent were intelligence information cables on tapes pouched to headquarters, and the Secretariat processed the tapes; 27 percent were received in the machine cipher system from overseas stations not yet equipped with the automated high-speed equipment and still using the old cable format, which required manual processing; 51.3 percent of all incoming cables were processed on the Xerox 914. 160/ The study did not, of course, include the operations of the non-CIA cable branch in Q Building,* which up to this point had been using the thermofax system for reproduction of non-CIA cables. In mid-summer of 1961, however, a third Xerox 914 and an offset press were obtained

* See below, p. 160.

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and placed in the Q Building branch.

Although the cost of using the Xerox equipment in cable processing was much less than that of any other known method, the increased use of the machines from 1961 to 1965 brought the annual cost of operation to about \$25,000 -- figure that suggested that the cost of outright purchase of the 914's might be less than the cost of rental. In January 1965 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) suggested this possibility to Butler. The Xerox Corporation would sell new machines for \$29,500 or would sell the leased machines for less with full credit for rentals paid up to a limit of \$14,500. 161/

Butler and his staff considered the problem thoroughly and decided that it would be better to continue the rental; plans were made to revise the cable processing system, plans that might materially reduce the use of the Xerox, and besides, a new model of the 914 -- the 2400 -- was about to be put on the market. 162/ When, incidentally, the Xerox 2400 did come out later in 1965, the rental cost was too high to be justified by the benefits of the increased production speed, and Butler stuck with the 914's.

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D. Cable Secretariat-OCR Cable Branch Merger

1. Rationale and Procedure

As noted earlier, the processing and distribution of non-CIA cables had been assigned to the DDI Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) -- a logical assignment at the time because of the dissemination responsibilities of the office.

When OCD was reorganized and re-named the Office of Central Reference (OCR) in August 1955, the non-CIA cable function was retained. Because of the physical proximity of OCR to the other components of the DDI, this arrangement worked very well as far as OCI, ORR, and OSI were concerned. The DDP components, however, were located in the buildings along the reflecting pool, some distance from OCR, and the requirement for courier delivery delayed their receipt of non-CIA cables. In September 1960 Robert King, a special assistant to Bissell, the DDP, approached Butler with the proposition that the Secretariat take over the OCR cable branch and thus eliminate the delay -- the Secretariat was, of course, located within the DDP complex.

Butler and King agreed that the best way to get

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the proposition considered was first to advise Earman so that the DCI would know what was going on and then refer the matter to the Management Staff for study. King took care of informing Earman, and on 6 October Earman called Butler and said that he thought that the Bissell proposal had some merit and that he was referring it to White, the DDS, for study by the Management Staff. Butler assured Earman that he would cooperate fully; but he also pointed out that because of the nature of the requirements governing the dissemination of non-CIA cables, he was not particularly interested in acquiring the function. 163/

The Management Staff assigned [] to (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
the study -- [] had done the two 1958 studies (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
of the Secretariat staffing and overtime. After a preliminary look at the problem, [] came up (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
with a statement that the purpose of the study would be to determine

what effect the transfer of the non-CIA cable dissemination function to the Cable Secretariat would have on the speed of service to various Agency components, and whether the present dissemination system could be speeded up. 164/

In the section of his report dealing with "facts

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bearing on the problem" [] pointed out that the transfer would obviously speed up the delivery of non-CIA cables to the DDP but would slow down dissemination to other Agency components.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

The speed of delivery, however, was not the only factor to consider. [] study pointed out that the Agency would be in the new building within a year, that the transfer of the OCR cable branch would also have to be accompanied by the transfer of the RID element that disseminated non-CIA cables, and that immediate transfer would require additional Cable Secretariat space for [] persons and 26 safes in L Building, which was already badly overcrowded.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Taking all of the factors into consideration, [] came up with the recommendation that physically the non-CIA cable function remain "in the OCR Cable Branch and the RID/DS until the move to the new building" and that administratively the function be transferred to the Secretariat in preparation for the physical merger at the time of the move. 165/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. The Non-CIA Cable Branch

The recommendation of the study was concurred in by Amory (the DDI), Bissell (the DDP), and Earman,

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(the EO/DCI); and on 5 February 1961 White (the DDS), issued an Agency Notice announcing the change in responsibility and setting the effective date as 22 January, with the physical merger of personnel, facilities, and records to be deferred until the move to the new building. 166/ By the end of February the non-CIA Cable Branch of the Secretariat was established in Q Building -- RID (b)(3) CIAAct people had been transferred to the branch to complete the centralization of the function.

There was an immediate speed-up in the delivery of non-CIA cables to DDP components -- largely through the use of Secretariat couriers in addition to the Agency couriers on which the OCR cable branch had depended -- and the speed of delivery to DDI components was maintained.

In March 1961 the total cable volume handled by the Secretariat, including the non-CIA branch, exceeded any previously recorded -- cables. (b)(3) NatSecAct This included a 44-percent increase in CIA cables and an 18-percent increase in non-CIA cables over the 1960 monthly averages. 167/

The increase in the handling of non-CIA cables compounded an already difficult situation. The OCR

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and RID people now merged in the branch had been processing non-CIA cables for different customers and with different methods to meet different requirements. The former OCR people had to be re-trained to process cables to meet DDP requirements, and the former RID people had to adapt to the requirements of non-DDP components. At the same time, all of them had to change old methods to meet as far as possible the dissemination standards applied by the Secretariat to CIA cables.

In spite of the increased volume of non-CIA cables and the re-training problems, the branch succeeded in doing the job it was designed to do. On 30 March 1961 -- less than two months after the merger became effective -- the chief of WH Division, J. C. King, sent to the DDP a memorandum saying that "since the recent consolidation of the OCR and FI/RI elements into the Cable Secretariat," dissemination of State and Defense cables to WH had been "speeded up from five and one-half and often more hours to an average of about one hour after receipt in the Agency." 168/ Butler was informed of the WH memorandum and immediately passed the compliment on to the

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(b)(3) CIAAct

[] man -- [] of whom were women -- non-CIA cable branch in a memorandum addressed to [] chief of the branch, adding "My thanks to you and your office in making possible this improved service to WH." 169/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. The Branch Move to the New Building

By the last week of September 1961 the new Headquarters Building had neared completion to the point that a number of DDI components were being moved into permanent quarters there.

Among the first elements to move was the CIA Watch of OCI and its production staff, one of the primary customers for non-CIA cables. To avoid an interruption of service, the non-CIA cable branch was moved to the new building at the same time. The Secretariat's permanent quarters were not yet finished, and the branch began operations in temporary quarters on the ground floor. Because the DDP components were not scheduled to move until several months later, three members of the branch, instead of going to the new building, moved into the Secretariat space in L Building and continued to service the DDP elements. This arrangement continued until March 1962,

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when the Cable Secretariat as a unit moved into permanent quarters in the new building.*

E. Special Processing

1. DCI Selects

On 1 December 1961 Earman appointed Walter Elder, who was the Executive Assistant to the DDCI, as the Cable Briefing Officer for the new Director, John McCone. 170/ This position had not existed before -- the function had been performed on an *ad hoc* basis by Earman and Butler. New procedures had to be devised, so Butler began to provide the DCI, the DDCI, the DDP, and the CCP/COP books of cables arranged by geographic areas, each area group preceded by a summary page covering all of the cables in the group. Within each group the cables were arranged in the order of descending urgency -- a determination that was made by the cable duty officer, who also prepared the summaries. 171/

The same kind of book was prepared for non-CIA cables, using the same method of grouping and

* See below, p. 167.

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summarizing. Apparently the book device for handling DCI Selects was effective, for it has continued in use since that time.

2. State Cables

About two years after the change in the processing of DCI Selects, a major change was made in the processing of State Department cables. Until April 1963 State messages were delivered to the Agency in 17 copies. The non-CIA cable unit, both before and after its transfer to the Secretariat, prepared the copies for distribution. This process involved logging, handprinting the dissemination list on one copy for the files, handprinting a name and address on each of the other copies, and then sending the copies to the individual addressees; it was necessary to make additional copies if the dissemination list exceeded 16 addressees. In addition to the work involved there was the disadvantage of an addressee not knowing who the other addressees were -- often a source of confusion and misunderstanding.

In March 1963 this problem came to the attention of Lyman Kirkpatrick, then the Executive

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Director,* and he asked Butler to try to find a solution. Butler's solution was simple but effective; reduce the number of copies received from State from 17 to four, and the Secretariat would take care of the entire distribution in the Agency. Butler spelled out his proposal in some detail in a 19 April memorandum to Kirkpatrick, 172/ and Kirkpatrick approved. Paul Borel, the AD/OCR, made the necessary arrangements with State. Thereafter the Secretariat received four copies of State cables; two were sent immediately to the OCI duty officer, one was sent to the Secretariat duty officer to scan for DCI interest, and the fourth was processed for distribution copies -- each copy bearing a complete list of addressees.

F. Adjustment to the New Building**

The Agency's master plan for the move into the new

* In April 1962 the EO/DCI position held by Earman was eliminated, and the position of Executive Director was created, with Kirkpatrick the incumbent (10 Apr 62). In May 1962 Earman was appointed Inspector General, Kirkpatrick's former position (2 May 62).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

** The undocumented information in this section is based on Cable Secretariat Monthly Reports and on the recollections of the original author.

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Headquarters Building called for the Cable Secretariat, the Signal Center, and the Intelligence Watch to move simultaneously on 10 March 1962 -- as noted earlier, the non-CIA cable branch had moved into temporary quarters in the new building in September 1961, and on 1 March 1962 the branch moved into the permanent Secretariat quarters. The 10 March three-unit move had to be carefully coordinated and planned so that there would be no interruption of cable and TD processing at any time.

Before the move the Signal Center had installed duplicate equipment in its area of the new building and had arranged the circuits so that by throwing a series of switches cables could be received simultaneously at both locations.

The equipment and circuitry had been thoroughly tested, and the Signal Center was prepared to throw the switches immediately upon notification that the Cable Secretariat and the Intelligence Watch were shutting down and leaving for the new building. The move began on schedule at 0730 on 10 March. The Secretariat's area in the new building had been completely furnished and had been stocked with all necessary supplies, so within a few hours the Secretariat

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was doing business as usual. During these few hours, of course, Secretariat personnel were processing cables in the new building, using the non-CIA cable branch facilities and other pre-installed equipment. There was no interruption of service. The Secretariat's move was planned and managed by Frank Reynolds, and he fully deserved the praise given him by the DDS. 173/

During the first month in the new building the Cable Secretariat processed a total of items, ^{(b)(3) NatSecAct} the second highest monthly volume recorded up to that time. New equipment and better work areas improved work-flow patterns and permitted efficient, high-volume production without overextending personnel.* The new lounge area, equipped with basic kitchen equipment, had an excellent effect on employee morale, particularly that of the evening and midnight shifts. There were problems, however; some of them were minor and some major, but all of them required adjustment.

For example, the conveyor system that had been installed between the Secretariat and the Signal

* By late 1963, however, it had become apparent that the Secretariat area needed renovation and change to improve operating efficiency. 174/ The work began in March 1964 and was finally completed in December.

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Center had proved to be totally unacceptable. When it was tested before the two units moved into the building it seemed to have been designed for the movement of iron ore rather than pieces of paper. It was removed before the Secretariat occupied the space; and until June 1962, when the pneumatic-tube system was installed, cable traffic had to be hand-carried between the Secretariat and the Signal Center. Even then, however, there were restrictions on the kinds of material that could be put into the pneumatic-tube system. These restrictions were relaxed somewhat after the adoption of a secure-mailing wrapper, but Top Secret documents still had to be hand-carried.

A more serious problem -- at least for several months -- was that of servicing the Agency components that had not yet moved into the new building. There were several of these in the buildings along the reflecting pool and the buildings in the old headquarters area on E Street. A part of the problem was handled by maintaining a satellite operation in a small office on the ground floor of L Building. The office was open from 0700 to 1700 on work days, and each morning at 0700 a Secretariat courier would

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deliver the overnight headquarters accumulation of cable traffic to the satellite office, where the components still located in the reflecting pool area would pick up their cables. At 1700 when the office closed, the day's take of outgoing traffic would be taken by courier to the Secretariat for processing. The E Street part of the problem was solved by establishing a courier schedule of four round trips each day between headquarters and the E Street buildings. As the DDP components moved into the new building the entire problem disappeared; those Agency elements that did not move were not major customers of the Cable Secretariat.

G. Records Management

In January 1963 the chief of the Signal Center, Lawrence Harper at the time, suggested that the Signal Center archives be moved to the Cable Secretariat, and the Director of Communications asked the Records Management Staff to make a study of the possibility. Butler knew of the proposal, of course, and on 8 February -- even before the study got under way -- he made his position clear to Kirkpatrick:

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I would like to be on record that I do not want these archives; however, it is quite possible that the best place for them is in my office. 175/

The Records Management Staff study was completed on 3 April 1963, and the report was put into coordination channels. By 16 May the coordination was completed, and McClelland sent the report along to Kirkpatrick under a memorandum that indicated concurrence with report's recommendations -- which were, in effect, that the Signal Center archives be transferred to the Cable Secretariat and that the transfer be effective on 1 July 1963. 176/

Butler had concurred in the recommendation, but in a 17 May memorandum to Kirkpatrick he listed five provisions qualifying his concurrence. 177/ The provisions concerned, among other things, responsibility for evaluation of cables for permanent retention, the transfer of personnel from the Signal Center to the Secretariat, and the provision of equipment. Kirkpatrick approved the recommendations of the study and agreed with Butler's qualifications, and on 1 July 1963 the archives were officially transferred to the Cable Secretariat. Included in the transfer were (b)(3) CIAAct people and their positions -- archives assistants

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and one archives clerk. At that time, in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Records Management Staff report, the name of the archives was changed to "The CIA Cable Reference File." Lack of space prevented the immediate physical transfer of the function, but by September space was available, and the physical transfer took place.

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IX. Management and Administration, 1960 - 1965

A. Management Methods

1. The Cost Criterion

Gordon Butler was a pre-McNamara advocate of using the cost-effectiveness criterion in the evaluation of government operations -- at least the operations of the Cable Secretariat. Although cost-effectiveness was of interest to Butler's supervisors and was reported to them, his major use of it appeared to be internal -- as a device to make the personnel of the Secretariat aware of how well they were doing. It should be noted, of course, that the Secretariat -- unlike most other Agency components -- was a production unit, and its output could be measured specifically in terms of the number of cables processed during any given period of time. Thus the nature of the operation lent itself neatly to the cost-effectiveness concept. In any event, Butler used the cost factor, and his employees' awareness of it, as a management tool.

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The first of the reports on the cost of processing cables in the Secretariat covered the six-month period from 14 June to 12 December 1959. The report covered all costs directly attributable to Secretariat operations -- salaries, insurance, retirement, travel, supplies, equipment, equipment rental, printing services, and the like. The report showed that during the six-month period the cost per cable was \$2.435.* A second report covering the next six-month period, from 13 December 1959 to 11 January 1960, showed the cost per cable to have been \$2.438. Later, after the merger with the OCR and IR non-CIA cable units, the reports were done on a fiscal-year basis and arrived at a cost-per-cable figure combining CIA and non-CIA cable processing. These fiscal-year reports also developed productivity-per-person figures.

Bar-graph charts of the results of the cost studies were posted, new figures were added at the end of each fiscal year, and Secretariat employees always had a measure of the effectiveness of their performance. For example, they could see that in

* All reports on "Cable Secretariat Operations Costs" are available in the files of the Cable Secretariat.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

fiscal year 1960 the total of cables processed was

[] the cost per cable was \$2,436; the T/O was

[] positions; and the productivity was [] cables

(b)(3) CIAAct

per position. In fiscal year 1965 the total cable

volume had risen to [] the cost per cable had

been cut to \$1.54; the T/O had increased to [] and

the productivity per position had increased to []

cables.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Staff Meetings

Perhaps the best analysis of Butler's managerial style is that written by his deputy in September 1970:*

Gordon Butler never lost an opportunity for involving his staff in the Cable Secretariat's policies, procedures and problems. He believed that all problems could be resolved by team work of the people most concerned, once they became involved; that communication must go both ways -- up and down; that those who supervise should reflect an awareness of what the workers want from their leaders -- understanding and appreciation of the work being done, and a willingness to throw a little weight at the workload, rather than at people. He made his views known to his Senior and Junior supervisory staff; that he expected them to communicate with the people they supervised; that they abide by the same rules and regulations that the employees were expected to observe; that they give prompt consideration to grievances,

* The analysis was written by Frank Reynolds, who was the author of the four-volume first draft of this historical paper.

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and that every employee be treated with consideration and with respect. He encouraged the staff to discuss the problems of their people and to try to arrive at a satisfactory solution before passing the problem to the Front Office.

Butler not only preached this managerial philosophy; he also practiced it. Each month he held what was called a "combined staff meeting," which was attended by supervisory representatives from each of the three shifts and by three or four non-supervisory workers -- clerks, typists, press operators, and couriers. Everyone was given an opportunity to speak freely on any problems of procedure or policy and to offer suggestions of how working procedures or conditions could be improved. No suggestion was dismissed out of hand; a team of three people was appointed to study each suggestion and make a report of the conclusions -- a recommendation for adoption, modification, or rejection -- and give the reasons for the recommendation. Butler called this procedure "The Cable Secretariat Management Review." It proved to be a very effective way of involving, at one time or another, almost all people at all levels in the problems of the Secretariat.

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3. Other Management Methods

At a "combined staff meeting" early in 1958 Butler suggested the publication of an office newspaper; he pointed out that the three-shift operation of the Secretariat tended to segment the staff and that a news bulletin of some kind might be effective in creating a sense of unity. His suggestion was studied by one of the three-man teams; it was approved and on 4 April 1958 the first issue of *Cable Secretariat Comments* was published. It was a six-page mimeographed paper containing a statement of the objectives of the publication, a "meet-the-boss" article describing Butler's background and experience, items of information about the development of plans for the new Headquarters Building, and a page of humorous cartoons related to the day-to-day activities of the office. The paper was an instant success within the Secretariat and even attracted the attention of Earman, the EO/DCI, who asked to be put on the distribution list -- a request that was reported in the second issue of the twice-monthly publication.

One of the problems of managing an office that operated 24 hours a day seven days a week was that of

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developing a means of performance evaluation that would ensure fair recognition of the performance of those people who worked the evening and midnight shifts and thus were not often directly observed by front-office management. To do this, Butler established specific performance standards for those jobs that were measurable in terms of average production and average rates of error. These were keyed to the standard fitness report performance ratings -- weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding. In that way performance could be evaluated not only on the basis of a supervisor's judgment but also on the mathematical score determined by the application of the performance standards to the individual's production record. This procedure went into effect in 1963, and in February 1964 the first Quality Step Increase (QSI) granted in the Cable Secretariat was awarded to [] a GS-08 cable analyst, on (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) the basis of his work in exceeding the norms established by the performance standards. During 1964 and 1965, QSI's were awarded to 16 Cable Secretariat employees, about equally divided among the three shifts, in positions ranging in grade from GS-05 to GS-13.

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The volume of cable traffic in the Secretariat was always rising, and Butler was constantly looking for new, faster, and less costly methods of cable processing. True to his philosophy of management, he centered his search in the Secretariat itself. In a November 1963 memorandum addressed to all Secretariat personnel he announced

. . . an intensive program for implementation in 1964 in which we plan to examine many of our practices and procedures and to effect improvements wherever possible. The objectives of this review are to improve the quality of our product, to reduce unit cost, to reduce our processing time and to improve working conditions. 178/

The memorandum made it clear that all functions of the Secretariat were targets for improvement, but a list attached to the memorandum identified 27 specific procedures that were prime candidates. The program produced a great many suggestions, and several of them were implemented -- for these the originators were rewarded through the Agency Suggestion Award Program. For example, a substantial cash award was given to an employee who suggested new procedures for logging and filing non-CIA cables -- procedures that eliminated needless filing space and folders, speeded up processing, facilitated destruction of obsolete material, and dovetailed with procedures for filing CIA cables.

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B. Changes in Agency Authority and Organization

Since the beginning of Cable Secretariat operations, procedures for the dissemination of cables within the Agency were based on the requirements of organizational components and the preferences of the people who headed those components.

Each change in Agency organization and each change in high-level administrative officers required several changes in dissemination procedures. As noted earlier, on 1 January 1959 Richard Bissell had succeeded Frank Wisner as DDP, and there had been changes in cable dissemination to the DDP. From that time until 29 November 1961, when John McCone succeeded Dulles as DCI, there had been no major organizational changes and no changes in senior officials.

Thereafter, however, through the spring of 1962, the changes came in rapid succession. This, of course, was during the period that the DDP components were moving into the new building; the Secretariat was deeply involved in adapting dissemination procedures to the moves and at the same time was altering procedures to meet the requirements of these changes in Agency organization and command: 179/

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- 27 Dec 61 -- C. P. Cabell resigned as DDCI, effective 31 Jan 62.
- 17 Feb 62 -- Richard Helms succeeded Richard Bissell as DDP. Thomas Karamessines became Acting DDP/COPS.
- 19 Feb 62 -- Deputy Directorate for Research (DDR) established; Herbert Scoville named DDR.
- 9 Mar 62 -- Marshall S. Carter appointed DDCI, succeeding Cabell.
- 19 Mar 62 -- Thomas Karamessines named DDP/COPS. (Position re-titled Assistant DDP on 1 May 62.)
- 30 Mar 62 -- Robert Amory, DDI, resigned from Agency; Huntington Sheldon named Acting DDI.
- 1 Apr 62 -- Offices of General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, and Comptroller moved from DDS to Office of the DCI. John Bross succeeded Edward Saunders as Comptroller.
- 10 Apr 62 -- Position of EO/DCI eliminated and position of CIA Executive Director established; Lyman Kirkpatrick incumbent.
- 15 Apr 62 -- Elements of DDP Development Projects Division (DPD) moved to DDR. 180/
- 16 Apr 62 -- R. Jack Smith named Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, succeeding Huntington Sheldon.
- 23 Apr 62 -- Ray Cline named DDI; Huntington Sheldon named Assistant DDI.
- 2 May 62 -- John Earman named Inspector General, succeeding Lyman Kirkpatrick.

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~~SECRET~~C. Administrative Reviews1. Staffing Complement, 1962

While the Cable Secretariat was involved in the complicated adaption of cable dissemination procedures to the changes in Agency organization and command, Butler was wrestling with another problem -- that of staffing the Secretariat to meet the production requirements. In his 11 April monthly report, the last to go to the EO/DCI -- thereafter they went to the Executive Director, Kirkpatrick -- he pointed out that his T/O was five persons short of the authorized ☐ positions. (b)(3) CIAAct

In his monthly report covering operations in May he told Kirkpatrick that he was preparing a proposal to revise the Secretariat T/O by adding some new positions and upgrading some slots. On 12 August he submitted the proposal along with a memorandum that said that he was proposing a ceiling change from ☐ to ☐ positions, a change that "is in line with the T/O approved in 1955 -- ☐ then, plus ☐ picked (b)(3) CIAAct up when we took on the dissemination of non-CIA cables." 181/ The memorandum also stated that Butler was asking for the upgrading of a number of positions below the GS-12 level.

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and CIA cable processing and the establishment of full-time chief and deputy chief positions in the Message Center for each of the three shifts. On 20 September [] report was sent to the DDS by (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) the Director of Personnel, then Emmet D. Echols, with the recommendation that the proposed "revision to the staffing complement of the Cable Secretariat-Message Center be approved (Tab A), [*] and that the personnel ceiling be increased from [] to [] com- (b)(3) CIAAct mensurate with the present authorized position strength." 183/

The DDS, White, approved the recommendation but noted that "DD/S is without authority to approve ceiling increase. This matter should be resolved with the Comptroller." 184/ This meant another memorandum had to be sent to the Comptroller, which it was on 27 September. 185/ The Comptroller, John Bross, approved the recommendation on 5 October, 186/ but it appeared that he, too, lacked authority to approve ceiling increases; and on 8 October Bross sent the recommendation to the DDCI, Carter, indicating

* Tab A was the standard T/O form showing the position title, the position number and grade, and the number of people in each position; for example, Watch Officer, GS-0132.07 - 12, (9), which meant that nine people would occupy positions as GS-12 Watch Officers.

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Comptroller concurrence and recommending DDCI approval. 187/ Carter approved on 10 October, 188/ and on 15 October Butler received a copy of Form 261, which established his T/O at ☐ positions.

(b)(3) CIAAct

2. The IG Survey, 1963

In late October 1963 Earman, then the Inspector General, called Butler and told him that the IG Staff was about to make a routine inspection of the Cable Secretariat. Butler assured Earman of his full cooperation. The IG survey was completed near the end of November, and on 23 December Earman sent the survey report to Carter with a covering memorandum in which he said:

The Cable Secretariat is a tightly organized office which provides, under demanding standards of timeliness and security, dissemination of communications to Agency command and working levels and to other agencies and departments. The Cable Secretariat has met its mission so successfully that our recommendations are peripheral to its primary functions.
189/

Attached to Earman's memorandum was a memorandum prepared for Carter's signature and addressed to the Cable Secretary requesting that within 30 days he furnish a summary of action taken on the recommendations of the IG survey report.

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On 17 January 1964 Butler submitted to the DDCI the requested summary, saying that with the exception of recommendation number six he had taken positive action on all of the IG's recommendations. 190/ Recommendation number six was the elimination of individual production reports, which the inspectors had found to be an irritant to the people who were required to submit them. In the comments that accompanied his memorandum to the DDCI, Butler said,

I am not at this time in agreement with the Inspector General's views on the premise that the production reports are of considerable value to me in my management of the Cable Secretariat.

Apparently Butler's dissent was effective, for on 19 March 1964 he received from Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director-Comptroller (ED-C),* a memorandum telling him that "the recommendations contained in the Inspector General's survey report on the Secretariat are approved with the exception of recommendation #6 which is disapproved."

* On 18 November 1963 the Office of the Comptroller became a part of the Office of the Executive Director, and the Executive Director became the Executive Director-Comptroller. The change was announced by [] 26 November 1963.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The final paragraph of the ED-C's memorandum said,

This Inspector General survey confirms the outstanding manner in which you are administering the Cable Secretariat, and I personally commend you and your staff for an exceptionally fine Inspector General's report.

3. Staffing Complement, 1964

One of the "exceptionally fine" aspects of the IG's report was a section that put into Butler's hands a lever with which to raise his staffing complement. Because the section that did that is a revealing analysis of the condition of the Cable Secretariat at the end of 1963, the full text is given here:

While the presently rising volume can be expected to level off eventually, there is no indication that this will be in the foreseeable future.

This continual rise in the volume of work will inevitably confront the Cable Secretary with the problem of determining the extent to which additional personnel are needed. This is not a problem that he can control, as his work is the result of the activities of others. His organization must process what comes to it. Under present conditions there is little if any slack in the Secretariat. With it apparently becoming standard practice to carry an almost continual backlog under normal conditions, it follows that in time of crisis serious strains will be placed on the Secretariat's ability to fulfill its mission. In fact, it has been reported to the inspectors that during the

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Cuban crisis the Secretariat fell far behind in processing the heavy flow of traffic.

As the control point for the flow of critical information the Secretariat is an essential activity. Its operation with too small a margin in personnel strength could prove critical in future crises. At the time of the inspection the Cable Secretary was well along in the exploration of new equipment and the development of new procedures to increase the production capacity of the office. He was confident that over the next year these new programs will contribute to a significant increase in Secretariat productivity. We are impressed with the new programs, and with the Cable Secretary's evaluation of their potential, especially in view of his long record of success in such innovations in the past. However, we hold some reservations about the extent to which mechanical efficiency can continue to meet all the demands that may be placed upon the office. While we accept the Cable Secretary's evaluation at this time, we still feel that the entire problem of staffing should be reviewed after completion of the new steps, to determine the extent to which they meet all the demands levied upon the Secretariat.

Butler lost no time in applying the lever. On 13 January 1964 -- about two months before the recommendations of the IG's report were officially approved -- he sent to the Salary and Wage Division of O/Pers a memorandum in which he quoted the IG's comments on the staffing problem and requested that a review of the Secretariat's staffing complement be made before the end of 1964. 191/ The Salary and

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Wage Division complied with Butler's request, conducted the review, and submitted the findings on 11 December 1964. 192/

The findings were something of a shock to Butler; either his lever had been limp, or he had used the wrong fulcrum. The Salary and Wage Division had made three recommendations:

- a. That the Records Management Staff be requested to make a full-scale study of the processing requirements of the Cable Secretariat;
- b. That immediate steps be taken to secure full staffing of the Cable Secretariat, including temporary authority to exceed current ceiling by three clericals, pending results of the Records Management study; and
- c. That failing to obtain additional personnel, a temporary staggering of hours for some of the second and third shift personnel, but that this should not be used as a final solution.

Butler could accept none of these recommendations. On 16 December 1964 he sent a somewhat indignant memorandum to Kirkpatrick. He pointed out that his operations had been thoroughly studied again and again, most recently by the IG Staff in December 1963, and he did not believe that another study was needed; he was convinced that the solution of his problem was revised procedures, more people, and full utilization of appropriate mechanical-computer equipment.

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He dismissed the suggested temporary staggering of work hours as not being feasible because of the consequences of disrupted households and a lack of public transportation and car pools. He said that the "taking of immediate steps to fully staff the Cable Secretariat" would be doing no more than the Office of Personnel had been trying to do for many months. He recommended to Kirkpatrick that

a. Our T/O be increased by [] clerical types, [] grade four and [] grade five, together with funds.

(b)(3) CIAAct

b. No further studies be made of the Cable Secretariat at this time.

c. I be directed to report on whether processing time and capabilities are improved when we have on hand [] people. (Note: it is not reasonable to expect to maintain a strength of [] in this unit -- to maintain [] people on hand, we need a T/O of [] in my opinion.) 193/

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Kirkpatrick approved Butler's recommendation for an increase of [] slots, but Butler did not know it until early February 1965 when the DCI Administrative Officer forwarded to him a copy of a memorandum for the Director of Personnel on the subject of "Position Ceiling Change" dated 8 February 1965 and signed by the Management Control Officer. 194/

(b)(3) CIAAct

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The memorandum referred to Butler's
16 December 1964 memorandum and stated that the
Secretariat's new ceiling was positions "per
direction of the Executive Director-Comptroller."

(b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET~~X. Growth and Change, 1965 - 1966A. The Workload Problem

As Butler had pointed out in his 16 December 1964 memorandum to Kirkpatrick, an official T/O of [] (b)(3) CIAAct positions did not necessarily mean that there would be [] people on board. Indeed, when the Secretariat (b)(3) CIAAct had a T/O of [] positions, it was not possible -- (b)(3) CIAAct even with the earnest efforts of the Office of Personnel -- to fill all of them. The February 1965 increase from [] to [] was of benefit to the Sec- (b)(3) CIAAct retariat only because it increased the recruiting requirement and thus increased the possibility of getting more people on board.

By May 1965 more positions had been filled, but the Secretariat was still nine persons under the authorized ceiling of [] positions; and it was in (b)(3) CIAAct May, immediately after the crisis in the Dominican Republic, that the Secretariat set a new high monthly record of [] units processed and another new (b)(3) NatSecAct record for cables processed during one 24-hour period -- [] 195/ Largely because of the (b)(3) NatSecAct

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shortage of personnel the Secretariat was forced to increase its monthly average of overtime use by 385 hours.

Fortunately the workload of the Secretariat had been reduced somewhat in February 1965 when a new pneumatic tube, called the "purple tube," was installed to permit transmission of cables directly from the Secretariat to the Operations Center. Before that time the pneumatic tube system could be used only during day-time hours, and at all other times cables had to be hand-carried. Because the "purple tube" linked only the Secretariat and the Operations Center, there were no security restrictions on its use, and all cables -- including TS -- could go through the tube.

During the summer of 1965 the shortage of personnel in the Secretariat was relieved temporarily by the use of summer employees. The Agency's summer employee program -- the temporary employment of the sons and daughters of Agency employees -- had been in existence for several years, but because of the sensitivity of the work of the Secretariat Butler had not used the program. In May 1965,

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however, he decided that summer employees could be used, and he requested that eight of them be assigned to him. 196/ His request was approved by the ED-C and the Director of Personnel, and in June the summer employees came on board. Because none of them had TS security clearance, it was necessary to establish special procedures in their duty assignments, but by the end of the summer it was clear that the special treatment had been worth the effort. In his monthly report for September Butler said:

All of them performed their duties to the full satisfaction of this office. They were of tremendous help to the Cable Secretariat and I would be happy to recommend any one of them for permanent assignment to the Agency.

B. Procedural Changes

1. The Direct-Image System

A breakthrough of a kind in the processing of cables had been made by the Cable Secretariat in March 1960 when the Xerox 914 was installed it eliminated the tedious process of making masters by typing, proofing, and retyping.* By the

* See above, p. 154.

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beginning of 1965 the Xerox equipment was still useful, but it was clear that the procedures for the use of it could be considerably simplified. The major problem was that the Secretariat received cables from the Signal Center on white teletype rollpaper, which had to be cut and mounted and then fed into the Xerox for the making of a master.

By February 1965 the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat, working together, had devised a method of using offset master material instead of the standard rollpaper in the teletype machines; the offset master was then produced by the teletype machines themselves, and there was no need for cutting and mounting and using the Xerox for production of a master. The new process was called the "Direct-Image Teletype Master System."

Although the cost of the offset master material was slightly higher than that of the standard rollpaper, it was more than justified by the overall reduction in the cost of processing cables -- the cost in March 1965, the first full month when the new system was in use, was \$1,961 lower than the cost in January 1965 -- and by the reduction in the

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Secretariat's processing time -- a decrease of 47 percent in processing immediate precedence items and 43 percent in processing priority messages. 197/ The new system did, however, have its drawbacks. The offset master material was sensitive to fingerprint marks and grease, and it tended to curl at the edges, which caused some trouble in the offset presses.* On balance, however, the direct-image system was definitely superior to the old method.

2. Color Standardization

Another improvement in cable processing was made in March 1965. Over the years the Secretariat had been using five different colors of paper in reproducing cables. Each incoming message required three different colors -- yellow to the action unit, green to the RI files, and white to all other recipients. Each outgoing message required two colors -- blue to the RI files and pink to information recipients. The use of the different colored paper required that the high-speed, semi-

* In early 1967 these disadvantages were eliminated by re-engineering the teletype machines -- "stunting," it was called -- so that they printed page-size texts on fanfold paper, thus providing a master in pre-printed cable form. 198/

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automatic reproduction equipment had to be stopped frequently to change from one color paper to another; this meant that the equipment could not be operated at or near capacity. With the Secretariat T/O still unfilled and cable volume increasing steadily, even small improvements were important; and Butler saw in the multi-colored-paper procedure a chance for a small improvement.

On 18 March 1965 Butler attended a DDP staff meeting and recommended that the Secretariat drop the use of different colored paper and reproduce only white copies. He pointed out that the change would reduce from 21 to 10 the steps necessary in the reproduction of cables. 199/ The members of the DDP staff accepted all but one part of Butler's proposal; they insisted that outgoing cables continue to be reproduced on pink paper. Butler was quite willing to compromise, and thereafter only white and pink paper was used in the processing of cables -- a definite improvement over the old method.

3. Publication of Confirmations

An improvement of somewhat greater magnitude came in July 1965. Up until that time incoming

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cables repeated ("confirmed") critical parts of messages -- names, dates, times, numerals, and the like -- at the end of the message. The Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat were responsible for cross-checking the confirmation with the body of the cable to insure clarity and accuracy, and then the Secretariat deleted the confirmation before the cable was reproduced and disseminated. The cross-checking was a tedious process; Secretariat and Signal Center personnel could not be familiar with the background of most of the confirmation material, and much of their time was used in unnecessary cross-checking.

On the other hand, the cable addressees *were* familiar with the situations, events, and people referred to in the cables and were much better qualified to check confirmations for accuracy. After some unofficial coordination with the Secretariat's major customers, Butler announced on 6 July 1965 that as of that date all incoming messages -- except Intelligence Reports -- would be disseminated with the confirmation portion included, just as the cable was received. 200/

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~~SECRET~~4. Revision of TD Processing

Perhaps because Intelligence Reports -- still referred to internally as TD's -- were disseminated to other members of the intelligence community, special care was taken to produce copies of high quality. Cables reproduced for Agency dissemination were processed on Xerox equipment; but the Xerox copies were not always up to the TD quality standards, and the flexowriter was used for TD's. This required that the Secretariat convert the punched paper teletype tape, supplied by the Signal Center, to a direct-image master for use on the flexowriter. It took about 20 minutes to process the average TD; if three TD's were received for processing at the same time, the third would be delayed for about an hour before it got into dissemination channels. In August 1965 Butler proposed that the format for TD reporting from the field be modified so that the addition of paste-on headers would enable the Signal Center tape to serve as a master for the flexowriter processing. 201/ The proposal was approved by the DDP, the instructions for format changes were sent to the

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field, and by April 1966 the new procedure was in operation. 202/

5. Purge of the Pseudo/Crypto Files

During 1965 there was another change in cable processing procedures -- one that warrants mention : even though its direct effect on the Secretariat's operations was not a major one. As noted earlier, the Secretariat maintained a listing of all pseudonyms and cryptonyms that might be expected to appear in cable traffic. This list was used by the cable duty officer when he selected messages for the DCI's information. He would prepare a "breakout slip" giving the true identities of the pseudonyms and the spell-out of the cryptonyms in a message, and the breakout slip would be attached to copies that went to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDP, and the ADDP -- any one or all of whom might not be familiar with the pseudonyms and cryptonyms used.

In March 1965 Helms, then the DDP, told Butler that he was somewhat concerned about the fact that the breakout slips often identified specific sources when such identification was not necessary. Helms believed that a descriptive device would serve

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the purpose of the breakout and would avoid specific identification. Butler agreed with Helms, and soon thereafter the DDP began a thorough review of the Secretariat's pseudo/crypto list. In a 9 April memorandum to Kirkpatrick Butler reported that

Karamessines had detailed two DDP employees to review each identity, with the objective of substituting where appropriate a descriptive identity which will not pinpoint an individual The idea is that the identity would meet the needs of the DCI equally well as the present system and better protect the identity of the source. 203/

As an interim measure while the purge of the files was in progress, the cable duty officers were requested to "use their good judgment and wherever possible furnish a breakout which does not pinpoint a particular individual." 204/ The review of the files was completed in October 1965. In his monthly report covering October, Butler so informed the ED-C, adding that Karamessines had instructed the DDP divisions and staffs to avoid the need for a repetition of the purge exercise by providing the Cable Secretariat with descriptive identities of new pseudonyms and informing the Secretariat when pseudonyms and cryptonyms became inactive.

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C. Requirements of the New Command

In the spring of 1965 there were changes in the top command of the Agency and of the DDP that had major effects on the operations of the Cable Secretariat. On 28 April Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., replaced McCone as DCI, and Richard Helms was moved from his position as DDP to the DDCI position, replacing Carter, who then became Director of the National Security Agency. At the same time, Desmond Fitzgerald was appointed DDP to succeed Helms. Karamessines remained in the position of ADDP. 205/ For some months, while the new command was getting settled the processing of cables continued without major change, but by September things began to happen.

1. The DDP Duty Officer Staff

Since the beginning of the Cable Secretariat operation in 1952, the Secretariat duty officers had been known as CSDO's and were so designated in cable handbooks and cable regulations. When the DDP created the Clandestine Services duty officer position in January 1953, the CSDO term happened to fit that position also. This dual application of the

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term created no confusion over the years simply because the Secretariat duty officers also served as Clandestine Services duty officers. The Secretariat staff was a bit dismayed, therefore, when on 23 September 1965 the DDP issued Clandestine Services Notice [] which stated that henceforth the CSDO (b)(3) NatSecAct designation would be used only to identify

the Clandestine Services Duty Officer, who will be on duty in the CIA Operations Center as the representative of the Deputy Director for Plans [] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Administratively, the notice said, the CSDO staff was assigned to the Intelligence Group of the DDP Foreign Intelligence Staff, with operational supervision provided by the office of the Deputy Director for Plans.

The CS notice also assigned to the CSDO a number of responsibilities and authorities, some of them new and some of them formerly in the province of the Cable Secretariat and the Operations Center Senior Duty Officer:

Provide appropriate assistance to the Operations Center Senior Duty Officer (SDO) by providing information or by initiating action within the Clandestine Services in response to requests directed to the SDO.

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Brief the Director on important matters affecting the Clandestine Services which arise during his tour of duty.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In effect the CS notice relegated the Cable Secretariat duty officers to a support role -- with their designation reduced to CDO. They were to continue to support the SDO and the Intelligence Watch (IW) Staff, and in addition they were to provide the major support for the CSDO staff. By sheer happenstance the date of the CS notice, 23 September 1965, was the day that India and Pakistan momentarily halted fighting over Kashmir in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution and later in the day broke the cease-fire agreement and resumed heavy fighting. These events created a sudden swell in cable traffic, and during the remainder of September the Cable Secretariat duty officer staff was faced with the problem of carrying out normal duties --

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vastly increased in volume -- and providing [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

In addition, of course, the CDO's had to provide support for the newly established CSDO function. The CSDO staff had neither cable reference files nor pseudo/crypto files, and the CDO's had to provide copies of referenced cables and identities of pseudonyms and cryptonyms for virtually all the cables handled. Eventually of course, the problems were solved, and the CSDO and CDO systems adjusted to normal operating procedures.

2. Briefing the DCI

One of these procedures was the briefing of the DCI. During his tenure as Director, McCone had preferred to use a special assistant in his own office as a cable briefing officer; the special assistant was fully briefed on the over-night cable traffic by the SDO and the Cable Secretariat duty officer. When Raborn succeeded McCone, the method was changed. Raborn usually arrived at his office by 0615 hours each morning, and he wanted an immediate briefing on the night's cable take. The

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SDO and the CSDO, both of whom had been on duty during the night, were the logical briefers -- until September 1965 the CSDO was the Cable Secretariat duty officer wearing his second hat. After the CS notice set up the CSDO system, the CDO helped the SDO and the CSDO prepare for the briefing, and each morning just before 0600 they would check with the CDO for late messages that might be of interest to the DCI.

The DCI briefing routine started when the on-duty security officer called the Operations Center and told the SDO and the CSDO that the Director had entered the building. They timed their arrival at the DCI's office to coincide with his, and the briefing began as the Director sat down at his desk. The SDO opened with non-covert and special intelligence information that had come in during the night; the CSDO followed with coverage of significant Clandestine Services matters. By working agreement between the two briefing officers, if the CSDO considered any part of his briefing to be operationally sensitive, he would signal the SDO, who would then leave the room -- the SDO, of course, was not a DDP officer and thus was not privy to

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sensitive operational intelligence. During the briefings, which usually lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, the Director listened and ate his breakfast; the atmosphere was informal and relaxed, but there was no time wasted in idle conversation.

When Helms became DCI at the end of June 1966, the early-morning briefings were dropped. Helms preferred to be briefed by his Deputy Directors during his daily meetings with them at 0900. The change meant that the SDO briefed the DDI, and the CSDO briefed the DDP before the morning meeting, and the CDO supplied both briefers with the latest incoming information right up to the time of the briefings -- usually at 0800.

3. The Coffey Committee Reviews

In early 1966 the Secretariat was still adjusting to the change introduced by the DDP's establishment of the new CSDO system, when another major change came as a result of the requirements of the new command. Raborn made it clear that he did not like the lack of uniformity of format in the cables that came to his desk. The "lack of uniformity" had been intentionally developed over the years as an effective method of making instant

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identification of the various categories of cables -- there were five or six categories determined by such factors as degree of sensitivity, types of distribution, required operational action, administrative response, and the like. The DCI's preference had to be considered, however, and on 2 March 1966 Colonel White,* the ED-C, appointed a committee to study the possibility of establishing a uniform format for all cables. 206/

John W. Coffey, Director of Communications, was named chairman of the committee, and there were eight members -- two each from the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS; one from the DDS&T; and one, Butler, from the Secretariat.

The committee met on 11 March and several times during the next ten days, and on 22 March the secretary of the group submitted to Coffey a draft of its recommendations. 207/ By 29 March the draft had been put into the shape of a final report that was submitted to White for approval. 208/ Attached to the report were drafts of the headquarters and field regulations that would implement the actions recommended by the committee.

* White succeeded Kirkpatrick as ED-C on 5 July 1965
[redacted] 24 June 1965).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The recommendations were broad in scope; they covered all outgoing and incoming cables -- including intelligence reports. In general, the recommended format changes were designed to establish a uniform pattern for all cables, the uniformity to be achieved by assigning to each of the first four lines of all cables a specific function and form -- classification, time of release, originator, references, precedence, information addressees, sensitivity indicators, project cryptonyms, and the like, all in predetermined order. The committee's recommendations were approved in April 1966, 209/ to become effective on 1 May -- the existing cable forms were to be used, but with the new format, until new forms specifically designed to fit the new format could be printed and distributed.*

Although the work of the Coffey committee had satisfied the DCI's desire for uniformity in the format of cables, it had not considered another factor that concerned him -- probably because his

* A year later, on 6 April 1967, a revised edition of the Cable Handbook, [] and the [] version, [] were issued, containing the new procedures.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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concern had not been known to the committee when they began their study in March. At some time in April the Director mentioned to the ED-C that some cables came to his desk without any indication of who else had received copies. He felt that he should have that information. White informed Coffey of the Director's remark, and on 15 April Coffey notified White that the committee had been reconvened to study the matter and also to consider another related matter -- the earlier committee study had revealed the fact that there was split responsibility in selecting cables for the attention of the DCI and other key officials in the Agency. 210/ In accordance with Headquarters Regulation the Cable Secretariat was responsible for DCI selects. Also, however, the SDO at the Operations Center reviewed all special intelligence messages and selected some for DCI attention, and he sometimes sent to the DCI advance copies of regular messages provided the Operations Center by the Cable Secretariat. Copies sent to the DCI by the SDO did not show distribution lists, and at times the SDO sent copies of the same messages that

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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the Secretariat had selected for DCI attention.

The Coffey committee soon came up with a proposal of procedures that would insure that copies of Agency and non-Agency cables selected for the DCI, the DDCI, and the ED-C would show internal Agency distribution, would eliminate duplicate distribution, and would insure that the Operations Center and the Cable Secretariat would know the criteria each other used in selecting cables for senior officials. The proposed procedures were approved and became effective on 25 April 1966 and were incorporated in the Cable Secretariat Standing Operating Procedures as of that date. 211/ (b)(3) NatSecAct

The new procedures retained the regulatory responsibility of the Secretariat duty officer for the selection and dissemination of cables for DCI attention, but they required that when the CDO sent advance copies of selected cables to the SDO, the CSDO, or other units he would indicate that the cable was a DCI Select. The new procedures also required that a distribution list appear on all copies of cables that went to the DCI. In addition there was the requirement that when the SDO, the CSDO, or any other official decided that the DCI

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should see a certain cable not selected by the CDO' he would request the CDO to send it, giving his reasons for the request. The new procedures were effective but they did place an additional burden on the Cable Secretariat -- a burden that gradually diminished as each of the authorized "selectors" became familiar with the criteria used by the others.

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XI. Summary and Conclusions

A. A Look Back*

If one were to describe the CIA Cable Secretariat as the heart of the Agency, the analogy would not be too much overdrawn. To the extent that current information is the life blood of intelligence, the Secretariat's function has always been that of supplying the parts of the Agency body with the substance of life; and the supply system had to be fast, efficient, and continuous. Like any viable body, the Agency was always growing -- either in size or complexity of functions or both, and the Secretariat had to adjust to these changes and meet new requirements as they arose. More often than not, the new requirements were not accompanied by increases in the Secretariat's T/O. To meet them, then, there had to be a constant search for ways of improving procedures and a constant effort to apply

* This section was written by one who was not a member of the staff of the Secretariat. The conclusions and evaluations are based on a study of the four-volume original history of the Secretariat and on the impressions the writer gained during almost 20 years of service with the Agency.

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technological developments to cable processing. Over the years from 1952 through 1966 improvement of procedures -- by any and all possible means -- became the hallmark of the Secretariat.

Although a great many of the cable processing problems were solved by the adaption of sophisticated machinery as it became available, the richest source from which procedural improvements came was the Secretariat's own people. Not only were they thoroughly versed in the techniques of cable processing but also they were sincerely committed to the mission of the Secretariat. To a great extent this commitment was generated by their admiration and respect for the Cable Secretary, Gordon Butler.

Butler came to the Agency in response to the direct request of General Smith, then DCI. Smith wanted Butler because he was familiar with Butler's work in military cable processing and he had confidence in Butler's ability to establish and manage an Agency cable secretariat.

The years have justified Smith's confidence. Butler quickly adapted his military experience to the new situation, he anticipated problems and found

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solutions before they became critical, and he grew as the Agency grew. He won and held the respect of his superiors, and he did it without compromising his own convictions; he never hesitated to voice opposition to proposals that he deemed unproductive, but he always had sound reasons for opposition.

Perhaps most important to the effective function of the Secretariat, he stood up for the people who worked for him, and he did whatever he could to promote their welfare. It was only fitting, therefore, that at the time of his retirement late in 1971 that Butler was awarded the Agency's Intelligence Medal of Merit.

B. A Look Ahead

Although the time span of this paper extends only through 1966, it seems appropriate here to identify the major development in the Secretariat during the period that followed 1966. This was the introduction of the automation concept. Actually the possibility of computerizing cable processing was being considered by Butler as early as 1965. By that time it had become apparent that the mere improvement of procedures by the combined application of ingenuity and mechanical

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devices could not possibly keep pace with the increasing volume of cable traffic and the complexity of dissemination.

A 29 December 1965 memorandum for the record describes a conversation that Butler had with White, then the ED-C. 212/ Butler told White that the Army and the State Department message systems were being computerized, that he had examined the progress on them, and that he believed that the Cable Secretariat could automate. White agreed that the possibility should be explored, and Butler's memorandum was sent along to the Office of Computer Services (OCS) with the request that the problem be studied. OCS completed the requested study in April 1966. The chief of OCS, Joseph Becker, recommended to Butler that the computerization of the Cable Secretariat be combined with that of the Signal Center. Butler recommended to White that Becker's proposal be approved, and at the same time he recommended that the cable receiving functions of the Intelligence Watch and the DDP also be computerized. 213/ White approved both Becker's and Butler's recommendations and authorized Butler to include a request for funds in his FY 1968 budget.

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Butler did so. The budget request for the (b)(3) CIAAct automation of the Secretariat was [] a figure based on the OCS estimate of cost. The request was included in the overall Agency budget request that was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB).

On 28 November 1966 Butler was informed that the BOB had removed the [] item. The reason (b)(3) CIAAct given was that the request was not supported by specifications concerning the items required and the timing of installation. In March 1967 Butler reported to White that the BOB's reason was not a valid one and that he, Butler, intended to go ahead with specific planning on the assumption that funds would be made available in the FY 1969 budget. 214/

Soon thereafter Butler, with White's approval, formed an Automated Communication Terminal (ACT) working group. It was composed of representatives of the Cable Secretariat, the Office of Communications, and OCS. The group began working on specifications and completed a first draft in June 1969. By that time Butler had concluded that "we have a long way to go -- years, not months -- before automation is a fact in the Cable Secretariat." 215/ He was quite right. The ACT specifications were submitted

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to a firm of consultants, the Auerbach Corporation, for an estimate of cost. On 18 July the estimate was submitted -- [REDACTED] more than the budget allocation. The ACT program was then divided into three phases, the first for the Signal Center, the second for the Cable Secretariat, and the third for other elements -- primarily the IW and the DDP cable receiving functions.

(b)(3) CIAAct

In June 1970 a contract for the first phase was let to the North American Rockwell Information Systems (NARISCO) in the amount of [REDACTED] Specifica- tions for phase two were completed in January 1971, and on 14 February, the day before bids were to be solicited, the ED-C announced that phases two and three were put on indefinite hold pending completion of a study of the overall Agency computer program. [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[REDACTED] of the Office of Program Planning and Budgeting was assigned to conduct the study. Butler's staff immediately began to assemble a host of material for [REDACTED] to review; Butler assumed that because [REDACTED] knew nothing at all about the functions of the Secretariat he would spend at least several weeks learning something about 20 years of development in

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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cable processing. Actually [] spent about two hours in the Secretariat. He completed his full report of computerization in the Agency in less than 60 days, and that part of his conclusions related to the Cable Secretariat recommended, in effect, that the Secretariat be abolished and its functions be scattered around among other Agency components.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[] report was given to the Deputy Directors and the Cable Secretary as an oral briefing. He had no specific ideas about implementing his conclusions and recommendations; he said that such things were not his concern and another study would have to be made before anything specific could be done. "Another study" was not made, and computerization of the Cable Secretariat was in abeyance -- perhaps in limbo.

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154. [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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12



CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Support Services Historical Series

THE OFFICE OF LOGISTICS -- AN OVERVIEW
1945-70

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OL-14

July 1972

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THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES

OL-14

THE OFFICE OF LOGISTICS -- AN OVERVIEW
1945-70

by

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

July 1972

(b)(6)

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FOREWORD

This history is a summary of the growth and development of the logistics function in the Central Intelligence Agency. It is designed to pull together and place in perspective the wide variety of responsibilities and activities described in detail in the separate histories of the line divisions of the Office of Logistics (OL). For a complete list of historical studies of OL components, see Appendix C.

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The Office of Logistics -- An Overview

1945-70

I. Introduction

This history covers some 25 years and carries events within the Office of Logistics (OL) through 1970. This period, which includes the brief lifespans of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), encompasses virtually the entire existence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, in some instances, may be too recent to be truly considered as history. It is possible, however, to obtain a certain perspective into the birth and growth of the logistical activities of the Agency, which makes the effort of telling this history worthwhile.

Viewing the events of the past 25 years, a pattern soon becomes evident. During the first 8 years (1945-53) there was tremendous growth, with its attendant confusion both within the Agency and within its logistical support mechanisms. Procedures

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were loosely defined or nonexistent, and responsibilities were fragmented between the dominant components -- the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). By 1953, efforts at consolidation had succeeded -- again within the Agency through the melding of OPC and OSO under the umbrella of the Clandestine Services (CS) and through the establishment of the Logistics Office having sole responsibility for supplying all components of CIA.

The 17 or so years that followed the consolidation of the CS and the logistics function were marked initially by a high degree of centralization followed by a gradual trend towards decentralization -- a pendulum effect that can be exemplified by the method of accounting for property. Initially, nonexpendable property was defined as nonconsumable property costing \$10 or more per item. By 1970, nonexpendable property, while still considered nonconsumable, had to cost \$200 or more to be included in this category. The reader will discern other examples of the loosening of controls initially installed in the early 1950's -- the obvious conclusion is that the Agency logistics element had attained a balance, a long-sought maturity.

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~~SECRET~~II. The Formative Years, 1945-53

From September 1945 to September 1947, the national intelligence community was in a state of flux. With the cessation of World War II, the dismantlement of the military forces, including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), commenced, impelled by the fervor of a war-weary populace. Before all the assets of OSS were liquidated, President Truman issued an Executive Order -- effective 10 October 1945 -- establishing the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and transferring all elements of OSS -- except those absorbed by the Departments of Army, Navy, and State -- to the new organization.1/* Barely 4 months later, on 22 January 1946, a new Presidential Directive created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and vested in that body the authority to establish the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).2/ By 1 November 1946, SSU property assets had been absorbed by CIG.3/ A problem common to both these organizations was their forced reliance upon other Government agencies, primarily the

*For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

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Departments of War, Navy, and, to a lesser degree, State for operating funds and personnel. Neither SSU nor CIG was independently funded by Congress.* It was the opinion of CIG's General Counsel that CIG had no official power "to take personnel action, to certify payrolls, to authorize travel and to procure supplies."4/ Supplies and equipment were obtained in two primary ways: either directly from existing War Department stocks or with confidential funds made available to the CIG by other Government agencies.

The organizational confusion was resolved with the phaseout of the CIG and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The 80th Congress, in Public Law 253 (National Security Act), signed on 26 July 1947, established the CIA. The National Security Act became effective on 18 September 1947.

A. Period of Transition: SSU to CIG to CIA

While the outline presented above tends to indicate

*This situation was not completely rectified until the enabling legislation, commonly referred to as the CIA Act of 1949, became law on 20 June 1949.

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turmoil, the logistics functions actually remained relatively stable. The Procurement and Supply Branch (P&S)* (see Figure 1) functioned as the SSU logistics element. The broken lines on Figure 1 indicate those elements whose existence was deemed temporary. On 1 October 1945 P&S had a personnel strength of [] a figure that steadily declined. A year later, under CIG [] the number of personnel performing logistics functions had dropped [] with the phaseout of the temporary elements of P&S. 5/ During its short lifespan P&S processed some 2, 698 procurement requests with a dollar value of \$160, 324. The Surplus Property Section disposed of \$3 million worth of surplus equipment, and the Contract Termination Section terminated 69 contracts and obtained favorable settlement of 67 others. **6/

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When the logistics structure of SSU was absorbed by CIG in October 1946, the organization and mission remained

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
**Precise statistical data for this period are not easily obtainable, and the reliability of those available is questionable. Statistics presented in this paragraph are cited as examples of activity and do not necessarily indicate the total activity of the element.

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Figure 1

Organizational Chart
Strategic Services Unit -- Procurement and Supply Branch
October 1945

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unchanged, with the exception that the Contract Termination and Surplus Property Sections were eliminated. The primary functions of the unit included procurement, supply and warehousing, maintenance of buildings, operation of a telephone section, a central mail room, and a central courier office. On 22 November 1946 the Personnel and Administration Branch was established.^{7/} A subordinate element of this branch was the Services Division, which took over the personnel and the functions of the defunct P&S Branch. The Services Division retained the P&S Branch missions and added to these the responsibilities for printing, reproduction, and the translation of foreign language documents to meet the requirements of CIG.^{*8/} Figure 2** shows the organizational structure of the Services Division.

On 18 June 1947 the Personnel and Administration Branch

*The printing and reproduction functions are understandable support missions, but how the responsibility for translating foreign documents came to be placed under this division is something of a mystery. To muddy the water even further, the organizational chart available for the period reflects the Translation Section, but the corresponding Table of Organization (T/O) does not reflect a personnel strength for this section. Efforts to validate the existence and/or rationale for the Translation Section have come to a dead end in every instance.


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Figure 2

Organizational Chart
Central Intelligence Group
November 1946



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was renamed the Executive for Administration and Management -- to become effective 1 July -- and the Services Division -- now to be the Services Branch -- along with other support elements, became a part of this newly created office. 9/ In CIG parlance, a division was subordinate to a branch, so this change in nomenclature was indicative of the growing importance of the logistical function. Concurrently, the Translation Section disappeared and a new division was added -- Central Records -- which was responsible for records management, top secret control, administrative files, and mail and courier service.

Heretofore the logistical effort had been concentrated in the metropolitan area -- supplying the demands of the headquarters elements. It now became clear that to truly support CIG a reorientation was necessary. Support -- in terms of supplies and equipment -- was required on a global basis. To gain a perspective into the activities of the period, it must be remembered that the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was the major operating component within CIG. Operations were primarily of the Foreign Intelligence (FI) type, and the days of large-scale paramilitary (PM) activity were still in the future. National policy was often

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unsettled, and the lack of direction was reflected in the operations of CIG. In the field, case officers had great latitude in administration. They rented safehouses as required, often purchased required supplies and equipment with cash, and were able, on an individual basis, to obtain support from local representatives of

[redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

At this point in time, the final reorganization -- in a national sense -- occurred. The National Security Act of 1947 was implemented, and CIG became CIA on 18 September 1947. The logistics structure was essentially untouched by this change except that the Services Branch lost its Central Records Division. (b)(3) CIAAct The branch had grown in personnel to [redacted] -- with a T/O of [redacted] -- and consisted of the Office of the Chief, and Supply, Property, Reproduction, Travel, and Transportation Sections. 10/

B. CIA's Logistic System

The next few years were marked by numerous internal organizational changes. At its birth CIA was a relatively small organization consisting of less than [redacted] people, and it had an (b)(3) CIAAct

*This paragraph is a summary of the impressions received during discussions with those who had been on board during this early era.

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operating budget of some [] A constant search for the correct balance between the operational elements and the support elements began late in 1948. The major share of the logistics function was being performed by the Services Branch, but it is important to note that OSO also contained a logistics support unit in the form of its Project Support Branch -- later called the Transportation and Supply Division. The catalyst, both for the Agency and its support elements, was the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) on 1 September 1948. 11/ Vested with the mission of countering Communism by the use of "dirty tricks," OPC was originally autonomous and merely attached to CIA for administrative purposes. 12/ With both OSO and OPC in operation there was duplication and diffusion of the logistics effort throughout the Agency, to say nothing of the divergence of opinion over how the support function should be organized.

Generally the operational elements felt strongly that to be fully responsive OPC and OSO each required an organic support element and further that support elements should be

*The exact figures, while available, are still classified TS (as of May 1972). Precise figures may be found in "Report of Survey" by Messrs. Miller and McGruder, 10 May 1955. HS/HC 526 (TS)

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compartmented into covert and overt functions. With the creation of OPC the Agency was about to embark on operations on a much more grandiose scale than many had anticipated. In the first 4 years of its existence the Agency grew from a relatively small organization to one having more than [] and an (b)(3) CIAAct operating budget well in excess of [] -- for FY 1953 some 71 percent of this money was for OPC operations.*

1. Organization of Logistics Support

While the operational components were plumping for organic support units, Agency management, in its first major organizational effort, placed the responsibility for support under the CIA Executive. 14/ The reorganization, decreed on 14 September 1948 by General Order No. 11, provided that effective 1 December the Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) was to be abolished, together with its Personnel, Services, Budget and Finance, and Management Branches. Implementation of the

*Again, imprecise figures are used because of the TS classification of the source. Personnel figures are taken from the source quoted in the footnote on p. 11 above. Budgetary figures are available in the Office of Comptroller, "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities--CIA and Predecessor Organizations," 20 September 1945 through 23 January 1952, (TS) HS/HC 36, Item 2.

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reorganization was delayed, but on 31 December 1948 abolition of the Executive for A&M was confirmed along with abolition of its branches. The former branch chiefs now became functional officers. Thus the Chief of the Services Branch of A&M became the Services Officer under the CIA Executive. 15/ At the same time that this change occurred OSO lost its own logistics support element -- the Transportation and Supply Division -- which was replaced by covert counterparts in the new Services Office. 16/ (See Figure 3.*)

The organization, as outlined in Figure 3, lasted barely 10 months when it was superseded by another change. On 1 October 1949 the Services Office per se was abolished, and the overt and covert functions were made separate staffs -- still responsible to the CIA Executive. 17/ (See Figure 4.**)


The Services Division of each staff was a self-contained logistical support group. On 5 October 1949, only 4 days after it was scheduled to become effective, the Overt Support Staff was renamed the Administrative Staff, and the Covert Support Staff

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
Figure 3Organization of Services Office
January 1949~~SECRET~~

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Figure 4

Organization of Overt and
Covert Support Staffs
October 1949

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became the Special Support Staff, 18/ Each staff inherited the divisions from its predecessors, and in addition the Administrative Staff picked up the Medical Division (see Figure 5*).

Figures 4 and 5 provide ample evidence that the philosophy concerning compartmentation was being observed. The operational components, however, were disturbed by the organization because the support elements were reporting to the CIA Executive -- the number-three man in the Agency hierarchy. In a history of the period, [] says:

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(b)(3) CIAAct

The Chief of the Special Support Staff reported directly to the Executive, CIA. Thus while recognizing the need for separate facilities for the covert offices, General Order No. 24 placed command of these covert facilities in the Executive, CIA, leaving the covert offices, and especially OPC, without any direct control over the resources upon which it was dependent for its existence and operations. The policy guidance as to scale and magnitude of operations given OPC by the Departments of State and Defense, to which OPC attempted to respond, was not recognized by the CIA Special Support Staff elements. Thus, the office [OPC] was in the position of receiving its mission on a large scale from one source and its means on a limited scale from another unrelated and uncoordinated source. 19/


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Figure 5

Organization of Administrative and
Special Support Staff
October 1949



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OPC did, however, have a quasi-logistics system of its own. Staff III of OPC was an administrative unit, and among its other functions it was charged with providing for "OPC Headquarters services and supply needs; develops and implements policies and procedures related thereto." 20/ Staff II of OPC contained a Materiel Branch whose mission was:

Advises and assists in the development and formulation of OPC materiel (services, supplies, and equipment, exclusive of ammunition and equipment and special devices) requirements and the acquisition of materiel* necessary to the implementation of plans and projects in locations other than Headquarters. 21/

The OPC unit grew, and by 1951 it was called the Administration and Logistics (A&L) Staff with a T/O of of whom were assigned to the Logistics Division and to the General Services Division. 22/ That there was a division of responsibilities between the Special Support Staff and OPC's own support elements is evident; but to make matters worse, this division of responsibility, always confusing and often inefficient, led finally to friction between the two elements. The primary bone of contention seems to have been which element should properly deal with

(b)(3) CIAAct

*Emphasis added.

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DOD and the Armed Services. OPC, because of its quasi-military type mission and the large number of military officers assigned to the office, acquired extensive contacts among the services. This dispute surfaced in 1950 when Andrew E. Van Esso, then Chief of the Procurement Office -- a later reorganization of the Special Support Staff -- attempted to consolidate sole responsibility for all acquisition of supplies and equipment in the Procurement Office. In a memorandum to the ADPC, his Special Support Assistant (SSA), Colonel Robert Taylor, summarized Van Esso's position:

Van Esso reiterated his request that OPC stop dealing with JSPD on matters of supply and that OPC recognize his office as the sole point of contact with the military services and others for the procurement of materiel.^{23/}

Taylor informed Van Esso that OPC would be happy to submit requests for supplies that it would normally expect to receive through CIA channels to his office but that OPC would expect that requirements that arose as a result of joint planning with the various military staffs must be worked out as best suited each individual case. Taylor assured Van Esso that OPC would do its best to prevent duplication of requirements that might

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arise as a result of OPC work with the military services on war planning. *24/ One day later Taylor fired off another memorandum to the ADPC, Frank Wisner, on the same subject. Taylor had seen a memorandum proposed by Van Esso for the DCI's signature that would require all Agency requirements for materiel requested from the military to pass through a central point -- Van Esso's Procurement Office. Noting that the DCI had recently complimented the US Air Force (USAF) as having

contributed materially to the accomplishment by this Agency of certain of its objectives. The high priority which you are according such support is greatly appreciated. 25/

Taylor's rejoinder was:

The "high-priority" referred to in this paragraph is the priority afforded to OPC because of its peculiar relationship to the Air Force and is not the priority accorded to CIA as such. To have OPC priority placed in the same category with agency-wide priority would mean in effect substantial lessening of the support which OPC now enjoys. 26/

Problems such as the one described above were not finally

*OPC was responsible for all war planning, running the gamut from guerrilla to "hot war."

- 20 -

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resolved until the formation of the CS in 1952 and the subsequent centralization of all logistics functions in 1954. Another unfortunate result of such maneuverings was the lack of confidence many of the operational elements had in the Agency logistics system as it then existed.

On 1 December 1950, the CIA Executive became the Deputy Director for Administration (DDA). As part of this reorganization, the Administrative and Special Support Staffs were replaced by the Administrative Services Office and the Procurement Office -- on equal levels.27/ (See Figure 6. *)

As Figure 6 shows, the logistics functions remained divided between two independent offices. The division of responsibilities was based on putting purely administrative support under one office and planning, procurement, and supply into another separate office. Two more realignments were to occur, but the concept of division of responsibilities was to be retained. A year later, in December 1951, a high-level reorganization occurred, and a new command level was activated -- the Office of General Services. This office had two major components: Administrative


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Figure 6

Organization of Administrative Services
and Procurement Offices
December 1950

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- 22 -

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Services (formerly the Administrative Services Office) and Organization and Methods Services (formerly the Office of Management Analysis). The Procurement Office remained stable during this reorganization, but on 21 February 1952, 3 months later, another shuffle occurred. The Procurement Office was renamed the Procurement and Supply (P&S) Office, and the governing regulation assigned as its mission:

The Chief of Procurement and Supply is responsible for the procurement, storage, issue, and Agency accountability of all Agency equipment and supplies except as departure therefrom is properly authorized, and for coordination and compilation of requirements of materials required for logistical support. 28/

By August of 1952 P&S began to assume greater responsibilities. On 5 August the transportation function was transferred from the Office of General Services to P&S, exclusive of the motor pool and the trucking function. During that same month a portion of the Real Estate and Construction Division responsibilities, such as engineering support, was transferred to P&S. A chain reaction had been triggered, for in September 1952 the logisticians assigned to OPC's A&L Staff were transferred to P&S. These changes were precursors of those yet to come; and on

- 23 -

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20 March 1953 the Logistics Office was activated, assuming the mantle from P&S. 29/

Before the Logistics Office came into being, however, there was a protracted struggle among the operational elements to retain their various autonomies -- from each other and from the rest of the Agency. From the creation of OPC in September 1948 until General Smith's decree of 1 August 1952 effecting a merger of OSO and OPC under the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), logistics and other support activities were dispersed, duplicated, and decentralized at the whim of the operational managers. The development of an effective centralized support program would, in fact, be a continuing point of friction between the Deputy Director for Administration (DDA*) and the Clandestine Services until well into the 1960's,** and the history of logistics developments was one of the principal features of that story.

*Established 1 December 1950, this Directorate became the Deputy Directorate for Support (DDS) on 3 February 1955.

**As noted later in this paper, the question of centralization vs decentralization of support functions was less of an "either-or" proposition by the end of the 1960's than it had been in earlier years. Pragmatists, bearing the results of cost-effectiveness studies, demonstrated the need for flexibility in support -- including logistics support -- for operations.

- 24 -

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~~SECRET~~2. Support for Operations

It is difficult to ferret out examples of operational support during the SSU-CIG era. As far as can be ascertained, operations were on a small scale and consisted of FI activities, which do not usually require large-scale logistical support. As mentioned previously, the creation of OPC in September 1948 was a catalyst that spurred the growth of both CIA and its logistical elements. The major projects of this era were triggered by the Chinese Communist takeover on the mainland and the Korean War. Two major projects born during the early 1950's had much to do with the decision to develop the

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

- 26 -

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~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

While it is true that neither of these projects ever actually achieved much from an operational standpoint, both had a tremendous impact on the logistical elements. Instead of requiring a few typewriters and other miscellaneous equipment, these projects put the logistical function in the big time as evidenced by a memorandum to the Comptroller from Colonel Richard G. Stilwell, Chief of the FE Division. ** Stilwell pointed out that the Project Review Committee (PRC)*** had authorized [redacted] for FE/OPC activities. Of this amount, [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

*It is also interesting to note that [redacted] was essentially an OPC project while [redacted] was sponsored by OSO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Colonel Stilwell is yet another Army officer who attained success in his chosen profession. In 1970 he was a Lieutenant General assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Operations, on the Army General Staff.

***The PRC was responsible for approving projects conceptually as well as for approving funds.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Kilbourne Johnston, the ADPC,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 28 -

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(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 29 -

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] His trip report

summarized his findings:

It is the opinion of the undersigned that the present system of procurement is functioning with exceptional efficiency, and barring unforeseen security breaks, it is recommended that the present procedure continue to the extent required by operational needs. 39/

Changes were made, nevertheless, and it was at this time that

[redacted] a staff employee from the Office of Scientific (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Intelligence of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), was

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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*General Cabell was DDCI

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] constructed at a cost in excess of [] was (b)(3) CIAAct

throughout the period of this history the major Agency support
base in the FE area; and in terms of size, activity, and longevity

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct it exceeded any base ever developed by the Agency overseas. *

Neither [] lasted long as support and opera-
tional bases. []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Within CONUS the problem of facilities was somewhat
different. In the metropolitan Washington area -- in the early
days it was termed the "departmental" area -- the emphasis was
in obtaining office space and storage facilities. ***

From the outset the answer appeared to be to obtain one
large facility to house all Agency operations, and on 31 March

_____ (b)(1)
*As this is written (1972), the [] has orders to (b)(3) NatSecAct
disengage from support activity, and by 1 July 1972 only a residual
force will remain.

[]
***See Table 1, page 36.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~Table 1Space Facilities Required by CIA1948-53 46/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Space Occupied a/</u>	<u>Number of Buildings</u>	
1948			(b)(3) CIAAct
1949			
1950			
1951			
1953			

a. Net square feet.

1947 the DCI, Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, requested of the Public Buildings Service (PBS) "that CIG be assigned a single, permanent, fireproof building having a minimum capacity

47/ Such requests were repeated frequently over the years without success until Congress on 15 July 1955 -- Public Law 161, 84th Congress -- authorized \$46 million for a CIA building.

(b)(3) CIAAct

In addition to finding space for people, the logistical support elements had to have warehouse space. Until 1953 the headquarters logistical functions were conducted out of


- 36 -

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct~~SECRET~~


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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

the East Coast Depot,



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Operation of this facility was terminated in December 1966.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

- 38 -

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As mentioned earlier the most vital legislation affecting the Agency was the CIA Act of 1949 -- Public Law 110, 81st Congress, 20 June 1949 -- for it gave the Agency a budgetary and fiscal stability that had hitherto been lacking. Before the passage of PL 110 the lack of specific enabling legislation had necessitated that the DCI depend on delegations from the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Navy and on verbal and somewhat tenuous understandings with the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congress and other Government agencies as to the purposes for which available funds could legally and properly be expended. There were, of course, many aspects to this act, but analyzed from the standpoint of its impact upon the logistical elements, the act provided the following authorities:

1. Extended to CIA certain authority in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 relating to negotiation of purchases and contracts for supply without advertising* under certain conditions;
2. Exempted the CIA from certain statutory restrictions on the amount that can be paid for rent of quarters and the amount that can be expended for alterations;

*Emphasis added.

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3. Provided broad authority for transfers between the CIA and other Government departments and agencies of such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB);*

4. Provided authority for exchange of funds without regard to Section 3651 of the Revised Statutes (31 USC 543);**

5. Provided for the expenditure of funds for certain purposes without regard to requirements of existing law or Comptroller General decisions which specify that such expenditures are not permissible unless authorized by law; and for the expenditure of certain funds solely on the certification of the DCI. ***

The authorities provided in the act thus gave the Agency a latitude, especially in the field of procurement, that it sorely needed.

Parallel actions that were to complement the authorities provided by the CIA Act of 1949 were the support agreements reached with other Government agencies. One of the earliest recorded agreements was concluded in 1949 between the DCI and

This particular agreement appears
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Now (1972) termed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

**This exemption allows CIA to convert US dollars, gold, and silver into foreign currencies and the use of such currencies for payment in kind.


***Emphases added.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



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(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Representing CIA were Andrew E. Van Esso, Chief, Procurement Requirements Staff;

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(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

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in CIA and the apparent internal jurisdictional conflict in CIA concerning procurement responsibility and authority resulted in undesirable liaison with excessive numbers of people, conflicting claims to CIA procurement authority, and conflicting correspondence channels.

(6) Priority ratings, planning of [] requirements, and the security of handling shipments were jeopardized by the generally chaotic situation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Recommendations:

(1) CIA should place its house in order by firmly placing procurement responsibility and authority in a single office and by designating specific liaison points and communications channels.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(2) The present dual authorities under which CIA is receiving logistics support from [] should be replaced with a single new authority. 53/


It is interesting to note that both recommendations made

[] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct
and the creation of an independent


Logistics Office in that same year provided the single point of

[] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Until her retirement in 1970, [redacted] was the (b)(6)
Agency's point of contact in DA and over some 17 years rendered (b)(3) CIAAct
outstanding service and cooperation to the Agency.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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when needed to effect the transport of Agency supplies and equipment; and GSA directs and coordinates the design, engineering, construction, maintenance, and repair requirements of Agency properties within the Washington metropolitan area,

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The techniques used in the acquisition of supplies and equipment were refined during this early period. Interagency support agreements were formalized, and the method of procurement and funding also underwent a change. From 1946 to 1952

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

That logisticians were routinely excluded from the planning

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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phase of operations is demonstrated by the following excerpt from a memorandum to the ADPC from his executive officer:

OPC welcomes all possible assistance from the Support Staff but is fearful to accept this assistance unless assurance can be given that operational details will not be passed through the entire administrative hierarchy.

Through the use of these Logistics Support Officers, it is believed that we will be able to use the CIA Support Staff personnel much more effectively. We further believe that due to the extremely sensitive nature of our operations, this is the most effective way of "cutting-in" Meloon's people [Chief, Special Support Staff] and far preferable to their attempting to participate in regular planning conferences. 55/

Over the years, the attitude expressed in the quotation above gradually diminished as faith in the Agency's support system grew.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The implementation of this and other refinements allowed the Agency to procure more items openly or through GSA, and by 1953 only those procurements in which the interest of the USG had to be concealed were part of the covert procurement program. 56/

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III. The Office of Logistics -- Coming of Age

A. Organization and Mission

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The publication of CIA Regulation No. on 20 March

1953 was the turning point in the history of Logistics. The mission paragraph of this Regulation stated:

The Chief of Logistics is responsible for the procurement, distribution, and accountability of Agency equipment and supplies, for transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies; for meeting real estate and construction needs, except for securing space assignments through the General Services Administration in the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C.; and for the coordination and compilation of forecasts of requirements for Agency logistical support.

Although some overlap of logistical functions between the new Logistics Office and OGS continued to exist, it was short lived.* A totality had been created and the problems faced by the new office were many. (See Figure 7 -- Organization.**)

Standard procedures for property accountability were


*The OGS was dissolved on 15 February 1954.

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Figure 7

Organization of the Logistics Office
March 1953



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nonexistent, stock control was being performed manually, financial accountability procedures had to be developed in conjunction with the Comptroller, and logistics procedures had not been formally promulgated -- these were the major problems faced by the newly created office.^{57/} Careful analysis of the mission statement contained in Regulation No. [] reveals another (b)(3) NatSecAct important function -- that of forecasting requirements for Agency logistical support. It must be realized that virtually all expertise in logistics functions had been stripped from the Area Divisions and Staffs of the DDP when the A&L Staff of OPC was liquidated. It was of paramount importance to both logistics and the operations personnel that the planning functions continue to be performed by the Coordination and Requirements Staff but by July 1954 the need for this Staff had diminished. The prime reason for this was the fact that the Logistics Career Board* had introduced trained logistics personnel into the staffs of the operational elements of the Agency, and these individuals provided the point

*The Logistics Career Board was established by CIA Regulation No. [] 25 May 1953. The Board was charged with the career planning, development, promotion, and assignment of Logistics career designees throughout the Agency.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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of contact between the operational element they represented and
"Main Log."

The other problems enumerated above were resolutely
attacked and solutions found. By early 1953 the Supply Division
was operating three warehouse facilities

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

and the manual stock record system simply could not cope with
the volume. In October 1952 the conversion of stock records to
machine language had begun in order to utilize electronic account-
ing machines, commonly referred to as an EAM system. This
conversion was completed in February 1953. The Financial
Analysis Number (FAN) was adopted to interface with the Comp-
troller's Office, and this became the basis of the Agency's system
of financial accounting for property (FPA). These changes in
turn led to the initiation of an Agency cataloging system of pro-
fessional quality using the Federal Classification system as the
basis for its own program. Thus when fiscal year 1954 rolled
around, the Logistics Office was able to place monetary values
on Agency assets and be reasonably certain that the figures were
inclusive and correct -- the dollar value of assets on hand as of

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(b)(3) CIAAct

1 July 1953 totaled more than [] 58/* The final problem, that of formally promulgating logistics procedures, took somewhat longer to solve. Over a two-year period from about mid-1953 to mid-1955, however, some 51 [] Headquarters regulations were published and distributed covering all facets of the logistical operations of the Agency. In addition to the regulatory issuances, a series of handbooks was written and published. Four basic handbooks were developed for use as procedural guides for personnel requesting or requiring logistical support.** As can be seen, the Agency and its logistics element were coming of age -- and becoming a bureaucracy in the process.

Minor adjustments continued to be made in the structure of the Logistics Office -- most coming from the transfer of functions from the OGS. In December 1953 the motor pool function,

*This is a very general treatment of a tremendously complicated subject. Interested readers are referred to source 42 and source 57 for a complete explanation.

**In chronological order, these were: []

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] "Detached Station Supply Procedures, " 15 Jun 55 (S);

[] "Preparation and Submission of Requisitions, "(b)(3) NatSecAct

18 Jul 55 (S); [] "Field Supply Procedures, " 8 Sep 55;

and [] "Property Accounting Procedures for

Headquarters Controlled Activities, " 26 Sep 55 (S).

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(b)(3) CIAAct

with [] positions, was transferred to the Transportation Division. 59/ In February 1954 the OGS was dissolved and its remaining logistical functions transferred to the Logistics Office; the elements transferred were Printing and Reproduction, Mail Control, and Space, Maintenance, and Facilities. This final consolidation added one new division, Printing and Reproduction, to the Table of Organization (T/O) of the Logistics Office. 60/ The rapid assimilation of these functions ballooned the personnel strength to an on-duty figure [] operating under a T/O of [] (b)(3) CIAAct

Mr. James A. Garrison, Chief of Logistics, was apprehensive lest the sudden influx create inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the distribution of duties and personnel, and he requested a management survey of the Logistics Office. 61/ As a result of this management survey, the Logistics Office was retitled the Office of Logistics (OL) on 21 July 1954 and organized as shown in Figure 8. ** (b)(3) CIAAct

At the same time, the T/O was reduced to [] positions, and the on-duty strength fell slightly to a total of [] James Garrison

(b)(3) CIAAct

*See Appendix E for a statistical comparison of the personnel status of the logistics element.


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Figure 8

Organization of the Office of Logistics
July 1954



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was the driving force behind these efforts to create a strong, effective OL. He joined the Agency on October 1951 as the Acting Chief of the Procurement Office, replaced Andrew Van Esso as the Chief, P&S in 1952 (Van Esso resigned), and was made the Chief of Logistics in March 1953. Garrison continued as the Director of Logistics (D/L) until his retirement in September 1964. For more than a dozen years he was, in effect, "Mr. Logistics" and most of the organizational and procedural changes that were effected within OL were conceived in Garrison's fertile mind and implemented by the force of his personality.

Fluctuations in the organizational structure continued to occur, dictated primarily by mission requirements and refinements in management techniques. The Printing and Reproduction Division was renamed the Printing Services Division (PSD) on 13 June 1955. Also in 1955 the planning for the new Headquarters building had become such a burden on the Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD) that it became necessary to form a separate staff whose sole responsibility was to coordinate all planning for the Langley building. The Building Planning Staff was created in December 1955 and, once its work was completed,

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dissolved on 29 June 1962. *

Two organizational changes were made in 1956 -- the addition of an Executive Officer to the chain of command and the creation of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division. The formation of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division was authorized by General Cabell on 14 June 1956. 64/ Its mission was to develop, implement, and monitor a support program for the maintenance of Agency-owned and Agency-controlled aircraft. ** The lifespan of this Division as an element of OL was relatively short. The Division and its personnel were transferred to the Development Projects Division of the DDP on 6 March 1959. The other addition, the creation of the position of Executive Officer,

*Interestingly enough, such a staff, once presumed dead, was resurrected; and a new Building Planning Staff was given birth on 2 April 1969 to develop a "Master Plan" for the Langley site. 63/ The new staff, although personally approved by the Executive Director-Comptroller, Colonel White, was created with the stipulation that no personnel slots or money would be provided. The staff was formed by detailing personnel to it from other OL and Agency offices. Dr. Kenneth Addicott, a DDP careerist, was named Chairman of the Staff in June 1969 and continued in that capacity until his retirement on 4 February 1972. He is the source of the information contained herein.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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was more permanent. 65/* It was created to provide a means of reducing the workload of the Director and Deputy Director, and the Executive Officer was especially charged with providing administrative support and coordinating the efforts of the independent staffs. With these changes OL had six divisions -- the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division, the Procurement Division, the Real Estate and Construction Division, the Transportation Division, the Supply Division, and the Printing Services Division -- and four staffs -- Security, Building Planning, Administrative, and Planning.

Except for the loss of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division in 1959, the organization of the OL underwent only minor internal shiftings until 1962. Two events combined to result in the formation of the Logistics Services Division. One of these was the completion of the Headquarters Building at Langley. President Eisenhower laid the cornerstone for the building on 3 November 1959, and on the evening of 18 September 1961 Phase One of the move into the new CIA quarters commenced. 66/

*This position was effective on 24 October 1956 and continues in existence to date (1972).

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Occupation of this building placed a service requirement upon the OL which, to this date (1972), remains a major function -- often a frustrating and burdensome function. Although GSA was responsible for maintaining the building, that agency often did not or could not respond quickly enough to suit the tenants, and the OL was called upon to accomplish the mission -- telephone service, pneumatic tube, building supply, disposal of classified waste, or trimming the DCI's hedges! Concurrently an Inspector General (IG) Survey of June 1961 recommended a regrouping of units and functions to separate the pure line logistics responsibilities from services such as vehicle maintenance and courier service. 67/

Based on these recommendations and the obvious need to have a responsive unit located in the new building, Colonel White, then the DDS, * approved the formation of the Logistics Services Division on 5 September 1962. The Division was formally brought into existence on 23 October 1962 with a staff of personnel and an

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

*CIA Notice 3 Feb 55, formally established the Deputy Director for Support (DDS) and abolished the DDA and the Chief of Administration (COA), DDP. At this time, the DDS had under its control the Offices of Communications, Comptroller, Logistics, Personnel, Security, Training, Audit, General Counsel, Management, and Medical Services.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

annual operating budget of [REDACTED]

The ensuing years brought further changes to the organization of the OL, but the turbulent years had passed and forthcoming changes were more deliberate and studied. On 1 March 1965 the Administrative Staff was liquidated, an exercise that was directly related to a reduction in the authorized personnel ceiling of the OL. 69/ The separate elements of the Staff were placed under the direct supervision of the Director of Logistics and his staff, and the command structure of the Administrative Staff ceased to exist. Its Personnel Branch was redesignated the Personnel and Training Staff and reported directly to the D/L. The Budget and Fiscal Branch and the Records and Services Branch were made answerable to the Executive Officer.

The major organizational change of this period occurred on 16 March 1966 when the Transportation Division was dissolved. * Transportation had continued in existence as a branch, section, or division since the beginning of the Agency, including the days of

*The dissolution of this division is interesting because although OL files contain staff studies and proposed Headquarters [REDACTED] announcing the transfer of division functions, no Agency or OL publication was ever issued announcing the demise of the division.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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the SSU and the CIG. The contributions made by this element over the years are too numerous to list in detail, but in addition to the mundane business of supporting the Headquarters administrative transportation requirements, the Transportation Division initiated shipping arrangements with [redacted] operated a fleet of trucks between depots and ports of embarkation, and developed the first Agency program to monitor the acquisition and control of all Agency vehicles, 70/* The initiation of the TVA program is an excellent example of implementing a management control unquestionably needed and having it turn into a bureaucratic burden. At its inception the program was credited with reducing the vehicular requirements of the Agency by [redacted] vehicles with a corresponding savings in equipment investment of some \$500,000. ** For the first time, managers had detailed data available showing quantities, location, and intended use of each vehicle

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Begun in April 1955, this system was predicated upon the establishment of a Table of Vehicular Allowances (TVA) and remains in existence to date (1972).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**The initial count reflected approximately [redacted] vehicles on Agency records worldwide. The count was made by Mr. Frank [redacted] of the Transportation Division who was dispatched TDY for this express purpose. Over the years this figure has fluctuated and now (1972) stands at approximately [redacted] vehicles.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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acquired by the Agency. Forms were developed for use as "trip tickets"* and for periodic maintenance reports. Regulations were developed that prescribed what options and accessories could be requested; the series of regulations still (1972) contain many of these rules. Naturally, some case officers with a penchant for Jaguars and Mercedes-Benz automobiles were unhappy with these regulations. After management had gained a measure of control over the program, it then became a matter of paperwork -- filing the maintenance reports that were forwarded monthly to Headquarters and adjudicating requests for optional equipment or increases in the TVA. As with men and money, requirements always seemed to increase rather than decrease. Upon dissolution of the Transportation Division, this responsibility was transferred to the Supply Division. As the years passed so too did the rigid control of vehicles; delegations of authority were granted to the area divisions and other Agency elements having a TVA, the sending of maintenance forms to Headquarters was discontinued,

(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Military terminology for a form utilized by drivers of Government vehicles which indicated time-in, time-out, odometer reading, destination, and total mileage driven on a daily basis.

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and by the end of the period (1970) the OL was embarked upon a program of returning virtually all responsibility for the TVA's to the operating components and retaining only a computerized central reference file of the status of Agency vehicles. The paramount responsibilities of the Transportation Division -- the transport of people and things -- were divided between OL's Supply Division, which assumed total responsibility for the transport of things, and the Office of Personnel, which through its Central Processing Branch took over the responsibility for the transport of people.

Rounding out the reorganization was the formation of the

[redacted] designed to provide O^{(b)(1)}
(b)(3) NatSecAct and the Agency with a contracting office capable of dealing with the

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Approved by the DDS on 29 June 1959, it began operation on 25 September of that year from facilities located at [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Before bringing this section to its conclusion, two other changes in the Agency procurement system are worthy of note.

As a result of a study performed in 1966 by an outside management

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firm [] an Agency

Contract Review Board was established in September 1967. As currently constituted (1972) the Board consists of five members, one from each of the Deputy Directors and the DD/L acting as chairman, and its primary responsibilities are to review contracts and contract actions -- normally in the R&D field -- in excess of \$150,000, review cost overruns that exceed \$22,500 and 15 percent, and provide contracting policy upon request. In addition to the regular members, the Board also has advisors assigned from the General Counsel's office and the Office of Finance in addition to the OL Security Office and the Chief of the Procurement Management Staff (PMS). Because of the multidirectorate nature of this Board, it no longer appears on the OL organizational chart. The final element added to the OL structure was the PMS, which was activated on 17 April 1970. 71/ The establishment of this Staff was directly related to the decentralization of the procurement

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*Commonly referred to as the [] Because of its classification (BYEMAN), details are not included in this history. The report is available, however, in the OL Registry.

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contracting efforts begun in 1967.* The growing maturity and experience of the office allowed management to begin such decentralization without any great concern about its ultimate success. On 22 August 1967 the D/L delegated contracting-officer authority for R&D contracts to DDP's Technical Services Division (TSD). This was followed on 1 March 1968 by a similar delegation to the Office of Elint (OEL) of the DDS&T and then on 26 February 1969 to the Office of Research and Development (ORD), also DDS&T, and on the same date to the DDI's National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC). All such contracting officers are SL careerists, and one of the functions of the PMS is to give them a "home." Specifically, the PMS was designed as a "coordinating mechanism on behalf of all Headquarters contracting units having delegated authority from the Director of Logistics." 73/ The PMS also provides staff supervision over the activities of the (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Thus, at the end of the period, the organization of the OL was as

*Historically, the first special procurement authority was granted to Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination, in 1954. This delegation of authority related specifically to the development of the U-2. 72/

**Until the creation of the PMS, was an integral part of the Procurement Division.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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shown in Figure 9. *

B. Activities and Accomplishments

The period from 1953 through 1970 is replete with examples of the Office's accomplishments. This section will touch on only the most significant, and for definitive studies readers are again referred to the individual histories in the OL series listed in Appendix C.

1. Personnel Staffing

It is axiomatic that a unit is only as good as the personnel assigned to it. Taking this corollary one step further, it follows that even qualified personnel need training and motivation in order to produce to the limits of their capabilities. In short, they require good leadership. One of the first problems was to determine who was a logistician. CIA first established a career service program in 1952, and the then P&SO was directed to form its own career service board.^{74/} At this time there was no career service as such; one found a desk and held on. The first career service board managed to sort out and resolve many of

*Page 64.

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Organization of the Office of Logistics
31 December 1970



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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these problems and became the focal point for transfer and promotion actions until 1964 when the D/L delegated all "action functions" to his Personnel Officer. 75/ From that time, October 1964, until January 1970 only one meeting of the logistics career service board was conducted. 76/ This period coincides with the tour of Mr. George E. Meloon as the D/L and all promotions, transfers, and like personnel actions became the province of the division and staff chiefs with final approval coming personally from Meloon. To characterize OL during this era as a fiefdom of the D/L is not a great exaggeration. With the advent of the newly appointed D/L in January 1970, * new life was pumped into the career service board; and by the end of the period it, in conjunction with its panels, ** was once again operating as an independent advisor to the D/L on career matters. However, when considering the entire period of this report, the fact that no career logistics officer has ever ascended to the position of D/L is a telling summary of OL's career development program.

*Mr. John F. Blake

**In 1970 each SL Careerist was assigned a specific job title and assigned to a designated career service panel that was vested with the responsibility for developing each member's career pattern.

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Complicating the staffing problems for the OL are two facts: approximately one-third of its employees are engaged in unskilled or semiskilled service work, and more than another one-third of its careerists are actually working outside the Office in logistics slots that are under the control of other Agency components. In the first instance this has led to a rapid turnover of personnel because of the low grade and menial nature of much of the work. The calibre of individuals available for this type of work has also posed an inordinate number of personnel problems not usually experienced by the other components of the Agency. In the second instance, rotatability of its personnel causes perennial problems. Field stations as well as Headquarters elements must be staffed with career logisticians, and a field station's requirements are often the most difficult to satisfy. An individual once nominated by the D/L must himself accept, and there is often a rejection by the individual for personal or family reasons. Then concurrences must be obtained from both the area division and the station involved, and it is not unusual to get a refusal at either point. Once accepted, the nominee and his family must successfully pass a physical examination. Many are eliminated by this

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step; one reason is that as the average career logistician has been aging, the physical examinations have become increasingly more demanding. After all these hurdles have been passed, the candidate usually gets to the field station -- unless the slot is suddenly cut. In the past few years this has become another factor to contend with. Between mid-1968, when the Balance of Payments (BALPA) reductions began, and the end of the period (December 1970), OL lost some [] overseas slots.*

(b)(3) CIAAct

Reductions in overseas slots came at a time when the Office as a whole was also suffering from cutbacks with no loss of responsibility. The high-water mark in personnel staffing was reached in 1964 when the OL Career Service had an on-duty strength of [] This figure turned slowly downward in 1965, and by the end of the period the on-duty strength of the Office had declined to []*

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

*Such slots are under the control of the respective area division and are subject to reduction or elimination without the approval of the OL. OL had [] overseas slots on 31 May 1968 and [] on 30 June 1970.

(b)(3) CIAAct

**Source 75 was used for all figures except the 30 June 1970 statistics, which were obtained from the IBM computer run furnished to OL/P&TS.

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In tandem with the personnel programs, the necessity for training was recognized early in the period. Personnel were absorbed from the logistics staff of OPC and later OGS, and it was, in a sense, a mixed bag. Many were specialists and others had been exposed to only one facet of the logistics operation. In order to develop personnel qualified to perform a variety of functions, whether in "Main Log," an area division, or at a field station, an extensive in-house training program was initiated in 1953. The first running of the 6-week Logistics Support Course began on 9 November 1953 [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct The primary objective of the course was to provide training in headquarters and, especially, field supply procedures. The course was designed to augment the experience of personnel destined for overseas assignment and was conducted partially in the headquarters area and partially at [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Attendance increased, and during the first three years that the course was presented [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct students attended. The course was changed over the years to meet changing requirements; and in 1966, after the 31st running, it was dropped entirely when the Office of Training (OTR)

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established a comparable course.* Many other training programs existed and were utilized -- in the words of Mr. James Garrison, D/L** -- to

build up a group of professionals in the field of logistics who would know how to furnish materiels and services to the Agency at the lowest cost, in the most flexible and speedy fashion, and with the maximum of security. 77/

What has been achieved over the years is the virtual elimination of the turbulence caused by internal (OL) disorganization to a point where today (1972) such turbulence as exists results from factors outside the Office over which the Office has little influence.

2. Management Decisions

Assuming the existence of a qualified personnel force, the next question is how does such a force receive and carry out a mission. Basically, it responds to management

*No record of the total number of students who attended the course during 1953-66 can be located; however, [] would be a good estimate.

**D/L from March 1953 to September 1964.

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decisions made by the President and his senior advisors* which result in programs requiring activity on the part of the Agency. The personnel force is also, of course, responsive to internal decisions made by individuals in the CIA chain of command.

In previous sections of this history some of these management decisions have been examined; the decentralization of the procurement contracting function is a prime example. Others in this category include the acquisition and disposal of depots, termination of the large-scale foreign arms acquisition program (discussed in Chapter II), revitalization of the career management system (discussed above), dissolution of elements such as the Transportation Division (discussed in Chapter III), and many others in this vein. These decisions may be mission-related -- for example, ample storage space is required to perform the basic OL mission -- but it is important to understand that such decisions are conscientious efforts, in the absence of outside pressures, to improve the posture of OL in relation to the operational requirements of the Agency.

*Including the NSC, the Senior Interdepartmental Groups, the 303 Committee, and other elements of the executive decision-making machinery.

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the East Coast Depot (ECD)

As previously mentioned,

the East Coast facility

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In addition to the consolidation of its depot functions, OL also faced the problem of consolidating its headquarters functions. This took much longer and was not achieved until the late 1960's. The occupation of the new Headquarters building at Langley was touched upon briefly in Chapter II. A capsule version of the history** of the Headquarters building site selection could

*See Table 2.

**See source 46.

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simply not do justice to the story. To place this event in perspective, it is important to recall that the initial objective of the project was to house the entire Agency under one roof. As the planning stage continued to meet obstacles, the Agency expanded; and by the time the Headquarters Building was finally ready for occupancy, in September 1961, it was already too small to accommodate all elements of the Agency. Those elements, including Logistics, that were still occupying temporary quarters along the Potomac had to "find a home," so to speak; and this home was finally located in the Rosslyn area of Northern Virginia, some 7 miles from the Headquarters at Langley via the George Washington Parkway. Three 12-story office buildings -- Key, Magazine, and Ames -- located in this area were leased by the Agency and became home for many of its support elements. The Office of Logistics began moving into the Ames Building, at 1820 North Ft. Myer Drive, soon after the lease was signed on 24 January 1966, and by spring of that year "Main Log" had settled into its new home, occupying generally the top four floors of the building.

The final step in the consolidation of OL units was the

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construction of the Printing Services Building. * Approximately

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originally allocated for the construction of the Headquarters Building remained unobligated; and in March 1964 PSD recommended the use of these funds for the construction of a new printing plant across from the new building. At the time, PSD was operating from four separate locations, two of these located in the Headquarters Building. These two would remain in place; but Plant No. 1 (located at 2028 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia) and Plant No. 2 (located in the South Building, 2430 E Street, N. W.) along with the Chief, PSD, and his staff, who occupied office space in Quarters Eye, were to be moved into the new plant. Congress authorized the expenditure, and the new plant was in full production by 13 September 1967. 78/** Thus at the close of the period the OL with its staffs and divisions was in permanent quarters.

*This is not to overlook the move of LSD's garage and motor pool facilities from Rosslyn to its new quarters in in November 1970. Included in the BPS's Master Plan is a proposal to (b)(1) construct new garage facilities at Langley adjacent to the Headquarters Building. (b)(3) NatSecAct

**There is no intent to slight the many advances in the field of printing and especially graphics made by PSD. The full story of the accomplishments of this unit may be found in source 78, Printing for Intelligence 1942-1968.

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period also saw the virtual elimination of all major overseas support facilities.

3. Support Operations

By the mid-1950's the major projects inspired initially by OPC had quietly died. With the success in Guatemala

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large-scale logis-

tical support was no longer required. Viewed in retrospect, 1956 was probably the turning point for large-scale anti-Communist programs, if one considers the events of the year and the US reaction to those events. Early in the year, in February, Premier Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin before the 20th Soviet Congress. Riots erupted in Soviet Georgia in March and in Poznan, Poland, in June -- both suppressed with heavy casualties. The

(b)(1)

was denounced by the Soviets c(b)(3) NatSecAct

23 April. In July President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, bringing invasion by Israel on 29 October and intervention by France and the United Kingdom on the Israeli side. Also in October the Hungarian Revolt occurred -- to be crushed by

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intervention of the Soviet armed forces. Except for diplomatic maneuvers, the US did little to involve itself in any of these events. It proved, especially to Agency planners, that large-scale use of guerrilla forces and other types of PM activities against the Communists in eastern Europe were not in the cards. One event that was to have a momentous impact upon the Agency and OL occurred, little noticed, on 30 November of that same year: Fidel Castro's revolutionary band landed in Cuba's Oriente Province.

Although the late 1950's were devoid of major operations, one event that occurred was to have a significant impact upon the supply operations of the OL. The time was the summer of 1958, and the US Government was on the verge of intervention in

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Fidel Castro's forces took control of the Island from the dictator Batista. After the shouting and rejoicing died down, the US Government awoke to the fact that a Communist state had been established virtually on its doorstep. On 17 March 1960 President Eisenhower approved the basic plan for the replacement of the Castro regime. 79/* This decision unleashed a chain of events which, because of its ultimate failure, still elicits heated discussion. Regardless of the final outcome, the study of these events does reveal that the OL performed in an outstanding manner a mission for which it was neither manned nor equipped. Moreover, after the mission failed, OL succeeded in salvaging some 5,000 tons of unused supplies.

To set the stage, the first of many problems encountered was the fact that no project outline was ever prepared, and OL was without specific guidance as to the quantities and types of materiel required to support the operation. OL also faced a shortage of personnel as the project developed. In April 1960, ☐ Logistics

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

*Source 79, Logistics Support ☐ March 1960 - October 1961, is the primary source for this discussion. Interested readers are referred to the basic document for the full story of the ☐

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personnel were assigned full-time duties in support of Project JMARC (later renamed JMATE). By December this figure had increased to [] and by the time of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the number of logisticians supporting the project stood at []. At the same time that OL was contributing this large force of expertise, the workload at "Main Log" was reflecting the tempo of the effort in the form of increasing requisitions, procurements -- of some 14,000 line items furnished, 6,000 represented new procurements* -- and packaging and shipping requirements.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

The packing and crating function was particularly sensitive because of the requirement of maintaining plausible denial on the part of the US Government. One example of this was the requirement to []

(b)(1)

[] To accomplish this task, clerical and administrative personnel were pulled from OL and the OP's Replacement Pool and detailed to [] for 2- to 3-week periods during

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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*OL stocks some 17,000 line items and this figure has remained relatively constant over the years. In comparison, a US nuclear submarine requires 30,000 line items to maintain its serviceability.

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March 1961 to work under the supervision of Depot packers. By invasion day, 17 April 1961, OL had acquired, processed, packed, and shipped 8,000 tons of supplies to JMARC support, training, operational, and strike bases; of this quantity, 4,200 tons was for the invasion force and the remainder for training and guerrilla warfare requirements.

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*In addition to source 80, see unpublished monograph on this subject written by on file in RECD and OL/PS.

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overflowing river, inefficient and poorly motivated labor, a high incidence of equipment breakdown, extremely poor subgrade, customs delays, and some host country politics.

Although the mission was accomplished against almost impossible odds, the reputation of OL (and of [redacted] in particular) suffered because of a cost overrun. Estimated to cost (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

the fact that equipment was flown in from four countries, that the force labored 20 hours a day 7 days a week, and that many other obstacles were overcome, the cost overrun seemed to stick in the minds of Headquarters officers.

C. Tracy Barnes, A/DDP/A, probably the most vehement critic of the OL effort, stated in a memorandum for the DDP:

In view of [redacted] performance with respect to letting us know what was happening, I am not too happy about accepting his views. (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

Why was Headquarters not informed sooner that a large cost increase might be expected?

The responsibility for this - in my opinion - descends directly on [redacted] who was the staff engineer assigned to the job and comes from Garrisons [sic] [D/L] shop. He says that the work was progressing so rapidly that the bills were way behind and, consequently, it (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

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was very difficult to know exactly where the costs stood at any given moment. I don't think that this is a satisfactory answer since it must have been clear fairly early in the job that a significant overage would occur even though the exact amount would have been unknown. My suggestion would be to report this fact to Garrison which may prove pretty hard on [] but, nevertheless, I think that the report should be made. Prior to doing so, I would be inclined to advise [] of our intentions. 81/

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(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Placed in perspective, the story of [] was a (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

classic example of field versus Headquarters -- a lone engineer fighting a deadline complicated by rain, mosquitoes, floods, and all the other problems versus the stereotype of the Headquarters manager -- both "right" but each lacking an understanding of the other's problems.

The 3-day invasion began on 17 April 1961 and ended in ignominious defeat for the anti-Castro forces -- [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
invading force [] were captured. During the invasion (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Logistics personnel loaded C-54's for airdrops -- 30,000 pounds were actually delivered to the beachhead -- and were standing by at the [] with additional ammunition, but that requirement was canceled on 19 April. In the aftermath OL was faced with the (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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problem of turning back to their owners some eight ships and

disposing of or reclaiming the residue of materiel. [] (b)(1)

was given [] worth of supplies and equipment for its coop- (b)(3) NatSecAct

eration, and [] received another [] worth for its (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

helpfulness. The remainder, 5,000 tons, was returned to []

[] Summing up the events of this period, Mr. James S.

Burwell, author of the OL history on the subject, * states:

...it is now clear that the task which was
given to OL was far beyond the Agency's
internal support capability... There was never
a basic plan developed by the project which
would have aided logistics in its approach to
meeting the commitment.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

At the same time that OL was occupied with the Cuban
project, world events were creating for OL, the Agency, and
indeed the US Government another challenge, which occupied much
of the national effort throughout the decade of the 1960's. On
9 March 1961 President John F. Kennedy authorized an offensive
program in Laos directed against the North Vietnamese-backed
Pathet Lao.^{82/} After the signing of the Geneva Accords -- which
prohibited foreign military forces in the country -- in 1962, the

*See source 79.

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[redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

to what became known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group

(CIDG), 83/* The CIDG was built to a peak of nearly [redacted] men

(b)(3) CIAAct

before the program was transferred to the US Army Special

Forces on 1 July 1963. After a lull lasting nearly a year, the

Agency began to support a new group of Vietnamese programs,

the largest of which was the Peoples Action Teams -- later termed

Revolutionary Development Cadres (RDC). Others included the

much-maligned Phoenix and Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).

(b)(3) CIAAct

At its peak the RDC included some [redacted] persons; both Phoenix

(b)(3) CIAAct

and PRU were much smaller, about [redacted] respectively.

This was a large force to support, and some idea of the require-

ments can be gained from looking at the staff complement assigned.

In 1961 Saigon was a [redacted] station, and Logistics had [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

officers assisted by [redacted] contract wives. At the height of the

activity in 1969 the station strength was approximately [redacted] and

(b)(3) CIAAct

the logistics element consisted of [redacted] personnel

augmented by [redacted] detailees, about [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

*Information and data concerning logistics activities in Vietnam were drawn from source 83.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

technicians, and nearly [] Vietnamese employees. In addition to the main supply base established at Saigon and its environs, subdepots were operated at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, and, during the period of the RDC program, [] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The RDC program was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV) on 1 July 1969, and the days of large-scale activity declined markedly after that date. The operations in Vietnam are significant not only because of the scale on which they were run -- FY 1966 saw a high point when requisitions totaling [] were processed -- but also because of the scope of the activity. (b)(3) CIAAct

Units such as RDC and PRU not only were equipped with weapons and administrative supplies but procurement actions also were initiated through the [] for a complete (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

line of uniforms, headgear, and the Asian equivalent of the jungle boot for these units. These quartermaster items were manufactured, in Asiatic sizes, [] -- black pajamas (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

for RDC, tiger-stripe suits for PRU -- and shipped to Saigon for issue. A kit-concept was developed for RDC whereby [] was (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

furnished RDC team T/O's, and that station in turn put the (b)(3) NatSecAct

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necessary items to equip one team in a kit form and shipped the individual kits directly to the major distribution points -- Da Nang, Nha Trang, [] and Saigon. Although the Audit reports (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct were consistently critical of how the paperwork war was progressing (at least until the station was converted to a Type I installation in April 1967), the manner in which operational support was rendered received nothing but kudos from both operational and support personnel.

Looking back, the activities of this period in Laos and Vietnam constitute a record of remarkable achievement. Taking 1968 as the high-water mark, the OL was directly supporting an (b)(3) NatSecAct armed force of nearly [] in Southeast Asia (SEA) with (b)(1) approximately [] staff employees scattered in some [] separate (b)(3) NatSecAct locations and with a budget for materiel of about [] (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

4. The Role of Technology

Although it is not considered an innovator in the technical field compared with such support services as communications, the OL has nonetheless made use of advancing technology to assist it in the performance of its mission. The leading element in this field has been PSD, which over the years has produced

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some trend-setting innovations in the fields of printing and graphics. The most notable of PSD's contributions was the introduction of the EPIC system in 1967. This system employs computer-produced magnetic tape to prepare the type-setting and plates for the printing process and provide a capability for rapid changes, printouts, and reproduction on very short notice.^{84/}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

If there is a shortcoming in OL's use of technology, it is in the area of computer application. Supply functions such as stock recordkeeping were put on an EAM system in 1953, and in 1960 this system was converted to one utilizing the computer. This conversion was made over the objections of both the D/L, Mr. James Garrison, and the Chief of the Supply Division,

[redacted] The changeover was directed by the DDS,

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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Colonel White. The OL's position was that even though the computer would materially improve operations, the particular system proposed was not a true technological advance because it consisted only of changing from one type of machinery to another without any corresponding increase in the quality of the output or product. In 1967 Mr. Robert Wiltse, then Chief of the Support Information Processing System (SIPS) staff, in a presentation to the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (OPPB), summed up the problem succinctly:

Our present Support systems are antiquated and must be modernized. Their flexibility has long since been used up. Just as we were forced to go to punched cards in the 50's to keep up with the new, changing, and additional requirements for information and service, we were forced to go to the computer in the 60's. We converted punched cards to the RCA 501 Computer early in 1960. In a sense, we have first generation systems on second generation equipment in a third generation era.86/

Since the formation of the SIPS staff in 1965, the support services have been groping towards development of a new system designed to take advantage of the modern hardware available. The SIPS Task Force has 11 personnel slots that are filled by SL careerists -- eight actually on duty as of December 1971 -- in

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order to lend expert logistics advice to the program. There have been many projected dates for a systems "start-up, " but even as this is written (May 1972) the system is yet to "go on the air. "

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~~SECRET~~IV. In Retrospect

It is difficult in a history of this type to determine what happenings and changes to include and which to ignore and, for that matter, when enough is enough. The purpose of this history has been to trace the growth of the OL during the past 25 years and portray its significant activities. The initial years were ones of explosive growth with a concomitant amount of confusion. These were years of attempting to satisfy requirements using the empirical approach to achieve solutions. Money was plentiful, and the management of resources had a lower priority than getting the job done. Because of the separate paths followed by OSO and OPC, the logistics functions were fragmented, procedures were dissimilar, and authorities and responsibilities were confused; in short, the logistics effort appeared to be in an administrative mess.

The marriage of OSO and OPC, although a reluctant one, not only proved beneficial to the CS but also allowed a sorting out of support responsibilities, including logistics, which had not been possible before. Realizing the looseness that had been inherent in the previous system, managers began to crank out controls,

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procedures, and SOP's in an attempt to tighten the reins and actually perform a management function. As time passed, it was recognized that the system was beginning to choke on its own red tape, and a slow but steady loosening of the reins began. At the end of the period the Office appears to have achieved a balance, staffed with experienced professionals capable of responding to wide-ranging requirements.

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~~SECRET~~Appendix A. Chronology

20 Sep 45	President Truman issues Executive Order establishing SSU, effective 1 Oct.
22 Jan 46	Presidential Directive establishes CIG under the authority of the NIA.
1 Nov 46	SSU property assets are absorbed by the CIG.
22 Nov 46	Personnel and Administration Branch is established within CIG.
18 Jun 47	Personnel and Administration Branch is renamed the Executive for Administration and Management, effective 1 July.
Jul 47	Services Division, under the Executive for Administration and Management is elevated to Branch status.
18 Sep 47	The "birthday" of CIA.
1 Sep 48	The Office of Policy Coordination is created as an instrument of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division and satelited on CIA for administrative support.
31 Dec 48	Executive for Administration and Management is abolished and replaced by the Executive, CIA; Chief, Services Branch, becomes the Services Officer.

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20 Jun 49

Congress passes Public Law 110 --
the CIA Act of 1949.

1 Oct 49

Services Office is abolished and in
its place two separate staffs --
Administrative Support Staff and the
Covert Support Staff -- are formed.

1 Dec 50

The CIA Executive becomes the
Deputy Director for Administration.
As part of reorganization, the Admin-
istrative and Special Support Staffs
are replaced by the Administrative
Services Office and the Procurement
Office, respectively.

Mar 51

First contract purchase of foreign
arms is negotiated.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Dec 51

General Services Office replaces
Administrative Services Office.

Jan 52

Station One




(b)(1)

21 Feb 52

Procurement Office is renamed the
Procurement and Supply Office.

(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)



(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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5 Aug 52	Procurement and Supply Offices absorb transportation functions from General Services Office.
Sep 52	Logistics officers of the Office of Policy Coordination are transferred to Procurement and Supply Office.
15 Nov 52	East Coast Depot (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
Feb 53	Supply records are converted to Electric Accounting Machine system.
20 Mar 53	Logistics Office is established and the Procurement and Supply Office is abolished. Mr. James A. Garrison appointed Chief of Logistics.
May 53	Logistics Career Service Board is established.
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
9 Nov 53	First Logistics Support Course begins.
15 Feb 54	Office of General Services is abolished, remainder of functions transferred to the Logistics Office.
17 Jun 54	Agency supplied and equipped force invades Guatemala.
21 Jul 54	Logistics Office retitled Office of Logistics. Mr. James A. Garrison continues as Director of Logistics.
3 Feb 55	Deputy Director for Administration is renamed Deputy Director for Support.

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Apr 55	Table of Vehicular Allowance system is initiated to control acquisition, use, and disposal of Agency vehicles.
13 Jun 55	Printing and Reproduction Division is renamed the Printing Services Division.
15 Jul 55	Congress authorizes funds for construction of a CIA building.
Dec 55	Building Planning Staff is created to coordinate planning and construction of new CIA building (dissolved on 29 June 1962 and revived on 2 April 1969).
14 Jun 56	Aircraft Maintenance Support Division is authorized as subordinate element of Office of Logistics.
	<div data-bbox="181 646 795 702" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 43px; width: 593px;"></div> <div data-bbox="777 632 933 677" style="float: right;">(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct</div>
24 Oct 56	Position of Executive Officer is established within the Office of Logistics.
	<div data-bbox="190 805 841 884" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 60px; width: 628px;"></div> <div data-bbox="803 823 961 868" style="float: right;">(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct</div>
1 Jan 59	Fidel Castro assumes control of Cuba.
6 Mar 59	Aircraft Maintenance Support Division is transferred to Deputy Director for Plans.

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		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
25 Sep 59	<div data-bbox="457 168 820 198" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 350px; height: 23px;"></div>	
	established as subordinate element of Procurement Division, Office of Logistics.	
3 Nov 59	President Eisenhower lays cornerstone for Langley Headquarters Building.	
17 Mar 60	President Eisenhower approves basic plan for the replacement of the Castro regime.	
9 Mar 61	President Kennedy authorizes offensive action against the Pathet Lao in Laos.	
	<div data-bbox="200 550 816 630" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 594px; height: 61px;"></div>	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
18 Sep 61	Movement into new Headquarters Building begins.	
	<div data-bbox="195 711 789 744" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 573px; height: 25px;"></div>	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
5 Sep 62	Logistics Services Division is created as subordinate element of Office of Logistics.	
1 Jul 63	Agency Paramilitary activities in Vietnam are transferred to US Army (SWITCHBACK).	
18 Sep 64	Mr. James A. Garrison retires. Mr. Alan M. Warfield appointed Director of Logistics.	

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1964	<div data-bbox="464 164 813 226" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 337px; height: 47px;"></div>	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
10 Jul 65	Mr. Alan M. Warfield reassigned. Mr. George E. Meloon appointed Director of Logistics.	
24 Jan 66	Ames Building is occupied by the Office of Logistics.	
1966	<div data-bbox="464 396 802 452" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 327px; height: 43px;"></div>	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
16 Mar 66	The Transportation Division is dissolved and its functions split between Supply Division, Office of Logistics, and the Office of Personnel.	
31 Dec 66	East Coast Depot <div data-bbox="643 576 802 650" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 154px; height: 56px;"></div>	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
22 Aug 67	Director of Logistics delegates contracting-officer authority to Technical Services Division, DDP.	
Sep 67	Agency Contract Review Board, chaired by Deputy Director of Logis- tics, is established to review R&D contracts in excess of \$150,000.	
13 Sep 67	New Printing Services Division plant commences operations.	
1 Mar 68	Director of Logistics delegates con- tracting-officer authority to Office of Elint, DD/S&T.	

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26 Feb 69	Director of Logistics delegates contracting-officer authority to Office of Research and Development, DD/S&T, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, DDI.
1 Jul 69	Revolutionary Development Cadres program is transferred from CIA control to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
5 Jan 70	Mr. George E. Meloon retires. Mr. John F. Blake appointed Director of Logistics.
17 Apr 70	Procurement Management Staff is created to advise independent contracting officers and also assumes staff supervision of (b)(1) Procurement Office. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~Appendix B. Source References

1. Executive Order 9621, 20 Sep 45, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions." S.
2. Presidential Directive of 22 Jan 46, "Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence." S.
3. Exchange of Memos, DCI (Vandenberg) and Director, SSU (Quinn), 1 and 2 Nov 46, subj: Transfer of Property, Supplies, and Equipment. C. HS/CSG 400.*
4. Memo to the Director from General Counsel, 13 Jun 46, subj: Administrative Authority of CIG. S. WASH-CIA-AD-18 Folder 6.
5. Unpublished MS, "The Historical Record of the Procurement and Supply Office, FY 46-1952." S. On file OL/PS.
6. Ibid.
7. File of CIG and Component Organizational Charts, 15 Oct 47. S. HS/HC-631.
8. "The Historical Record of the Procurement and Supply Office" (5, above). S.
9. CIG Gen Order 18 Jun 47. (7, above). (b)(3) NatSecAct
10. "The Historical Record of the Procurement and Supply Office" (5, above).

*All documents followed by "HS" code are on file with or available through the DCI - Historical Staff; other documents are available in OL, or as indicated.

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11. CIA Gen Order No. [] 27 Aug 48. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
12. Memo from Chief, Staff III (OPC) for Chief, Staff I (OPC), 22 Sep 50, subj: Organizational Development of OPC. S. HS/CSG 1201.
13. History of the Office of Policy Coordination (draft), 26 Jun 51⁵¹
by [] S. HS/CSG 2000. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
14. CIA Gen Order No. [] 14 Sep 48. S.
15. CIA Gen Order No. [] 31 Dec 48. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
16. CIA Gen Order No. [] above).
17. CIA Gen Order No. [] 20 Sep 49. S.
18. Ibid.
19. History of the Office of Policy Coordination (13, above). (b)(3) NatSecAct
20. OPC Regulation [] 20 Sep 50. S. HS/CSG 1001.
21. Ibid.
22. Memo for All Division Chiefs from D/ADPC, 20 Apr 51, subj: Target Table of Organization (Intermediate). S. HS/CSG 1203.
23. Memo for Mr. Wisner from SSA/ADPC, 27 Nov 50. S. HS/CSG 2079.
24. Ibid.
25. Memo for Mr. Wisner from SSA/ADPC, 28 Nov 50, subj: Logistics Support for OPC Operations. S. HS/CSG 1431.
26. Ibid.

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27. CIA Reg [] 1 Dec 50, amended 19 Jan 51. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
28. CIA Reg [] (Revised) 21 Feb 52. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
29. CIA Reg [] 20 Mar 53. S.
30. Draft History of the [] S. FE/HSO. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
31. Ibid. (b)(1)
32. Support Services Historical Series, [] (b)(3) NatSecAct
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33. Unpublished MS, [] S. (b)(1)
FE/HSO. (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
34. Memo for The Comptroller from Richard G. Stilwell, CFE,
27 Nov 51, subj: Request for Contingency Funds for Support
of FE/OPC Activities. S. HS/CSG 600.
35. Support Services Historical Series, History of Covert
Procurement, OL 13, Dec 71. EYES ONLY.
36. Memo for DDA from Chief, Procurement, 10 Apr 51, subj:
Procurement for OSO and OPC. S.
37. Memo for DDA from Kilbourne Johnston, ADPC, 14 Nov 51,
subj: Foreign Arms Procurement.
38. Memo for DDA from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ADSO, thru (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
[] .
39. Report of TDY in Europe, Period 23 Apr through 20 May 52,
by Warner Stutler, Deputy Chief, Procurement and Supply,
27 May 52. S.
40. History of Covert Procurement (35, above).

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41. Memo of Transmittal to DDA from Chief, Procurement, 20 Sep 51, subj: Procurement of Foreign Arms and Ammunition. S.
42. Support Services Historical Series, Supply Division, 1951-1970. S. OL 15, Aug 72.
43. Unpublished MS, History of WH Division. S.
44. Support Services Historical Series, Cold War Materiel Stockpile, 1957-1966, OL 3, by Paul E. Arneson, Nov 66. S.
45. Support Services Historical Series, Agency Real Estate Activity, 1947-66. S. OL 10, by [redacted] et al., Feb 72. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
46. Support Services Historical Series, Planning and Construction of the Agency Headquarters Building. S. HS Project No. 5,031.
47. Letter from Lt. Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, DCI to Mr. W. E. Reynolds, Commissioner of Public Buildings Service, Federal Works Agency. U.
48. Domestic Real Property Report, Mar 53, Form No. 36-219. S.
49. Supply Division, 1951-1970 (42, above).
50. Support Services Historical Series, Agency Engineering Activities, 1947-66, SSHP OL 11, 18 Feb 72. S.
51. Exchange of Memos between Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, and the DCI, Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, 6 Oct 49 and 18 Oct 49. S.
52. Record of Briefing presented to Major General John R. Deane, USA, SWPNE (Designate) by [redacted] Logistics Division, PM Staff, Nov/Dec 1953. S. HS/CSG 2388. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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53. Memo for the Record by Deputy Chief, Special Support Staff, 13 Nov 50, subj: Logistical Support from the [] S. HS/CSG 176. (b)(1)
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54. History of Covert Procurement (35, above).
55. Memo for Mr. Wisner, ADPC from Edward J. Green, Executive Officer, 1 Nov 49, subj: Conference with Messrs. Saunders, Meloon, and Echols. HS/CSG 1551.
56. Support Services Historical Series, Evolution of the Procurement Function in CIA, 1945-70. S. OL 16, [] (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
57. The DCI Historical Series, CIA Support Functions: Organization and Accomplishments of the DDA-DDS Group, 1953-56, Volume IV, HS 3, July 1960. S.
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59. CIA Notice No. [] 1 Dec 53. C.
60. CIA Notice No. [] 8 Feb 54 and CIA Regulation No. [] Change 1, 12 Mar 54. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
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63. Memo to DDI, DDP, DDS&T, GC, LC, ONE from DDS, 2 Apr 69, subj: Chairman, Building Planning Staff, DDS 69-1468. S.
64. Excerpt from "Diary Notes," DDS (L. K. White), 14 Jun 56. S.
65. Logistics Instruction No. 1-140-1, rev, 17 Oct 56. S.

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66. Planning and Construction of the Agency Headquarters Building (46, above).
67. Support Services Historical Services, Logistics Services Division, OL 17, Aug 72, S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
68. CIA Headquarters Notice [] 23 Oct 62. S.
69. Logistics Notice No. 1-1, 19 Feb 65. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
70. CIA Reg [] 5 Apr 55 and [] 6 Apr 55. S.
71. Logistics Notice No. 20-89, 17 Apr 70. S.
72. Evolution of the Procurement Function in CIA, 1945-1970 (56, above).
73. LN 20-89 (71, above). (b)(3) NatSecAct
74. CIA Notice No. [] 19 Jun 52. S.
75. Support Services Historical Series, Personnel and Training in Logistics, 1950-1969, S. OL 12, by [] Feb 72. (b)(6)
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76. Memo of Interview with John F. Blake, D/L, 8 Dec 71. S.
77. Memo for the Record: Interview with Mr. James A. Garrison, Director of Logistics, Office of Logistics, by Harold F. Gosnell, 28 Oct 58. S. On File OL/PS.
78. Support Services Historical Series, Printing for Intelligence, 1942-68, by [] OL 5, Nov 70. S. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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80. Agency Engineering Activities, 1947-66 (50, above).

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81. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, A/DDP/A, 11 Oct 60, (b)(1)
subj: Construction at [] S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
82. Support Services Historical Series, Logistics Support for
Operations in Laos, March 1961-June 1968, by []
[] OL 9, May 71. S. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
83. Support Services Historical Series, Logistics Support for
Operations in Vietnam, July 1962-December 1966, by
[] OL 8, Apr 71. S. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
84. Printing for Intelligence, 1942-68 (78, above).
85. Logistics Services Division (67, above).
86. Undated MS (Jun 67), "Briefing Notes for PPB." S. On file
with OL SIPS representative.

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Appendix C. Histories of the Activities and
Components of OL

<u>Title</u>	<u>HS or Component Project No.</u>	<u>Author</u>
[REDACTED]	OL 1	Paul E. Arneson
[REDACTED]	OL 2	Paul E. Arneson
Cold War Materiel Stock- pile, 1957-1966	OL 3	Paul E. Arneson
Emergency Supply Opera- tions During the Domin- ican Republic Crisis (29 April through 4 June 1965)	OL 4	[REDACTED]
Printing for Intelligence 1942-68	OL 5	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	OL 6	Jack B. Pfeiffer

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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<u>Title</u>	<u>HS or Component Project No.</u>	<u>Author</u>
Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961	OL 7	James S. Burwell
Logistics Support for Operations in Vietnam, July 1962-December 1966	OL 8	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	OL 9	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
Agency Real Estate Activity, 1947-66	OL 10	John Stephens, et al.
Agency Engineering Activity 1947-66	OL 11	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
Personnel and Training in Logistics, Novem- ber 1956-December 1969	OL 12	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	OL 13	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
The Office of Logistics -- An Overview, 1945-70	OL 14	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
Supply Division	OL 15	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

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<u>Title</u>	<u>HS or Component Project No.</u>	<u>Author</u>
Evolution of the Procurement Function in CIA, 1945-70	OL 16	<div data-bbox="627 271 822 306"></div> (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
Logistics Services	OL 17	Helen Santmyers

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Appendix D. Office of Logistics
Chronology of Key Personnel

Sep 46

Services Division

Martin I. McHugh, Chief
Joseph B. Kelly, Deputy Chief*

1 Jan 49

Services Office

Andrew E. Van Esso,
Acting Services Officer
James H. Drum, Acting Deputy
Services Officer (Overt)
Martin I. McHugh, Deputy
Services Officer (Covert)

20 Sep 49

Services Division of Adminis-
trative Staff (Overt)

Andrew E. Van Esso, Chief,
Administrative Staff
Martin I. McHugh, Chief,
Services Division

Procurement and Supply Division
of Special Support Staff (Covert)

George E. Meloon, Chief,
Special Support Staff
Thomas K. Strange, Acting Chief,
Procurement and Supply Division

*Between Sep 46 and Jan 49 Mr. Howard J. Preston and Mr. Warner Stutler were also Deputy Chiefs of the Services Division.

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1 Dec 50

Administrative Services

Wilfred L. Peel, Chief

Procurement

Andrew E. Van Esso, Chief

1 Nov 51

James A. Garrison, Chief

29 Dec 51

Office of General Services

29 Dec 51

Wilfred L. Peel, Chief

17 Mar 52

Chief

(b)(6)

26 Feb 53

Chief

(b)(3) CIAAct

28 Feb 53

Procurement and Supply

28 Feb 53

James A. Garrison, Chief

Logistics Office

Mar 53

James A. Garrison, Chief

21 Jul 54

Office of Logistics

21 Jul 54

James A. Garrison, Director

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<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
		<u>Director</u>
16 Feb 55	18 Sep 64	James A. Garrison
18 Sep 64	10 Jul 65	Alan M. Warfield
12 Jul 65	5 Jan 70	George E. Meloon
5 Jan 70	Present*	John F. Blake

Deputy Director

24 Apr 53	27 Mar 55	
27 Mar 55	1 Feb 57	
1 Feb 57	15 Jun 59	
15 Jun 59	6 Feb 61	
6 Feb 61	4 Aug 61	
4 Aug 61	25 May 63	Alan M. Warfield
27 May 63	25 Aug 64	James D. Andrews
25 Aug 64	11 Jul 65	George E. Meloon
19 Jul 65	6 Dec 65	
6 Dec 65	5 Jan 70	John F. Blake
5 Jan 70	Present*	

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

*15 January 1972

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<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
		<u>Chief, Planning Staff*</u>
19 Jan 51	Sep 51	
Sep 51	12 Feb 56	
12 Feb 56	Dec 56	
18 Dec 56	Mar 57	
Mar 57	19 Sep 57	
19 Sep 57	15 Jun 59	
29 Jun 59	12 Jan 61	James C. Bishop
12 Jan 61	24 Feb 63	
24 Feb 63	Unknown	
Unknown	17 May 65	
17 May 65	9 Aug 66	
9 Aug 66	14 Sep 66	
14 Sep 66	4 Mar 68	
4 Mar 68	14 Mar 69	
14 Mar 69	Present**	

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

*Between March 1953 and July 1955 the Planning Staff was called the Coordination and Requirements Staff.

**15 January 1972

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<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>	
		<u>Executive Officer</u>	
1 Dec 50	29 Oct 53	William E. Eisemann	
29 Oct 53	3 Aug 55	James C. Bishop	(b)(6)
3 Aug 55	Unknown	[REDACTED]	(b)(3) CIAAct
Unknown	25 Jun 56	William H. May	
25 Jun 56	24 Jan 57	Col. Joseph R. Groves	
24 Jan 57	24 Oct 57	[REDACTED]	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
24 Oct 57	21 Jul 58	William E. Eisemann	
21 Jul 58	26 Apr 61	[REDACTED]	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
26 Apr 61	8 Jan 63	William H. May	
8 Jan 63	27 Oct 63	[REDACTED]	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
27 Oct 63	1 Mar 65	[REDACTED]	
1 Mar 65	17 Jan 66	Paul E. Arneson	
17 Jan 66	14 Mar 69	Howard J. Preston	
14 Mar 69	29 Jun 70	Michael J. Malanick	
29 Jun 70	12 Oct 70	Walter F. Little (Acting)	
12 Oct 70*	Present**	[REDACTED]	(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

*Effective 12 October 1970 a new position of Assistant Executive Officer was established. Incumbent -- Walter F. Little.

**15 January 1972.

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		<u>Chief, Administration Staff*</u>
21 Feb 52	Unknown	W. S. White
Unknown	30 Nov 53	Millard F. Billings
30 Nov 53	25 Jun 56	W. S. White
25 Jun 56	26 Apr 61	William H. May
26 Apr 61	4 Aug 63	Richard B. Wright
4 Aug 63	1 Mar 65	Paul E. Arneson
		<u>Chief, Personnel and Training Staff</u>
1 Mar 65	22 Nov 65	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 50px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct</div>
22 Nov 65	Nov 67	
Nov 67	Present**	
		Harold E. Mayo
		<u>Security Staff</u>
21 Feb 52	1 Jun 56	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 150px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct</div>
1 Jun 56	14 Feb 65	
14 Feb 65	Mar 68	
Mar 68	May 69	
May 69	Present**	

*Note that Administration Staff was abolished on given date.

**15 January 1972.

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
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
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
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



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PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE AGENCY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
JANUARY 1946 - JULY 1963

VOLUME II APPENDIXES

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DCI-6

June 1973

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PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
AGENCY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
JANUARY 1946 - JULY 1963

VOLUME II APPENDIXES

*by**Peyton F. Anderson**and**Jack B. Pfeiffer*

June 1973

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Mar 47	Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, requests that a building be assigned to CIG.
16 Jan 48	Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, calls for meeting to consider construction of a building for CIA.
29 Apr 48	First survey of Agency space requirements.
16 Mar 49	Second survey of Agency space requirements.
30 Sep 49	Third survey of Agency space requirements.
31 Mar 50	GSA turns down proposed additions to "M" and "Q" Buildings.
11 Aug 50	Agency Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs estimate "ultimate" space requirements.
Oct 50	Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI, privately briefs Congressional leaders on CIA's building requirements.
Aug 51	Agency seeks appropriation of \$38 million for new building.
28 Sep 51	Military Construction Act authorizing \$38 million for CIA building is approved.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
8 Oct 51	House Committee on Appropriations denies funds for the new building.
1 Aug 52	Agency staff study recommends acquiring Navy Building.
24 June 53	The General Services Administration recommends site at Langley, Virginia.
16 Nov 54	Allen W. Dulles, DCI, requests the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization to grant exception to "dispersion standards" for CIA building.
22 Nov 54	Colonel L. K. White, DDA, establishes the Agency steering committee to provide overall guidance and general direction for the planning of the new building.
3,5 May 55	The National Capital Regional Planning Council (NCRPC) and the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) approve the Agency's application to utilize a site for the new building in Langley, Virginia.
15 Jul 55	Public Law 161, 84th Congress, authorizes \$46 million for construction of Headquarters Building plus \$8.5 million for George Washington Memorial Parkway to Langley site.
4 Aug 55	Public Law 219, 84th Congress, appropriates \$5.5 million for plans and specifications.
25 Oct 55	The Clarke and Rapuano Report on the proposed location of the Headquarters Building is submitted.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
5,6 Dec 55	Selection of the Langley site is approved by National Capital Regional Planning Council and disapproved by National Capital Planning Commission.
2 Feb 56	The National Capital Planning Commission approves CIA location plans at Langley, Virginia.
6 Feb 56	The Public Building Services, GSA, is selected as agent for Headquarters project.
1 Jun 56	Allen W. Dulles, DCI, appears before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in support of construction funding requirements.
5 Jul 56	A contract with the architectural firm of Harrison and Abramovitz is signed.
27 Jul 56	Public Law 814, 84th Congress, appropriates balance authorized by Public Law 161, 84th Congress.
Aug 56	First soil test borings are conducted at new site.
22 Mar 57	"Headquarters Space Directive D" is approved as basis for working drawings.
2 Aug 57	Tentative drawings and preliminary specifications are submitted.
Oct 57	Clearing the site begins.
5 Mar 58	Final working drawings and specifications are approved.
Oct 58	Grading and drainage of site is completed.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
Nov 58	The site is placed under security patrol, with security badges issued to contractors.
May 59	Work on the superstructure begins.
Sep 59	Excavation and foundation is 95 percent complete.
31 Nov 59	President Eisenhower lays the cornerstone.
Sep 60	Superstructure is more than half completed.
Mar 61	Entire building is enclosed.
19 Sep 61	Occupation of the north half of the building begins.
Feb 62	The south half of the building and the cafeteria are completed.
15 May 62	The building is completely occupied.

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1. Letter, DCI to D/BOB, 31 Mar 47, w/attachments; letter, DCI to Commissioner PBS, 25 Mar 47, sub: Space Problems Permanent Bldg for CIG. U. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 19.
2. Letter, DCI to Commissioner PBS, 25 Mar 47. (1, above)
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6. Letter, DCI to A/FWA, 16 Jul 47. (Sub and loc same as 1, above)
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10. Memo, C/SB for EX/A&M, 27 Feb 48, sub: Space Chart. S.

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12. Letter, C/Services Br to A/FWA, 29 Apr 48, U. (Sub and loc same as 1, above)
13. Draft, Letter, C/Services Br to A/FWA, 28 Apr 48, U. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 19.
14. Memo, Ex Dir for EX/A&M, 18 Feb 48, sub: Space Survey. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
15. Memo, C/Contract Section for C/Services Br, 18 Apr 48, sub: Space. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
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18. CIA Historical Staff, *Chronology 1946-65*, Vol I, 1946-55, Jun 70, p. 34. S.
19. Letter, Admin/GSA to DCI, 18 Apr 50, w/attachments ltr Sec Interior to GSA, 31 Mar 50. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
20. Memo, A/EX CIA for Each Asst Dir, 1 Aug 50, sub: CIA Space Requirements. C. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 19.
21. Working Chart, 11 Aug 50, sub: CIA Space Requirements, New Bldg file. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 19.
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26. Memo, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection for Support Services Historical Officer (SSHO), 10 Feb 71, sub: Comments on the Historical Study entitled Planning and Construction of the Agency Headquarters Building, Jan 46-Jul 63. S. (HS/HC 849.)
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28. Letter, Congressman Mahon to LC, 9 Oct 51. U. LC file, Building and Grounds No. 1, 1951-53.
29. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
30. Letter, Congressman Mahon to DCI, 23 Oct 51. U. DCI Handbook, Sec 4, BPS/OL. Original in LC file, Building & Grounds #1, 1951-53.
31. Letter, DCI to Congressman Mahon, 26 Oct 51. U. DCI Handbook, Sec 4, BPS/OL.
32. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
33. Space Report, 25 Sep 51. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
34. Memo for File, 9 Apr 51. S. DDA.Chrono, Jan-May 51, Job 54-13, Box 2.
35. Memo, C/AS for C/RECD, 15 Aug 51, sub: New Bldg for CIA. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.
36. Memo, SO, CIA for C/AS, 30 July 51, sub: Security Measure, Proposed New Bldg. C. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

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Diary Notes of the ADDA (Colonel L. K. White), 31 Jan 52. S. Subsequently these became *Diary Notes* of the DDA and then *Diary Notes* of the DDS. Hereafter referred to as *Diary Notes*. *Diary Notes* for Colonel White's tenure as ADDA, DDA, and DDS are available in the Executive Registry.

37. Memo, C/RECD for C/AS, 2 Oct 51, sub: New Bldg. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

Memo, C/RECD to C/AS, 18 Oct 51, sub: Space Study for New Bldg. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

Memo, C/RECD to C/AS, 14 Dec 51, sub: Budget Est of New Bldg Cost. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.
38. Memo, C/RECD for C/AS, 2 Oct 51, sub: New Bldg. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.
39. Memo, AC/RECD for C/AS, 5 Feb 52, sub: Work Load. S. BPS/OL, Liaison file 38.
40. Miscellaneous papers and memorandums of Colonel L. K. White, 27 Oct 51 - 2 Dec 54. S. See items from 27 Oct 51 through 4 Dec 51. HS/HC-849.
41. *Diary Notes*, 2 Jan 52. S.
42. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71, p. 7. (26, above)
43. Memo of Conversation, ADDA, 9 Jan 52, sub: New CIA Bldg. S. ADDA, Chrono, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 52, DDS Job 54-13, Box 2.
44. Memo for Record, ADDA, 8 Jan 52. S. ADDA Chrono, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 52, DDS, Job 54-13, Box 2.
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46. *Ibid.*

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47. *Diary Notes*, 15 and 30 Jan 52. S.
48. *Ibid*, 20 Mar 52. S.
49. *Ibid*, 27/28 Feb 52. S.
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51. CIA Historical Staff, *Key Personnel*, Apr 71, p. 43, 77. S.
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53. *Ibid*, 26 Feb 52. S.
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55. Letter, DDA to Commissioner PBS, 3 Aug 51. U. DDA Chrono, 7 May 51, DDS Job 54-13, Box 2.
56. Letter, C/GSO to C/S, Mgmt Div, PBS, 22 May 51. U. OYC, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
57. CIA Historical Staff, *Support Services Chronology of Key Personnel*, May 70, p. 10. S.
58. Personal History Statement, 20 Dec 53. S. C/RECD/OL, Personal file.
59. *Diary Notes*, 2-12 and 19 Jul and 5 Nov 52. S.
60. Staff Study, ADDA to DCI, 1 Aug 52, sub: New CIA Bldg vs Move into Navy or Munitions Bldg. S. DDA Chrono, Jul-Sep 52, DDS, Job 54-13, Box 2.
61. *Diary Notes*, 5 and 11 Aug 52. S.

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62. *Diary Notes*, 5 Nov 52. S.

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63. DCI Hist Series, HS-3, Vol IV, p. 381. S.
64. Legislative Counsel (LC) Daily Log, 2 Jun 53. S.
65. *Ibid.*, 9 Jun 53. S.
66. *Ibid.*, 16 Sep 53. S.
67. Space Report, 26 Jan 53. S. O/C, GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18.
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69. Letter, DCI to D/ODM, 16 Nov 54. U. Copy, ER-6-2603, Book, BPS/OL file.
70. Letter, D/ODM to DCI, 31 Dec 54. U. Copy, ER-6-4649, Book, BPS/OL file.
71. CIA Notice [] 19 Aug 52. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
72. Chrono, OL Hist, 12 Nov 58, sub: Development of Hist. S. OL, BPS/OL file 2, Drawer 2.
73. Memo, C/OGS for C/OP&S, 2 Oct 52, sub: RECD. S. O/C GSO, Job 54-177, Box 18. (b)(6)
74. Debriefings of [], Secy to C/RECD, 1948-54; [], Secy to C/OGS, 1946-54. S. (b)(3) CIAAct
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77. Memo, C/OL for DDA, 28 Sep 54, sub: Site Selection, Hq Bldg. S. BPS/OL Liaison File 38.
78. *Diary Notes*, 13 Oct 54. S. (See 29 Sep and 4 Oct 54)

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79. *Diary Notes*, 14 Dec 54. S.

Memo for Record, C/RECD, sub: Visit to Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 15 Dec 54. S. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

80. *Diary Notes*, 26 Jan 55. S.

81. *Diary Notes*, 14 through 18 Mar 55. S.

82. Memo for Record, C/RECD, sub: Meeting w/D.C. Gov Eng Commissioner, 8 Feb 55. C. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

83. CIA Notice [] 8 Feb 54. S.

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84. CIA Notice No. [] 26 Mar 55. S.

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85. Legislative Counsel Files, Steering Committee meeting minutes [22 Dec 54]. S.

86. Memo for Record, C/RECD, sub: Meeting w/Commissioner Strobel, PBS, 14 Feb 55. C. BPS/OL Liaison file 38.

87. Memo, C/RECD for C/OL, 4 Jan 55, sub: Outline Plan CIA Hq Project. C. BPS/OL file 1951-55.

88. Hist T/O & Ceiling, BPS, 25 Aug 59. S. OL/AS, [] file F-2.

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91. *Diary Notes*, 18 Feb and 14-18 Mar 55. S.
92. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
93. Memo, Joint NCPC-NCRPC Comm to NCPC, 7 Apr 55, sub: Report on CIA Application for Development of Site Near Langley, Virginia. U. HS/HC.849.
94. *Diary Notes*, 17 Jun 55. S.
95. *Ibid.*, 1-7, 8, 11 Jul, 13 Sep 55; 25 Jun 56. S.
96. *Ibid.*, 28 May 56. S.
Letter, Acting DDS to the Hon. Harry F. Byrd, 27 Apr 59. U.
97. *Diary Notes*, 28 Jun 56. S.
98. *Ibid.*, 18 Jan 56, 22 Oct 57, 27 Oct 59. S.
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99. *Diary Notes*, 18 Jan 56. S.
100. Memo for the Record, DDS, 29 Oct 59, sub: Meeting with Congressman Joel T. Broyhill. IUO. DDS 59-4507.
101. Letter, DDS to the Hon. Joel T. Broyhill, 31 Mar 61. U. DDS 61-0912.
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Leasing Retail Stores at CIA Bldg, 8 Oct 59. U.

Letter, L. K. White to Mrs. Elaine Handy, sub:
[Retail Stores in Hq Bldg] 6 Nov 59. U.

Letter, Martin L. Schnider to Col. Lawrence K.
White, sub: Branch Bank in CIA Hq, 9 Oct 59. U.

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Letter, L. K. White to A. H. Anger, sub: Candy
Store in Hq Bldg, 24 Nov 61. U.

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Conversation... Regarding Banking Facilities
at the New Bldg, 27 Feb 61. U.

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7 May 57; 26 Jun, 16 Sep 58; 22 Jun, 29 Sep 60;
14, 15 Dec 61; 17 Feb 64. S.

104. *Ibid.*, 16 Jun and 6 Nov 59, 23 Mar 61. S.

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(DDS 59-4599)

Letter, Robert L. Groom to Allen Dulles, sub:
Property adjoining CIA, 10 Nov 59. U. (ER-
11-9083)

Letter, Allen Dulles to Robert L. Groom, sub:
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105. *Diary Notes*, 14 May 57. S.

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107. Letter, DCI to the Hon. John M. Butler, 6 Mar 56.
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109. *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 55. S.
110. Letter, Harland Bartholomew, Chairman, NCPC, to Allen Dulles, 8 Nov 55, sub: Communications to NCPC from various Congressmen re location of CIA Hq Bldg: Enclosures from Senator J. Glenn Beall, Matthew M. Neeley, and Everett M. Dirksen, and Representatives DeWitt S. Hyde and John L. McMillan. S.
111. *Diary Notes*, 14, 20 Sep 55, S.
- Letter, Allen Dulles to the Hon. Theodore R. McKeldin, 15 Oct, 19 Dec 55. U.
112. *Congress and the Nation*, 1945-64, Legislative Branch-14, 1420. Washington, Congressional Quarterly Service. U.
113. *Diary Notes*, 15 Nov 55. S.
114. *Ibid.*, 15 Oct 54; 5 Jan, 21-25 Feb, 14-18 Mar, 9 May, 22 Jun, 14 Sep 55; 6 Jun, 5 Aug, 16, 17, 29, 30 Oct, 16 Dec 57. S.
- Memo for the Record, Richard P. Bray, 9 Mar 56, sub: Meeting with Joseph Freehill. S.
115. *Diary Notes*, 15 Jun 58. S.
116. Letter, Roger Fisher to Percival F. Brundage, 10 Jan 56. U.
- Letter, Roger Fisher to Governor Sherman Adams, 11 Jan 56. U.
- Letter, Assistant to the President to Roger Fisher, 23 Jan 56. U.
- Letter, Roger Fisher to Governor Sherman Adams, 28 Jan 56. U.

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Letter, Arthur S. Flemming to Roger Fisher, 6 Feb 56. U.

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- 117. *Diary Notes*, 29-31 Oct 56; 29 Oct, 14 Nov 57. S.
- 118. Memo for the Record, DDS, 18 Jun 55, sub: Position of the "Administration" Concerning the Location of the Projected New CIA Hq Bldg. C.
- 119. *Diary Notes*, 5-9 Dec 55. S.
- 120. Letter, J. S. Everly to Hon. Carl Hayden, 13 Jul 55. U.
- 121. Testimony of Rear Admiral Neill Phillips, USN (ret) before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee of DOD [re CIA site at Langley], 11 Jul 56. U.
- 122. Letter, DCI to the Hon. Dennis Chavez, Chairman DOD Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 18 Jul 55. U.
- 123. Letter, DDS to the Hon. Dennis Chavez, 21 Jul 55. U.
- 124. Letter, DCI to the Hon. George H. Mahon, 26 Jul 55. U.

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- 125. Supplemental Appropriations Act 1957 (P. L. 84-814), 27 Jul 56. U.
- 126. Report, Site Location (Clarke & Rapuano), 25 Oct 55. U. BPS/OL file F-31.
- 127. *Diary Notes*, 20 Dec 55. S.
- 128. *Ibid.*, 19 Dec 55. S.
- 129. *Ibid.*, 3 Jan 56. S.
- 130. *Ibid.*, 18, 19 Jan 56. S.
- 131. Memo of Conversation, Legislative Counsel, 5 Jan 56. IUO. DDS 56-106.
- 132. *Diary Notes*, 30 Jan-3 Feb 56. S.
- 133. Memo, DCI for Chairman NCPC, 3 Jan 56. U. In HIC files.
- 134. Letter, Chairman NCPC to DCI, 6 Feb 56. U. DDS 56-746.
Diary Notes, 30 Jan-3 Feb 56. S.
- 135. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
- 136. US Senate, Comm on Appropriations, Report No. 2580, 14 Jul 56 (Supplemental Appropriations Act 1957 (P. L. 84-814, 27 Jul 56). U.
- 137. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71, p. 16. (26, above)
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- 140. Remarks made by DCI to CIA Steering Committee members, 4 Oct 55. S. BPS/OL file 1.

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143. Debriefing of [redacted] 28 Sep 70. (b)(6)
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144. Memo, proj officer for C/BPS, 16 Jan 56, sub:
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145. CIA Historical Staff, *Chronology 1946-65*, Vol
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Million Hq", 16 Jan 56. BPS/OL file 38.
146. CIA Notice [redacted], 26 Nov 55. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
147. CIA Historical Staff *Chronology 1946-65*, Vol I,
p. 73, Jun 70. S.
148. Agreement between DCI and Administrator, GSA,
6 Feb 56. U. BPS/OL file 9.
149. *Diary Notes*, 13 and 20 Sep 55. S.
150. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26,
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151. Memo, CIA, Assistant to the DCI [Public Affairs],
9 Feb 56, w/attachments. C. BPS/OL file 9.
152. Notes for DCI's meeting with Harrison & Abramovitz,
17 Feb 56, w/General Officer Profile. U. BPS/OL
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153. Agreement, DCI and A/GS, GSA, 6 Feb 56, Construc-
tion Agent. U. BPS/OL file 9.
154. Letter, DDS to Commissioner PBS, 18 Aug 55. U.
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156. Memo, DDS for DCI, 20 Apr 55, sub: Meeting with Gen. Bragdon and Mr. Mansure. C. BPS/OL file 9.
157. *Diary Notes*, 28 Jun 55. S.
158. *Ibid.*, 11 Jul 55. S.
159. *Ibid.*, 12 Jul 55. S.
160. Letter, DCI to A/GSA, 3 Aug 55. U. BPS/OL file 17.
161. Memo for Record, DDS, 18 Aug 55, sub: Washington Meeting of 9 Aug 55 with W. K. Harrison Party & GSA. C. BPS/OL file 17.
162. Memo for Record, DDS, 14 Oct 55, sub: CIA/GSA Relationship: Proposed New Hq Bldg. S.
163. Memo for Record, DDS, 18 Aug 55. (165, above)
164. *Diary Notes*, 9-13 Jul 56. S.
165. Agreement, DCI & A/GSA, 6 Feb 56. U. BPS/OL file 12.
166. Memo for Record, DDS, 21 Feb 56, sub: Interview with Congressman Broyhill and Mr. Willgoos of Willgoos & Chase. IUO.
167. *Ibid.*
Legislative Counsel, Daily Log, 9 Feb 56. S.
168. Memo for Record, DDS, 1 Mar 56, sub: Architectural Services for Proposed New Building -- Williams, Coile & Blanchard. C. DDS 56-725.
169. *Diary Notes*, 19 Jan 56. S.
170. Memo, DDS for DCI, 8 Nov 56, sub: Satisfaction of Conditions Imposed by the Congress. IUO. DDS 56-3827.

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171. *Ibid.*
172. Memo, DDS for D/OL, 29 Jan 57, sub: Planning for the Proposed New Hq Bldg. S. DDS 57-0303.
173. *Diary Notes*, 6 Feb 57. S.
174. Memo, IG for DDS, 4 Feb 57, sub: Planning for the Proposed New Hq Bldg. S.
175. *Diary Notes*, 7 Feb 57. S.
176. Letter and Plan, Topographic Survey, Langley Site. U. BPS/OL Soil Testing file.
177. Letter and Plan, Test Boring Report, Langley Site, U. BPS/OL Soil Testing file.
178. Space Report, 31 Dec 56. S. SM&F Br, RECD/OL, Box 18.
179. *Diary Notes*, 13 Feb 57. S.
180. Memo for Record, 26 Jul 56, sub: Visit to Office of A&E. S. BPS/OL file 17.
181. Letter, A/Commissioner PBS to DCI, 15 Nov 56. U. BPS/OL file 17.
182. Memo, Sec Asst for C/BPS, 22 Oct 56, sub: Clearance of A&E Personnel. C. BPS/OL A&E file.
183. Chart, Cost Estimates, 14 May 56. U. BPS/OL A&E file.
184. *Diary Notes*, 27 Dec 57. S.
185. Letter, Asst Commissioner, PBS to H&A, 27 Feb 57. U. BPS/OL A&E file.
186. 17th Report of the Commission of Fine Arts, 1 Jul 54 to 30 Jun 58, pp. 20-21. U.
187. *Diary Notes*, 2, 18, 24, 25 Jan 57; 12, 25, 26 28 Feb 57; 4, 8, 12 Mar 57; 19 Jun 57. S.

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192. Steering Comm Meetings, 15 Feb 57 and 22 Mar 57. S. BPS/OL file 1.
193. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
194. Steering Comm Meetings, 20 Aug 57 to Mar 58. S. BPS/OL files 1, 2, & 10.
195. Memo, C/BPS to C/OL, 15 Nov 56, sub: Cost Estimates. S. BPS/OL file 17.
196. Project Directive, GSA Form 123a, 2 Aug 57. U. BPS/OL A&E file.
197. Memo for Record, 5 Mar 58. U. C/BPS/OL file F-18.
198. Minutes of Steering Comm, 7 Mar 58. S. BPS/OL file 1.
199. Memo, DDS for C/BPS, 17 Dec 57, sub: Visit to SAC Hq. S. BPS/OL file 38.
200. Memo for Record, DC/BPS/OL, 16 Aug 57, sub: Meeting of the Steering Comm. S. BPS/OL file 12.
201. Staff Study, D/OL to DDS, 2 Aug 56, sub: Staff Person Assigned to A-E Office. S. BPS/OL files 23 and 25.
202. Debriefing of [] on 17 Oct 70. S. (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct BPS/OL file 25.
203. IG Survey of O/L, Jun 61, p. 248-253. S. BPS/OL files.

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206. *Diary Notes*, 12 Sep 57. S.
207. *Ibid.*, 15 Oct 57. S.
208. *Ibid.*, 19 Dec 57. S.
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210. *Ibid.*, 19 Dec 61. S.
211. *Ibid.*, 17, 24 Jan 55; 7-8 Feb 55; 19, 21-25
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- Memo for the Record, 19 Feb 57, sub: Telephone
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IUO. BPS/OL, file 38.
212. *Diary Notes*, 1 Mar 61. S.
213. *Ibid.*, 16 Nov 61. S.
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215. Draft Outline, DDS *Support Services Bulletin*,
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216. SSHS, OS-3, Security Program of the CIA, *Physical
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222. Report, C/BPS to C/PS/OL, 6 Oct 59, sub: [] Committee Report. S. BPS/OL files. (b)(6)
223. *Diary Notes*, 4 May 60. S. (b)(3) CIAAct
224. Draft Outline, *DDS Support Services Bulletin*, 25 May 60. S. BPS/OL files.
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225. *Diary Notes*, 3 May 60. S. (b)(3) CIAAct
226. Report, C/BPS to C/PS/OL, 3 Oct 60, sub: [] Comm Report. S. BPS/OL files. (b)(6)
227. *Diary Notes*, 20 Oct, 2, 15 Nov, 14, 20 Dec 60; 4 Jan 61. S. (b)(3) CIAAct
228. Memo, AD/OL for DDS, 18 Nov 60, sub: Policy on Freezing Bldg Plans. C. DDS 60-4124.
229. Memo, AC/BPS for C/PS/OL, 4 Apr 61, sub: [] Report on FI Activities 1 Oct 60-31 Mar 61, S. (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct BPS/OL files.
230. Memo, DC/BPS for C/PS/OL, 28 Sep 61, sub: Report to President's FI Advisory Board, 1 Apr-30 Sep 61. IUO. BPS/OL files.
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233. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26,
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234. *Diary Notes*, 1, 9 Nov 60. S.
235. Public Papers of the President, Dwight D.
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236. IG Survey of O/L, Jun 61, p. 254. S. BPS/OL
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237. Memo for Record, ADDS, 27 Feb 61, sub: Plans
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file.
238. *Diary Notes*, 30 Mar 61. S.
239. IG Survey of O/L, Jun 61, p. 255. S. BPS/OL file.
240. Debriefing of P. F. Anderson, 20 Oct 70. S.
241. Memo, Acting DDP for DDS, 7 Sep 60, sub: Occupancy
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242. Memo, McGeorge Bundy, Pres Adv f/Natl Sec Affairs,
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- 244. *Diary Notes*, 20 Oct 58. S.
- 245. *Ibid.*, 9 Feb 58. S.
- 246. *Ibid.*, 25, 28 Mar 60. S.
- 247. *Ibid.*, 13 Jul 59. S.
- 248. *Ibid.*, 31 Mar, 13, 19 Apr 60. S.
- 249. *Ibid.*, 18 Dec 60. S.
- 250. Agenda, Preparation for Move, 17 Aug 61. S. BPS/OL, Master Plan file.
- 251. Memo, Curator HIC for SSHO, 10 Feb 71. (26, above)
- 252. *Ibid.*
- 253. *Diary Notes*, 15 Apr 57. S.
- 254. *Ibid.*, 29 Oct 57; 9, 21 Nov 60; 6, 30 Mar, 3, 6, 20, 27 Nov 61. S.
- 255. *Ibid.*, 23 Jun, 15, 17, 20 Jul, 1, 2, 10 Sep 59; 13 Sep 60; 4 Jan, 22 Mar, 15 Dec 61. S.
- 256. *Ibid.*, 8 Jan 61. S.
- 257. Draft Outline, *DDS Support Services Bulletin*, 2 Oct 61. U. BPS/OL files.
- 258. Debriefing C/Telephone Facility Br. 20 Oct 70. U.
- 259. Memo, Project Officer for D/C BPS/OL, 13 Nov 61 - 15 May 62, sub: Hq Move. S. BPS/OL files.
- 260. *Diary Notes*, 7 Oct, 4 Nov 59; 22 Jan, 21 Mar, 8 Jun 60; 9 Jan, 15 Mar, 5 Apr, 9 Oct 61; 29 Nov 62. S.

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261. Memo, DDS for D/OL, 12 Jun 62, sub: Hq Bldg Heating, Ventilating, and A/C Systems. S. File DDS Records Center, New Bldg, 1962.
262. *Diary Notes*, 29 Oct, 15 Nov 62. S.
263. *Ibid.*, 26 Sep 61. S.
264. *Ibid.*, 18, 21, 28, 29 Nov 61. S.
265. Project Officer Report, Feb 62, p. 2. U. BPS/OL files.
266. *Diary Notes*, 29 Nov 61. S.
267. *Ibid.*, 30 Nov, 4, 15 Dec 61. S.
268. Project Officer Report, pp. 1-3. (265, above)
269. Memo, H&A for Messrs [redacted] (b)(6)
5 Jan 62. U. BPS/OL file 25. (b)(3) CIAAct
- Letter, Asst Commissioner, PBS to H&A, 24 Oct 63.
U. BPS/OL file 25.
270. ADS/LSD/OL Space Utilization Summary, 12 Apr 63. S. (HS/HC 849)
271. *Ibid.*, Space Utilization Summary: Headquarters Bldg, 2 Oct 72. S. (HS/HC 849)
272. *Ibid.*
273. Memo, DDS for DCI, 29 Nov 61, sub: Comparative Cost Figures of the AEC, New State, and CIA Bldgs. IUO. OL/RECD/BPS files.
274. *Ibid.*
275. Transmittal, LKW [L. K. White] to D/L, 17 Feb 62, sub: [Savings from New Bldg]. U. OL/RECD/BPS files.
276. *Diary Notes*, 5 Apr 60. S.
277. *Ibid.*, 25 Nov, 1, 4 Dec 59; 27 Nov 61. S.

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~~SECRET~~Appendix CCongressional References

1. Military and Naval Construction Act (P.L. 83-155, September 28, 1951). For CIA building authorization in the amount of \$38,000,000, see Title IV, Sec. 401, [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] There was no testimony by (b)(3) NatSecAct
CIA witnesses on this bill. (This authorization was repealed by Sec. 511, P.L. 84-161.)

- See also: (a) Report No. 767, from the House Armed Services Committee, July 26, 1951. Report notes (p.19) that all projects in Sec. 401 are classified; therefore there is no specific reference to CIA construction which was approved under Air Force cover. (To accompany H.R. 4914.)
- (b) Report No. 727, from the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 4, 1951. Report notes (p.16) that all projects in

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Sec. 401 are classified; therefore, there is no specific reference to CIA construction which was approved [redacted]

(b)(1)

(To accompany H.R. 4914.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Report No. 1036, from the Senate Appropriations Committee, October 18, 1951 (to accompany H.R. 5650, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1952).
- (d) Conference Report. House No. 1226, October 20, 1951, (Senate and House Appropriations Committees conferees), (To accompany H.R. 5650.)

2. Military Construction Act of 1955 (P.L. 84-161, July 15, 1955). For authorization to construct a CIA headquarters installation, see Title IV, Sec. 401, and Title V, Secs. 501, 502(4), 504.

See also: (a) Hearings, Military Public Works Construction, May-June 1955, before the Subcommittee on Real Estate and Military Construction of the

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Senate Committee on Armed Services.
For CIA testimony, June 7, 1955,
see pp. 536-549. (Testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee
on this subject was in executive ses-
sion and not printed.) (To accom-
pany S. 1765 (H.R. 6829.)

- (b) Report No. 865, from the House
Armed Services Committee, June 20,
1955. Committee approval at pp.
14, 17 in the amount of \$56,000,000.
(To accompany H.R. 6829.)

- (c) Report No. 694, from the Senate
Armed Services Committee, June 30,
1955. Committee approval at pp.
2, 14-15, 16 in the amount of
\$53,500,000. (To accompany H.R.
6829.)

- (d) Conference Report, House No. 1083,
July 7, 1955, (Senate and House
Armed Services Committees conferees).
Approval at pp. 28-29 in the amount

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of \$55,000,000. (To accompany H.
R. 6829.)

3. Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1956 (P.L. 84-219, August 4, 1955). For CIA building partial appropriation, see Chapter III.

- See also: (a) Hearings, Military Construction Appropriations for 1956, June 1955, before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations. For CIA testimony, June 23, 1955, see pp. 165-181.
- (b) Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of a proposed provision pertaining to the Central Intelligence Agency House Document No. 210, July 1, 1955.
- (c) Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, June-July 1955, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. For CIA testimony,

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July 15, 1955, see pp. 24, 48-49, 239-275, 278-316, 363. (To accompany H.R. 7278.)

- (d) Report No. 1116, from the House Committee on Appropriations, July 12, 1955. Approval at pp. 14, 34 in the amount of \$3,000,000 for the preparation of detailed plans and specifications for the building. (To accompany H.R. 7278.)
- (e) Report No. 1094, from the Senate Committee on Appropriations, July 23, 1955. Approval at pp. 11, 53, 69 in the amount of \$7,000,000. (To accompany H.R. 7278.)
- (f) Conference Report. House No. 1586, July 29, 1955, (Senate and House Appropriations Committees conferees). Approval at pp. 2, 8 in the amount of \$5,500,000. (To accompany H.R. 7278.)

4. Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1957 (P.L. 84-814,

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July 27, 1956). For CIA building appropriation in the amount of \$49,000,000, see Chapter III, p. 3.

- See also: (a) Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957, Vol. 1, May-June 1956, before the House Committee on Appropriations. For CIA testimony before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, see pp. 238-306.
- (b) Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957. May-July 1956, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. For CIA testimony, July 11, 1956, see pp. 719-776. (To accompany H.R. 12138.)
- (c) Report No. 2638, from the House Committee on Appropriations, July 7, 1956. Approval of appropriation for the CIA building in the amount of \$49,000,000 at pp. 8, 36. (To accompany H.R. 12138.)

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- (d) Report No. 2580, from the Senate Committee on Appropriations, July 14, 1956. Approval of appropriation for the CIA building in the amount of \$49,000,000 at pp. 5, 31. (To accompany H.R. 12138.)
- (e) Report, House No. 2864, (Senate and House Appropriations Committees conferees). (To accompany H.R. 12138.)

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C O P Y

Appendix DStaff Study

SUBJECT: New CIA building vs. Movement into Main
Navy or Munitions Building

1. PROBLEM: Is it desirable to pursue the assignment of the Navy or Munitions Building to CIA, or to construct a new building designed to meet Agency requirements.
2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:
 - a. CIA has permanent enabling legislation to build a new building at a cost of \$38 million.
 - b. Possible building sites:

Nevius Tract, Arlington, Virginia

Present headquarters location, 2430 E Street N. W.
 - c. Nevius tract -- it has been estimated that it would cost approximately \$42.5 million to build on this site. Construction would require two and one-half to three years.
 - d. Present CIA headquarters location -- it has been estimated that an adequate building can be constructed in this area for less than \$38 million, including acquisition of land, which would cost approximately \$6 million. Time required for construction would be two and one-half to three years.
 - e. Main Navy Building, 17th and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Estimated cost of moving to Navy Building (including moves of other agencies involved) -- approximately \$11.1 million. Time required to complete move --

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approximately two years. This would permit 100 percent consolidation, exclusive of warehouses, etc.

- f. Munitions Building, Navy Annex, 20th and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Estimated cost of moving to Munitions Building (including moves of other agencies involved) -- approximately \$8.1 million. Time required to complete move -- one year. This building would accommodate approximately 70 percent of the Agency and the remaining 30 percent would stay in its present location.

- 3. DISCUSSION: The estimated cost of construction on the Nevius tract is \$4.5 million in excess of the amount authorized in our enabling legislation. In addition, use of this site would probably meet with objection by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the Fine Arts Commission. However, we could probably build on our present location within the amount authorized and without encountering comparable obstacles. While we could undertake preliminary planning using funds now available to the Agency, it would be at least six months before an appropriation could be requested from Congress, which means that a new building would not be ready for occupancy for three to three and one-half years from now, and it is not certain that Congress would appropriate the necessary funds.

The Main Navy Building would permit 100 percent consolidation of the Agency, exclusive of warehouse, etc., and is preferable to the Munitions Building. The acquisition of either, however, would eliminate any justification for a new CIA building in the foreseeable future. The Navy and Munitions Buildings are both old, temporary buildings which, although a great improvement over what we now have, still are far from ideal for our purposes, and would be expensive to maintain.

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4. CONCLUSIONS: In view of the time lag in our ability to request funds for a new building and the uncertainty of obtaining those funds, together with the substantial additional time required to construct a new building, it is concluded that it is desirable to make an immediate attempt to obtain as a first choice the Navy Building and as a second choice the Munitions Building.
5. ACTION RECOMMENDED: That action be taken to acquire the Navy Building for CIA as expeditiously as possible.

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~~SECRET~~Appendix EBuildings Occupied by CIA as of 26 January 1953

<u>Building</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Net Space (sq. ft.)</u>
North	2430 E Street N.W.	18,807
Central	2430 E Street N.W.	20,977
Administration	2430 E Street N.W.	9,095
South	2430 E Street N.W.	33,880
Rear of Temporary "Q"	2430 E Street N.W.	2,713
Temporary "Q"	24th-26th & D Streets N.W.	52,818
Temporary "M"	24th-26th & D Streets N.W.	68,560
Building 11	24th-26th & D Streets N.W.	14,441
Building 13	24th-26th & D Streets N.W.	4,688
Building 14	24th-26th & D Streets N.W.	7,720
	2501 H Street N.W.,	6,589
	2210 E Street N.W.	8,863
Washington Auditorium	20th & C Streets N.W.	23,932
Building "I"	West Potomac Park	112,430
Building "J"	West Potomac Park	92,300

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Building	Location	Net Space (sq. ft.)
Building "K"	West Potomac Park	52,036
Building "L"	West Potomac Park	94,440
Temporary 30	West Potomac Park	14,024
Temporary 31	West Potomac Park	3,930
Alcott Hall	West Potomac Park	24,400
Recreation & Service	West Potomac Park	40,214
Quarters Eye	West Potomac Park (b)(1)	62,392
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	9,105
	939 D Street N.W.	6,769
		19,381
	(b)(1)	7,314
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	20,045
Temporary "Y"	19th & B Streets N.E.	36,550
Riverside Stadium	26th & D Streets N.W.	39,860
	1919 Nash Street Rosslyn, Virginia	18,585
Rosslyn Warehouse	Rosslyn, Virginia	48,704
		20,000
	(b)(1)	53,440
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	20,980
		49,850

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<u>Building</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Net Space (sq. ft.)</u>
Building 7	24th & D Streets N.W.	2,061
Building 9	24th & D Streets N.W.	794
	Total:	1,122,687

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~~SECRET~~Appendix FOutline Plan for the Development of
the Proposed CIA Headquarters Project

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Phase</u>
1	A. Bureau of the Budget Approval
	1. Decision on Funding Method
	B. Site Approval
2	1. Approval of the Office of Defense Mobilization
3	2. Approval of the Public Roads Commission
3a	3. Exact Site Selection within the Available Area
3b	4. Final Approval of the Public Roads Commission and National Park and Planning Commission
3	C. Construction and Improvement of Roads
	1. George Washington Memorial Highway
	2. Leesburg Pike
	D. Development of "Definitive" Plans
3	1. Collection of Space Requirements
3	2. List of Special Requirements
3a	3. Decision on Type of Building
3b	4. Development of Sketches of Floor Plans
4	E. Development of Preliminary Plans and Cost Estimate

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1. Site Plan
 2. Floor Plans
 3. Elevations
 4. Architect's Drawings
 5. Cost Estimate
- 5 F. Congressional Approval
1. Bureau of the Budget
 2. Armed Services Committees or Public Works Committees
 3. Appropriations Committees
- 6 G. Preparation of Construction Plans
1. Fine Arts Commission Approval

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C O P Y

Appendix G

Testimony of
Rear Admiral Neill Phillips, USN (Ret.)
3053 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Before
The Senate Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee of Department of Defense
Senator Chavez, Chairman
July 11, 1956

Opposition of [sic] Building a CIA Headquarters
at Langley, Virginia

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee:

I am appearing as representative [sic] of the
Progressive Citizens Association of Georgetown (approx-
imately 900 members) and the Audubon Society of the
District of Columbia (approximately 1200 members in
the Greater Washington area). I have also been asked
to speak for the Middle States Division of the
American Canoe Association.

Your Committee has been asked to recommend an ap-
propriation of \$49,000,000 to build a mammoth CIA Head-
quarters (approaching the Pentagon in size) at Langley,
Virginia, on a site with no present access except a
winding 2-lane State road, and with no sewage facilities,

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whatever.

The cost of roads, bridges, and sewage disposal would be absolutely colossal. Parenthetically, it might be impossible ever to resolve the sewage problem at the Langley site no matter how much money were spent, as I shall try to show later.

Without these access and sanitary facilities, a CIA headquarters at Langley simply could not function. The price of such improvements should be considered just as much a part of the cost, as the price of the CIA buildings themselves. I submit that it is entirely unrealistic to talk about appropriating \$49,000,000 to build a CIA Langley headquarters, when in fact the \$49,000,000 is only a part of that cost.

I have studied the arguments and the pages of testimony on why or why not to build CIA at Langley, and I find that the fact fairly jumps out if [sic] even those line of fine print that the pro-Langley plan is very simple.

Get money from Congress to put up the buildings, and then somehow some Government department or agency will just simply have to go to work and figure out how to solve access and sanitation problems, and how to get

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appropriations from Congress to pay for them. True there have been tentative plans put forth as to widening roads and bridges and laying sewer mains, with rough estimates of the cost. But even a superficial reading shows them to be vague and generalized, with so many essential details not covered, as to be unacceptable in a business sense, particularly when such enormous sums are involved. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is wrong even to consider CIA's request for \$49,000,000 to build at Langley until, and unless CIA also submits a request for appropriations to cover this other utterly essential part of the job.

Now the above reasoning would hold good even if Langley were an ideal, or even a fairly practicable, site for CIA. But by all fair standards it is a tragically bad site. Believe me, my associates and I have tried to be objective and have tried hard to find some cogent reasons for CIA at Langley, but again after going over and over the arguments and testimony we can find only two real reasons advanced for it:

- (1) It would be pleasant for CIA employees to work in park-like surroundings with a river view.

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(2) It would be good for real estate people who could put up housing developments and shopping centers nearby.

On the other hand, the arguments against CIA at Langley seem overwhelming. I shall list them briefly before I close:

(1) Sewage. The Potomac is hideously polluted. Federal and State Governments are beginning the Augean task of trying to clean it up. Yet here is a proposal to put a junior Pentagon, with all those thousands of people, on a bluff of the Potomac about one-half mile above the new intake for the District water supply!!

True, the local Virginia authorities have committed to provide sewage facilities to the Langley CIA buildings, but so far as I can ascertain they have shown no plans as to what they are to do with the effluent except to dump it into the Potomac. And apparently there are no plans or ideas at all as to what to do about sewage from all the new communities that would spring up in the CIA area -- a problem that can reasonably be expected to grow as big as that of the CIA headquarters itself. And again,

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remember, all this in the immediate vicinity of the intake of the District water supply. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this is little short of a medieval approach to a grave health problem and is unacceptable by any modern standard.

(2) Bridges. Every day the press carries articles on where and how to build more bridges, or whether to pay the enormous sums required to bore a tunnel, in order to get the population back and forth across the Potomac, or to route traffic around and outside the District. All the proposed plans are drawn up with the idea of just keeping traffic moving for the population as it is at present distributed. We all know that that alone is a problem of staggering magnitude. Yet here we have a proposal to compound confusion by putting up a vast CIA complex at a spot in every way situated so as to generate more, much more, cross-river traffic.

(3) District Traffic. A CIA spokesman before the House Appropriations Committee in June estimated that "a large part of the 37% (of CIA traffic to Langley) would find the Key Bridge probably more convenient than Chain Bridge or Memorial Bridge." If you go to either

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end of Chain Bridge [sic], Virginia or Georgetown, at the rush hour this afternoon and see the pandemonium that exists, and then try to picture what it would be like with "a large part of the 37%" of CIA traffic trying to get back and forth, I believe you will be appalled. No plans that I know of have been made to take care of this increased traffic in the narrow environs of the Georgetown end of Chain Bridge [sic], and no such plans could be carried out without destroying much of Georgetown's present character and present property values.

A similar, or perhaps, worse, situation would exist at Chain Bridge, which it is proposed to widen. Approaches are narrow and there are numerous dead ends. True, the National Capital Regional Planning Commission proposes improvements to Canal Road and Weaver Place to serve Chain Bridge, at an estimated cost of \$900,000. I believe this estimate far too low for the size of the job. It is also obvious that it does not take into account (as there is no account taken in the case of Key Bridge) of the change in traffic patterns all over that part of the District of Columbia within two or three

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miles of Key and Chain Bridge that would result from the traffic flow engendered by a huge CIA complex at Langley.

(4) Impact on the Comprehensive Plan. This comprehensive plan was set up by the National and the Regional Capital Planning Commissions to provide for orderly development of the Nation's Capital and its environs. Putting CIA at Langley cuts directly across this Plan and flouts its basic concepts, as is plainly shown on page 2 of the National Capital Planning Commission's report of March 2, 1956, to which I fully invite your attention.

(5) Potential Park Land. The proposed site of CIA at Langley is on a tract of land now under the Bureau of Public Roads, which has indicated it does not need it. If there were no CIA at Langley this tract would almost certainly become park-land (for which it is ideally suited) in conjunction with the George Washington Memorial Highway; since it could be occupied as such under the Capper-Crampton Act. The tract is unique in being so near a big city yet possessing so many natural blessings. There are great stands of hardwoods, groves

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of flowering trees and bushes, abundant wild flowers and ferns many of them rare species, beautiful river views, and teeming bird and animal life. In conjunction with the George Washington Memorial Highway it could be made into a really fabulous park accessible to all the people. Yet it is proposed to shut it off for one Government agency and forever destroy much of its unspoiled character with huge building projects. This tragic deed would run counter to the aims of every conservation organization in the country and would be an official negation by the U. S. Government of every tenet of modern sociological thinking which stresses the need of increasing open spaces for increasing population.

(6) Other Locations for CIA. I shall not take up any more of your time other than to invite attention to the several other proposed locations for CIA, in the Northwest Section, in the new Southwest Redevelopment Area, in the vicinity of Alexandria, and in the vicinity of the National Training School for Boys; sites where most, if not all, of the deeply objectionable features of the Langley site do not exist. This matter of alternative sites has been covered in cogent detail by the recommendations submitted to CIA by the Federal City

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Council.

Mr. Chairman, I can sum up my regrettably long testimony in a few words:

This plan of CIA at Langley is indigestible and uncooked. Yet it has the most serious potential impact on the entire District of Columbia area. As hardheaded, but I believe public-spirited, citizens and taxpayers, we urgently request that you recommend that appropriations be held up until the present fuzzy picture is brought into a reasonable focus justifying the outpouring of billions of dollars for CIA at Langley.

Respectfully,

Neill Phillips

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C O P Y

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

July 26, 1955

The Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Defense Subcommittee
House Committee on Appropriations
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Under the provisions of the Military Construction Act of 1955 (P.L. 161), CIA is authorized to construct a headquarters installation at a cost of \$54,500,000. Of this sum not to exceed \$8,500,000 may be utilized for transfer to the National Capital Planning Commission and the Department of the Interior for the cost of extending the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the site of the Research Station of the Bureau of Public Roads at Langley, Fairfax County, Virginia, including acquisition of rights of way. The law provides that if CIA does not locate at the site at Langley, the \$8,500,000 shall not be available for obligation. The law also provides that not to exceed \$1,000,000 may be spent for the acquisition of a site.

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On 23 June, when I appeared before your Subcommittee in support of appropriations for this construction, the Military Construction Act had not yet passed the Congress. Until passed, the extension of the Parkway would not be assured and since this is essential to location at Langley, final determination on the site could not be made. The House Appropriations Committee therefore recommended the sum of \$3,000,000 for CIA to proceed with the preparation of detail plans and specifications, but postponed consideration of funds for a site. Subsequently, the sum recommended by the Appropriations Committee was stricken from the bill on the Floor of the House on a point of order.

When I later appeared before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in the Senate, P.L. 161 authorizing extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the Langley site had been enacted. I informed that Subcommittee that CIA strongly preferred locating its headquarters installation on the Government-owned tract at Langley, although, should the Committee deny funds for the Parkway extension, a tract at Alexandria would be acceptable. I pointed out to the Senate Sub-

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committee that failure to determine the site had been a major factor in the allowance by the House Appropriations Committee of funds for plans and specifications only. I further noted that such plans could not be properly prepared until a site was selected, and that to plan for Langley, we would require an additional \$4,000,000 for the first year's work on the Parkway extension to assure that the Parkway would be completed when our installation was ready for occupancy. Furthermore, I pointed out that it was my understanding that the House Committee preferred not to use unobligated balances for this construction project, and recommended that the Committee give us a direct appropriation of \$7,000,000. We have obtained the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for the use of direct appropriations, and a copy of the authorization from Mr. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, dated 21 July 1955, is attached for your information.

The Senate Appropriations Committee has now approved the sum of \$3,000,000 for the preparation of detail plans and specifications and \$4,000,000 for the extension of the Parkway, with a proviso that, if CIA

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does not locate at Langley, a sum of not to exceed \$350,000 shall be available for the acquisition of a site elsewhere.

It is my earnest hope that the House Appropriations Committee will accept the action of the Senate Appropriations Committee with one change. The best offer we now have for sufficient land in Alexandria is about \$500,000; hence \$350,000 appears inadequate and should be increased to \$500,000. This does not increase the total of \$7,000,000 requested since if site money is expended, the \$4,000,000 for the Parkway will not be required. While we consider the Langley site is the best available, we believe provision for an alternative is advisable to insure that the final choice is the best for our purposes, and that the construction of our permanent headquarters is completed at the earliest possible time.

I am attaching herewith a more detailed statement of our position in this matter so that you may be fully aware of the reasons for our preference for Langley and the steps that have been taken in connection with that site.

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Respectfully yours,

(Signed)

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Attachment

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C O P Y

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Washington 25, D. C.

July 21, 1955

My dear Mr. Dulles:

This is to inform you that the Bureau of the Budget has no objection to the Central Intelligence Agency requesting the Senate to grant a direct appropriation for the fiscal year 1956 for the initial cost of the development of a CIA headquarters installation and the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway as authorized by Title IV of the Act of July 15, 1955 (P.L. 161), provided that such request shall not exceed \$7 million.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Rowland Hughes

Director

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

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STATEMENT OF MR. ALLEN W. DULLES,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUEST FOR
AN APPROPRIATION TO CONSTRUCT A
HEADQUARTERS INSTALLATION FOR THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

After careful examination of more than thirty sites in or near the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia, the Central Intelligence Agency believes that Langley, Virginia, and Alexandria, Virginia, are the two areas which deserve most serious consideration.

CIA would strongly prefer to locate its new headquarters installation, authorized by P.L. 161, at the site of the Research Station of the Bureau of Public Roads at Langley, Virginia, within this 300-acre tract of Government-owned land. CIA would need 100 acres of this tract for its building site and access roads, for adequate parking space for its employees, and for security reasons.

A primary reason for CIA's preference for the Langley site is that of security. If CIA occupies this site, it will be surrounded on two sides by the remaining 200 acres of the tract, and on the third side by land owned by the National Park Service which

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extends to the Potomac River. Thus, we would be fully protected on three sides of the site. On the fourth side, the land is privately-owned, but lightly settled with one-family houses which would cause no problem. Thus, we are assured of maximum security for the installation. In addition, should it be necessary for the Central Intelligence Agency to expand because of war or national emergency, additional Government land is adjacent to the site at Langley for this purpose. On the other hand, if we are to locate in the Alexandria area and can obtain 100 acres of land, there is every reason to believe that the site would be immediately surrounded with apartments and small houses, as well as possible commercial developments. This would present greater security problems than are present at the Langley site and is a primary factor in our preference for Langley.

The Langley site compares favorably with other possible sites in terms of accessibility to the other Government agencies with which we must be in continual daily contact. From the standpoint of the morale of our personnel, the Langley site would be preferable as

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it would involve at most a very small relocation of the homes of our personnel.

It should be noted in connection with an Alexandria site, that on the basis of the present residences of CIA employees almost two-thirds of their number would have to travel through the District of Columbia at the height of the morning and evening rush hour, with a large concentration at the Memorial Bridge and the proposed new Constitution Avenue bridge, and moving in the same direction as the bulk of traffic as far as the Pentagon. On the other hand, if Langley is selected, this situation would be eased somewhat in view of the fact that 48% of CIA personnel live in the Northwest area of Washington and Montgomery County. They would use Key and Chain Bridges, and eventually the proposed new Cabin John Bridge, to the Langley site and would be travelling to and from work in the opposite direction from the flow of traffic.

CIA has consulted with the elected officials of Fairfax County with regard to the Langley property since November 1954. The Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County have, by formal resolution, extended

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an invitation to CIA to occupy this site. The Planning Commission of Fairfax County has formally expressed to the County Board of Supervisors the desirability of the CIA location at Langley, and their Chairman has stated that in this expression the Commission feels that they have correctly expressed the overwhelming majority sentiment of Fairfax County residents. Similar invitations have been expressed by the Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce representing more than 450 members without dissent, the McLean Business Association, and the Great Falls Grange No. 738 with a membership of 242.

Several citizens and Fairfax County officials testified before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate in favor of CIA's use of the Langley site and also presented a map showing that over 80% of the property owners in the immediate vicinity of the site favored its use by CIA. It should be noted that a small minority of local residents of the Langley area have protested against the location of CIA at the Langley site, and representatives of this group, as well as officials from Alexandria also testified before the Subcommittee.

The Central Intelligence Agency naturally under-

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stands the feelings of some of the residents of the Langley area who, rightly or wrongly, feel that the comparative seclusion of their community may be somewhat impaired by the Agency's location there. However, there seems to be no question but that, with the exception of this very small minority, Fairfax County wholeheartedly welcomes the CIA. The Agency feels that it is its primary duty, while taking into account the feelings of the residents, to attempt to select that site which will best facilitate the carrying out of its work in the public interest; and in view of the invitations and backing it has received from the people and officials of the area, CIA feels justified in expressing its preference for the Langley site.

In order for CIA to locate at Langley, it is necessary to improve the site's accessibility by the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway from its present terminus at Spout Run approximately 3-1/2 miles below Chain Bridge to the Langley site, a distance of approximately 7 miles. The authorization for this Parkway has been on the statute books for 25 years. The Capper-Crampton Act of May 29, 1930 (46 Stat.

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482), as amended, states:

"Such funds shall be appropriated as required for the expeditious, economical, and efficient development and completion of the following projects:

"(a) For the George Washington Memorial Parkway, to include the shores of the Potomac, and adjacent lands, from Mount Vernon to a point above the Great Falls on the Virginia side, except within the City of Alexandria,"

The General Counsel of the National Capital Planning Commission has given a formal opinion that the proposed extension is within the contemplation of this Act. It should also be noted that the National Capital Planning Commission has been acquiring rights of way for the Parkway extension from its present terminus at Spout Run to a point slightly above Chain Bridge irrespective of whether or not CIA might at some time locate at Langley. Funds have been included in the NCPD budget for this purpose. These funds may not, however, be sufficient to acquire all the rights of way to the Langley site, and for this reason the Congress, in the Military Construction Act of 1955, authorized CIA to transfer certain funds to the Commission for this purpose. Thus, it seems evident that

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the extension of this Parkway, which is a part of the master plan for the development of the metropolitan area, will be completed within the next few years in any event and CIA is merely speeding up this 7-mile extension to have it completed at the time of its occupancy of the Langley site.

The Office of the Commissioner of Highways (Virginia), in a letter dated 23 May 1955 to the County Executive of Fairfax County, stated that in view of the probability of a CIA installation near Langley they had allocated \$100,000 for the present fiscal year for the widening of Route 123 from Chain Bridge west, with a reasonable expectation for additional funds in the next fiscal year. On 9 June, the Highway Commissioner of Virginia wrote that the cost of widening Route 123 to a 4-lane highway from its intersection with the George Washington Memorial Parkway below the Langley site to its intersection with Route 193 above the site would be provided at their expense, and that this would be done concurrently with the development of the Parkway extension. On the same day, this matter was discussed with Governor Stanley of Virginia, and the meeting re-

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sulted in complete assurances of this concurrent improvement. While this may be an acceleration in the plans of the State of Virginia for the development of Highway 123, such plans were already in existence for future implementation and extend beyond the present commitments.

In its resolution of May 4, 1955, inviting the CIA to use the Langley site, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County assured the Agency "that the Fairfax County Government stands ready to cooperate fully in all matters under its own responsibilities." In its resolution of 18 May the Board authorized the forwarding of a letter to CIA stating "that the county can assure within two years from this date the availability of sewers for the facility contemplated on a basis of charges on rentals for such sewer service at figures which will not exceed the regular charges elsewhere in the county." We have further been informed that no part of the \$250,000-\$300,000 which this construction will cost will be borne by the Federal Government. Moreover, the cost of this additional link will not be a cost to the taxpayers. It is simply a financing pro-

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gram to provide a service and would be self-supporting by virtue of its revenue.

It should be noted that Fairfax County voted a \$20,000,000 integrated sewer system in 1953, and a \$2,000,000 unit of this system is presently being installed in the McLean-Langley area. Therefore, bringing of this link to the boundary of the CIA property is but a small part of the overall system in that area.

The City of Falls Church has assured CIA of its ability to supply water for the installation, and it does not require financial help from the Federal Government to make this possible. The City has funds available in the sum of approximately \$5,000 to extend the existing water main some 1,500 feet to serve the Langley site.

Somewhat similar assurances as to roads, sewers, and water supply have been received from Alexandria officials, who have invited CIA to locate within their city.

The cost of the building construction itself will not vary appreciably as between the Langley site or an Alexandria site. Insofar as the expenditure of Federal

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
funds is concerned, a site in Alexandria could presumably be acquired for something in the neighborhood of \$500,000, whereas the Langley site is on Government-owned land. If the Langley site is utilized, an expenditure of 8.5 million dollars for the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway will be involved. However, as noted above, this Parkway has long been authorized, and its completion is a part of the master plan for the development of the District of Columbia and its environs. The acceleration of the Parkway's extension will not change the eventual expenditure, and it will permit this Agency to occupy a preferred site with sufficient Government-owned acreage surrounding it to give better security protection than is presented by the alternative.

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Appendix I

**CIA Organizational Arrangement for the Development
of "Definitive" Plans for a Permanent Headquarters Building
4 October 1955**



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C O P Y

Appendix J

Feb 4, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Support

SUBJECT : Planning for the Proposed New Headquarters Building

REFERENCE : Paper dated 28 January 1957 on this subject

1. This is in regard to the paper which you gave to the Director and which was discussed at the Deputies Meeting on 28 January. It is regrettable that this paper was not considered by the Building Steering Committee prior to presentation to the Director, inasmuch as it is my understanding that the Steering Committee was established to obtain views on such major problems. Further, it would have been more useful had the Steering Committee been able to debate this matter before the Director was approached for a decision. Inasmuch as at some future date there may be inquiry into how certain decisions affecting the building were reached, I wish

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to go on record concerning certain matters in this paper.

2. First, the intent of Congress is well expressed in the conference report on the appropriations bill. I do not believe that it could be made more abundantly clear that the CIA building is intended to accommodate "all of its headquarters personnel." Further, I would construe the balance of this statement as precluding any return to Congress after construction has started to secure money for another wing or an additional building. In addition, one of our major selling points in securing the authorization and appropriation for the building was that it would save \$3,200,000 per annum. We already plan to reduce these savings by 50 per cent by leaving out certain elements. With the increase in cost of the building, and the necessity for leaving out even more elements if we stay at our present size or grow, it is obvious that these savings will be reduced further, even totally disappear. This, to my mind, makes it even more essential that we approach both the President and the Congress and explain to them exactly what must be done to house all of our headquarters per-

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sonnel. Reasonable individuals are not going to blame CIA for increases in building costs. Furthermore, I believe this agency can be severely criticized for compromising with present day circumstances to erect a building that will be unsatisfactory in the future. Not to face this issue today simply exposes the agency to severe attack when the realization dawns on the Congress and Washington that we built a building that couldn't house our headquarters personnel.

3. It is perfectly true as stated in this memorandum that to reraise this subject might expose us to the dangers of not getting the building at all at this time. However, assuming that this building is our permanent headquarters that will exist for decades, I do not feel that we should neglect any step that we can take in order to make the facts known to the White House and the Congress before we commence construction. In fact, I would go further and say that I consider it mandatory that whether we ask for more money or not, we advise the White House, the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress as to exactly how many persons in Washington will not be accommodated in the new headquarters building.

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4. Finally, I consider the quoted missives on the subject of keeping down capital expenditures not to be applicable in this regard. First, this building is to be a part of the permanent Washington landscape. Second, the savings inherent in its construction mean its amortization in 20 years. Third, the administration's desire to cut down on capital expenditures is related specifically to the present day economic situation, and by the time our contracts commence to affect either the money or materials market in 1958, the present economic situation may be drastically changed.

5. I therefore most strongly recommend that whether our approaches to the White House, Bureau of the Budget and the Congress are in the nature of requesting \$14,000,000 additionally or of advising them that we will have to leave 2,000 people out of the building, we must so advise and face the possibility of being ordered to reduce headquarters by that number, or delaying construction.

/S/ Lyman Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Distribution:

2 - Addressee
1 - I.G. Subject File
1 - I.G. Chrono

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~~SECRET~~Appendix KSites and Site Acquisition Data 1957-69

- A. Property: Basic CIA Tract
Area: 131.563 Acres
Acquisition Data: Transferred to Agency on
15 March 1957; Accepted
5 April 1957
From: Bureau of Public Roads
Costs: (1) Land - Transferred without reimbursement
(2) Buildings* - See below
- *Buildings: The Total cost of -- \$43,670,000.00
(a) Headquarters buildings
(b) Clearing and grading land
(c) All roadways and parking areas
(only first portion of west lot)
(d) All utilities such as water and
power on property
(e) Complete powerhouse, cafeteria,
and auditorium
(f) Security and property line fences
- B. Property: Viner Tract
Area: 13.8227 Acres
Acquisition Data: Property condemned and transferred
to the Agency on 12 June 1963
From: Viner
Costs: (1) Land - \$172,000.00
- C. Property: Rivercomb Tract
Area: 12.8279 Acres
Acquisition Data: Property condemned and trans-
ferred to the Agency on 12 June 1963
Costs: (1) Land - \$130,000.00
- D. Property: Travers Tract
Area: 11.2 Acres
Acquisition Data: GSA purchased land from Travers
on 11 August 1966
Cost: (1) Land - \$145,463.00

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- E. Property: Scattergood-Throne Tract
Area: 32 Acres
Acquisition Data: BPR purchased on 27 July 1947
- F. Property: West Parking
Area: 19.7 Acres
Acquisition Data: 30-day revocable use permit
from BPR
- G. Property: EAA Ballfields
Area: 29.5 Acres
Acquisition Data: 30-day revocable use permit
from BPR

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~~SECRET~~Appendix LProfessional Achievement Awards

1960 Engineers, Scientists, and Architects Day

25 February 1960

To the Outstanding Young Architect

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] Architect-Engineer, Central In-
telligence Agency

Cited for his outstanding contribution, at the age of 30, to the new headquarters building of the Central Intelligence Agency. He devised a scheme which has permitted the maximum number of necessary changes in plans during construction with a minimum of disruptions. These changes are the result of changes in organization, working relationships, and procedures during the construction time. His scheme will also greatly facilitate the move into the new building.

[redacted] has a degree of Bachelor of Architecture from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is a Registered Architect in the District of Columbia.

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~~SECRET~~Description of Achievement

1. One of the major problems in connection with the planning for a new headquarters building is created by the time lag between the date final working drawings are completed, and the date the building is ready for occupancy. During this period many changes occur in organization, personnel strength, operating procedures, and in the equipment and facilities required by the Agency for efficient operation. Such changes affect partition layouts, door locations, air conditioning, light, power, and other facilities.

2. In order that the maximum number of necessary changes might be effected prior to completion of construction, [] devised a means of templating (b)(6) Agency space layouts of the new building to serve (b)(3) CIAAct for working out building revisions resulting from changes in organization, working relationships, and procedures. His scheme also provides a means for determining location of telephone and power outlets, and when the building is complete will serve for planning and executing the move into the new building.

3. [] scheme was accomplished by (b)(6) using acetate sheets approximately two feet square (b)(3) CIAAct on each of which the outline of a section of the building was drawn at one-eighth scale. Fifteen such sheets provided the layout for an entire floor. A method of mounting these sheets on the wall of the plan room was devised so that each floor of the building could be viewed in its entirety. The building walls and fixed installations such as stairwells, toilets, pneumatic tube stations, columns, and main corridors were inked on the acetate sheets. Partitions within the building were shown in place by the use of three sizes of black tape, each size indicating a different type of partition. [] then devised an economical means of manufacturing furniture templates, drawn to scale, with an adhesive backing permitting them to be removed and reused. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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4. In actual use the acetate sheets are first completed so that the space layout is identical to that shown on the contract drawings. From information as to Agency requirements each space layout is templated to show the furniture and equipment the operating element requires in the new building. The acetate sheets are then reproduced by the ozalid process and copies furnished the prospective occupants. These layouts are reviewed and any required changes discussed with [] or other members of the Building Planning Staff. When changed conditions warrant revision of the space layout, such revisions are studied and analyzed by using the acetate sheets with the removable partitions (tape) and furniture templates. After the templated layouts have been completely reviewed and approved, additional prints are made and forwarded to Public Buildings Service and to the Contract Architect for use in the issuance of such contract change orders as may be necessary. Prints of the approved templated layouts are also being used to plan the telephone installation and electric outlets needed for each office. When the move to the new building is started these templated layouts will provide detailed information as to the placement of each piece of furniture and office equipment.

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET~~Appendix MHistory of the CIA Cornerstone Box

Following the symbolic placing of the Cornerstone Box at the laying of the CIA Cornerstone by the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, on 3 November 1959, the box was removed from its niche and taken into custody until such time as the Cornerstone was permanently emplaced. At that time, the Cornerstone Box contained only that material which was listed in the program of the Ceremony, minus the microfilm of the newspaper of 3 November, the tape recording of the Cornerstone Ceremony, and the photographs of that occasion.

Despite the Director's joking remark to the President (recorded on the tape) that the contents of the Box were "secret", there were no classified documents in the Cornerstone Box. Prior to the ceremony, careful consideration had been given to the documents which were to be included in the Box. After consultation with the Deputy Directors and the Inspector General, Mr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, the Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, had drawn up a list of proposed materials for inclusion in the Box, subject to the approval of Mr. Dulles. Included on the list were a considerable number of classified documents, largely in the field of National Estimates. It was finally determined not to include any classified material in the Cornerstone Box at the time of the Ceremony, and that the whole subject of classified contents should be held in abeyance until it could be determined what degree of control the Security Office would have over the new building when the box was finally put into the Cornerstone. Late in September 1960, the contractors advised that they were virtually at the point when they would desire to lay the Cornerstone permanently. At that time, the contents of the Cornerstone Box were reconsidered, and the DCI made a final determination that it should contain no classified material. At the request of the Office of the DDP, there was added to the contents of the Box those medals which are awarded for distinguished

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service in the field of intelligence, namely the National Security Medal, the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the Intelligence Star, and the Intelligence Medal of Merit; together with a description of these medals and the certificates which accompany them when awarded; and also a copy of the Certificate of Merit with Distinction and the Certificate of Merit. The complete list of the contents of the Cornerstone Box is appended as Tab A.

At this time, reconsideration was also given to the proper preservation of the contents of the Cornerstone Box and its ultimate sealing. There had been a general feeling that the copper box, furnished by the contractor, was not of the desired standard. It was rather too small for the contents, and its copper was not sufficiently thick to withstand the necessary welding of the top without seriously charring the papers enclosed. On the other hand, it had to be of the correct size to fit into the niche provided for it behind the Cornerstone slab. For these reasons, Mr. H. Gates Lloyd, Assistant Deputy Director/Support, made arrangements, through the CIA Technical Services Division, with the National Bureau of Standards to prepare a new copper box, whose sides are about an eighth of an inch thick. The box has been constructed from thirty pounds of copper. The magnetic tape recording of the Cornerstone Ceremony and the formal opening of the contractor's bids on the building has been placed in a steel box with a quarter inch steel plate on top and bottom, and a 1/8 inch steel plate on the sides. A description of the Cornerstone Box and its preparation, written by the Bureau of Standards, is attached herewith as Tab B.

On 20 October 1960, Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Pforzheimer, accompanied by two members of the Technical Services Division Staff, [redacted] went to the National Bureau of Standards and placed the material in the Cornerstone Box. The Box cover. (b)(6) was then welded into place by Bureau of Standards (b)(3) CIAAct

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employees. This process was under the supervision of George A. Ellinger, Chief of the Corrosion Section, Metallurgy Division, National Bureau of Standards, and Melvin Romanoff of his staff. Pictures of the ceremony were taken. The copper box was then buffed by Mr. Zieda, also a Bureau employee. Inscribed on the top of the Box is an instruction which reads as follows:

"Top
To Open:
Cut Carefully Near Top
Do Not Use Torch"

On 2 November 1960, Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director/Support, accompanied by Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Pforzheimer, inserted the Cornerstone Box into its niche, and the Cornerstone was then lowered into place. Many of the participants, which also included Mr. (b)(6) James A. Garrison, Director of Logistics, (b)(3) CIAAct Chief of the Building Planning Staff, and other members of their staff, as well as representatives of the architects and contractors, threw lucky pennies into the niche with the Box. Photographs (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct were taken.

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Curator/Historical Intelligence
Collection

Att:
Tabs "A" & "B"

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~~SECRET~~Tab AContents of Cornerstone Box

Copy of Memorandum for President Franklin D. Roosevelt from Major General William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, dated 18 November 1944, regarding the establishment of a permanent centralized intelligence service and copy of Memorandum from President Roosevelt to General Donovan, dated 5 April 1945, directing that General Donovan discuss his plan with the appropriate officials of the Government.

Copy of President Harry S. Truman's Executive Letter of 22 January 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group.

Statement of General (then Lieutenant General) Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, on 29 April 1947, in support of the sections of the proposed National Security Act of 1947 to establish the Central Intelligence Agency.

A Text and Explanation of Statutes and Executive Orders relating specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency, including Enabling and Appropriations Acts for the construction of the new CIA Building.

Reproduction of the CIA seal and its official description.

"William J. Donovan and the National Security." A speech by Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Erie County Bar Association, Buffalo, New York, 4 May 1959.

Aerial photographs of the area of the CIA Building site at the time of the Cornerstone Ceremony.

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Copy of the architect's drawing of the CIA Building as it will appear when completed.

Invitation to the ceremony, copy of the Program, tape recording of the proceedings, selected photographs of the ceremony, and copy of pamphlet entitled "The Cornerstone Ceremony," containing the speeches made on the occasion.

A microfilm of Washington and northern Virginia newspapers for 3 November 1959 (the date of the ceremony), and selected articles from subsequent issues (4-6 November) concerning the ceremony.

The National Security Medal and the four CIA Medals, the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the Intelligence Star, and the Intelligence Medal of Merit; together with a description of these medals and the certificates which accompany them when awarded; and also a copy of the Certificate of Merit with Distinction and the Certificate of Merit.

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~~SECRET~~Tab BMethod of Construction of Metal Boxes
Used to Contain These Articles

The steel box which contains the magnetic tape was constructed from AISI number 1020 steel. The plates for the sides, top, and bottom of the box and cover were cut to size and all edges ground. The seams in the box and cover were joined by the electric arc weld method.

The outer container was fabricated from copper plates which were joined by Heliarc welds (inert gas tungsten arc method).

The container was lined with asbestos paper (dried at 105°C for 48 hours), the contents inserted in the box and the lid was welded in place. During the operation of sealing the lid, the container was immersed in water up to one inch from the top in order to reduce the temperature inside the box.

Prior to sealing the copper box, the same operations were performed on a dummy box which contained similar articles. Before opening the box to examine

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the contents, it was totally immersed in water to check for leakage.

The box was made and sealed at the National Bureau of Standards.

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Appendix NInvitation to Cornerstone-Laying Ceremony

*The Director of Central Intelligence
requests the honor of your presence
at the ceremonies in which*

*The President of the United States
will lay the Cornerstone of the
Central Intelligence Agency Building
at eleven thirty o'clock on the morning of
Tuesday, November third, nineteen hundred fifty-nine
Langley, Virginia*

Card of admission enclosed

*R. A. P. 2430 E Street NW, Washington, D. C.
Executive J-6115, Extension 4096*

~~SECRET~~Appendix ODescription of the Headquarters BuildingFebruary 1962

1. The Site. The headquarters building is on a tract of land containing approximately 140 acres. It is part of a Government-owned tract formerly known as the Leiter Estate. The building site is irregularly shaped, vaguely reminiscent of the outline of the State of Texas, complete with a panhandle which provides access from Virginia State Route 123. The tract fronts on the George Washington Memorial Parkway which runs along the Potomac River from below Washington to interstate route 495. One of the access roads to the site is this four-lane divided highway in the Parkway which extends to the Cabin John Bridge on the Washington Circumferential Highway, Route 495. Access to the southern entrance of the building site is from State Route 123.

2. Site Layout. The building is placed approximately in the center of the main part of the site and faces generally east. The building, with the Cafeteria Auditorium and Power Plant, covers

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approximately 9 acres of the site. Two large parking lots are provided with a total capacity of 3,000 cars. The parking lots require about 21 acres. Roads on the site serving the building entrances, parking lots, power plant and other facilities total more than 2 miles. In several large areas of the site the natural growth has been left undisturbed except for clearing out brush and dead trees. The entire perimeter of the main part of the site is bounded by trees and very little of the building is visible from the public highways.

3. The Building. The headquarters building is constructed of reinforced concrete with the floor slabs supported by columns generally 20 feet apart center to center. It provides a total of approximately one million square feet of space for use by the Agency. Corridors and service areas require an additional 600,000 square feet. The Ground and First Floors constitute an oblong base with curved outer walls and corners enclosing three landscaped courts, two of which are 80 feet wide by 140 feet deep and a center court 260 feet wide by 140 feet deep. The

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greatest length of the building north to south is about 926 feet and the depth, excluding the cafeteria, 475 feet. Rising from this two-story base are five connected towers 90 feet wide and varying in length from 151 feet to 671 feet. These towers contain six floors (second through seventh).

Architectural features include a five-foot setback at the second floor and a ten-foot setback at the seventh floor. Continuous glass windows form the exterior walls of those two floors. The Ground Floor exterior has windows two feet by three feet set rather high above the floor level every five feet except at the entrances and several parts of the rear of the building. The remainder of the building (floors 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6) have windows approximately 3 feet wide by about 7 feet high, spaced five feet apart center to center. The windows on these five floors are set in precast concrete with a quartz aggregate finish. The quartz aggregate, while predominantly white, contains some color and serves to relieve what might otherwise be a rather drab concrete finish. There are two penthouses on the building approximately 32

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feet high, 55 feet wide and 282 feet long, housing elevator machinery, fan rooms for air conditioning and other mechanical and electrical equipment.

The entire building is air conditioned. In most areas, floors are covered with asphalt tile. Interior masonry walls are generally plastered and painted. The bulk of the partitioning is of the steel movable type, either full or part height. Part height partitioning is 68" high. Heights from the floor to the ceiling vary, depending upon the use to be made of the space. Ceilings are of acoustical tile suspended from the upper floor slab. The space between the ceiling and the slab above is used for air conditioning ducts, conduit, tube runs and other mechanical and electrical equipment. Lighting is by fluorescent fixtures generally flush mounted five feet apart. Telephone and electrical outlets are from floor cells so spaced as to provide ample coverage.

4. Building Facilities. The Auditorium is a reinforced concrete dome-shaped structure. The dome shape itself is an acoustical feature and acoustical

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quality of the Auditorium is further improved by the interior design. The Auditorium seats 500 people. It has a small stage with a disappearing screen for film projection. The Auditorium is connected to the building by an underground passage which also provides sheltered access to the building from the bus stop near the front of the building.

The Cafeteria seats about 1400 people at one time. It is divided into one main dining room, and one smaller dining room. Employees found an innovation in cafeteria service that was unique in the area. The new set-up is called by various names -- "super-market", "hollow square", and "open square", -- all attempting to describe a system that permits a patron to go directly to various places where the food he wants is displayed, without standing in a line. The new system is under the management of Government Services Incorporated. In addition there is a small table service dining room. Snack bars are located throughout the building, generally two to a floor. The executive dining rooms and kitchen are located on the seventh floor.

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Vertical transportation within the building is provided by an escalator serving the Ground and First Floors and four banks of four elevators each serving all floors. Since almost half of the space in the building is provided by the Ground and First Floors, the single escalator can handle a considerable share of the morning and evening traffic. Elevators are the high-speed automatic self-operated type. In addition to the 16-passenger elevators, there are two freight elevators serving all floors.

In the rear of the building two large loading docks are provided for incoming and outgoing mail, supplies, equipment, etc. One of these docks is used primarily to serve the Cafeteria and the Public Building Service.

The building contains modern paper carrying devices. One of these is an automatic Pneumatic Tube System. This system is designed primarily for the movement of small quantities of correspondence type papers and is used where expeditious handling is essential. There are approximately 150 stations from any one of which material can be dispatched to

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or received from any other station. In addition to the Pneumatic Tube System, there is a tray conveyor system serving two stations on each floor and from these stations distribution can be made by courier to the surrounding areas. The tray conveyor system can handle bulky material such as magazines, books, newspapers, folders and even office supplies. Each tray can carry a 30-pound load. The system has a capacity for picking up 8 trays per minute.

Classified trash is destroyed by burning at two points in the basement of the building. Employees may deposit bagged classified trash in incinerator chutes at any of four points on each floor.

Clocks controlled by a master clock are installed throughout the building, although not necessarily in every room. Alarm systems throughout the building are wired to a central control room.

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- Figure 1 Aerial view, original Headquarters area, 2430 E Street NW, Washington, D. C. Building with light roof was Central Building; smaller building on courtyard was East Building; and the third building was the Administration Building (formerly the South Building).
- Figure 2 Central Building, 2430 E Street NW.
- Figure 3 East Building, 2430 E Street NW.
- Figure 4 Administration Building, 2430 E Street NW.
- Figure 5 Alcott and Barton Halls (scientific and technical intelligence centers).
- Figure 6 Building 13 (Security's "black box" building).
- Figure 7 Building 14 (Graphics Register).
- Figure 8 Tempos I, J, K, and L ("Spook" quarters).
- Figure 9 1016 16th Street NW (Office of Personnel and Office of Training facilities. Also overt employment office for Agency as listed in telephone directory).
- Figure 10 Site and block model, Campus Scheme, 1956.
- Figure 11 Cornerstone ceremony, Headquarters Building, November 3, 1959.
- Figure 12 Cornerstone, Headquarters' Building
- Figure 13 Building under construction, 1959-60.

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- Figure 14 Aerial view, Main entrance. Auditorium under construction (Summer 1962).
- Figure 15 Aerial view, Main and North entrances, auditorium under construction (Summer 1962).
- Figure 16 Aerial view, Main entrance (Spring 1963).
- Figure 17 Aerial view, North end (Spring 1963).
- Figure 18 Aerial view, road system and Headquarters area. (GW Parkway access at top of photo. Printing Services Building and part of Steam Plant visible center and lower left.)
- Figure 19 Aerial view, access road from Route 123.
- Figure 20 Aerial view, cafeteria entrances (Summer 1963).
- Figure 21 Auditorium, main entrance (Summer 1963).
- Figure 22 Auditorium, side view.
- Figure 23 Auditorium, close up of dome paneling and junction of auditorium lobby with amphitheater.
- Figure 24 Auditorium, lobby entrance.
- Figure 25 Auditorium, construction detail, lobby entrance.
- Figure 26 Mr. Dulles's "campus." (SE corner of building in foreground.)
- Figure 27 Main entrance, construction detail.
- Figure 28 Canopy, main entrance, construction detail.
- Figure 29 Cafeteria, arches and windows.
- Figure 30 Cafeteria, windows and arches.

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
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- Figure 31 Cafeteria, arches and reflections. (Note construction detail of arches.)
- Figure 32 South Cafeteria, arches over entrance.
- Figure 33 North Cafeteria, interior detail.
- Figure 34 Cafeteria, side view.
- Figure 35 Courtyard, Headquarters Building.
- Figure 36 Lobby and CIA Seal, main entrance.
- Figure 37 Lobby, main entrance.
- Figure 38 Corridor on courtyard, first floor.
- Figure 39 Leased property: (1) Chamber of Commerce Building and (2) 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia. (During its years as the home of OTR, 1000 Glebe was known as "Blue U.")
- Figure 40 Leased property: (1) Key Building and (2) Ames Building, Rosslyn (Arlington), Virginia.
- Figure 41 "Assigned" property, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), Building 213, Washington Naval Yard.

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Figure 1
Aerial view, original Headquarters
Area.



84 **MAP 2** Approved for Release: 2017/12/28 C02526284
EXISTING & PROPOSED ROADWAYS






Figure 2
Central Building, 2430 E Street
NW.

Figure 3
East Building, 2430 E Street NW.





Figure 4
Administration Building, 2430 E
Street NW.



Figure 5
Alcott and Barton Halls



Figure 6
Building 13 (Security's "black
box" building).

Figure 7
Building 14 (Graphics Register).





Figure 8
Tempo I, J, K, and L ("Spook"
quarters).

Figure 9
1016 16th Street NW.





Figure 10
Site and block model, Campus
Scheme, 1956



Figure 11
Cornerstone ceremony, Headquarters
Building, 3 November 1959.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DWIGHT D EISENHOWER

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALLEN W DULLES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL CHARLES P CABELL

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

LAWRENCE K WHITE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SUPPORT

HARBIN S CHANDLER JR

CHIEF BUILDING PLANNING STAFF

FRANKLIN FLOETE

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR

F MORAN Mc CONIHE

COMMISSIONER PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE

ARCHITECTS

WALLACE K HARRISON MAX ABRAMOVITZ

ASSOCIATE ARCHITECT

FREDERIC R KING

CHAS H TOMPKINS CO - J A JONES CONSTRUCTION CO
BUILDERS

1 9 5 9

Figure 12
Cornerstone, Headquarters Building






Figure 14
Aerial view, Main entrance.
(Summer 1962).




Figure 15
Aerial view, Main and North
entrances. (Summer 1962).




Figure 16
Aerial view, Main entrance
(Spring 1963).




Figure 17
Aerial view, North end (Spring
1963).




Figure 18
Aerial view, road system and Headquarters area.



Figure 19
Aerial view, access road from
Route 123.

Figure 20
Aerial view, cafeteria entrance
(Summer 1963).





Figure 21
Auditorium, main entrance (Summer
1963).




Figure 22
Auditorium, side view.